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The greater part of the post war period has 
been characterised in intellectual life by a 
suspicion of questions of reference, and a 
flight from the links between discourse and 
history – procedures of avoidance that seem 
also to be symptomatic of submerged 
traumatic histories, of which the Holocaust is 
one.  
(Rothberg, 2000: 15)
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Abstract:
This study is grounded in my concerns, as a HE lecturer in Dementia Studies, about 
the difficulties practitioner-students face in writing reflectively about their work with 
people who have dementia.  I introduced a short fiction film, Ex Memoria, into the 
curriculum, initially as a means of ascertaining whether the use of an arts-based 
approach would facilitate greater reflection among students more familiar with 
biomedical perspectives on dementia. The film attempts to convey the experiences of 
a woman with dementia, a Polish-Jewish refugee from wartime Poland, now living in 
a London care home.  Twenty two students completed either coursework assignments 
or reviews based on the film.  The findings suggest that the psychosocial perspective 
which underpins the Dementia Studies programme, and has been widely promoted as 
a corrective to the biomedical ‘standard paradigm’ (Kitwood, 1997), itself contributes 
to the ahistorical and depoliticized positioning of people with dementia, their families, 
and professional caregivers.  In conclusion I argue that the psychologisation of 
dementia has contributed to its academic marginalisation. A broader, more 
transdisciplinary approach is required; one which sets dementia in the context of 20th 
century history, and thus avoids the social amnesia (Jacoby, 1996) currently affecting 
dementia studies.  
Keywords:  Higher Education; dementia studies; film; history; narrative
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Introduction:  History is what hurts….
When the government…no…the people, ordered it…all the flies and 
fleas came out of the box we opened…I grew up in all that dust…all 
the birds…the bees…the humming bees…all the people wishing.  My 
father was nervous…he didn’t know what would become of it…who 
could he trust apart from his children…he heard the people whispering, 
whispering, whispering… 
              (extract from the narrative biography of a woman diagnosed 
              with dementia: Catherine. Brown and Clegg eds, 2007: 147)
History is what hurts. It is what refuses desire and sets inexorable  
limits to individual as well as collective praxis.  
                                
                                                                              (Jameson, 1981: 102)
Background
Between December 2004 and September 2005 I was a member of a small advisory 
group involved in developing the script of a short (15 minute) fiction film entitled Ex 
Memoria.  The film attempts to convey something of the lived experience of Eva, a 
woman in her late seventies and former Jewish refugee from wartime Poland, who 
now has dementia and is living in a London care home.  The intention was to bring 
the viewer face to face with someone from whom it is easier to look away, whose 
history it is easier not to know.  This thesis provides a detailed study of the film’s 
development, its subsequent introduction into the curriculum of the BSc (Hons) in 
Dementia Studies, for which I was then course leader, and the responses and reactions 
to the film of practitioners in the field of dementia care who were part-time distance 
learners on the BSc programme.
My thesis also charts the difficulties of bringing to the forefront of research a 
subversive voice which is at odds with both the traditions of the field of study 
(dementia care), and with the founding ethos of my immediate work environment.  At 
the beginning of the study I was aware that I would be arguing against the former, 
which is still heavily dominated by the biomedical ‘disease model’ of dementia.   It 
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took much longer to realise (or to begin to articulate with any consistency) that the 
psychosocial model which has underpinned my own teaching for the past 12 years 
might, rather than offering a kind of ‘gestalt shift’ corrective to the biomedical model, 
also be part of the problem.  
In the process of this study I have attempted to follow the advice of Stronach and 
MacLure (1997: 6) on ‘opening up to interrogation …the institutional discourses that 
define the limits of the speaking subject’, both my own and those of the students I 
teach.  My critique of both the dominant biomedical discourse on dementia and its 
‘successor science’ alternative, aims to reveal something of their political and 
historical unconscious (Jameson 1981; Marcherey 1978). I will argue here that what is 
missing from the current understanding of dementia is a historical dimension of 
awareness, and that this broadens the field for discussion, problematizes established 
orthodoxies, and suggests new interdisciplinary (or transdisciplinary) links for 
teaching, learning and research.  If the field of dementia studies would be enriched by 
a greater interest in social history and critical theory among educators and researchers, 
then it is also the case that social and critical theory would benefit from a deeper 
engagement with the nature and experience of dementia.
The Ex Memoria project
The existing draft script of Ex Memoria had been written by a film writer/director, 
Josh Appignanesi, who based the story on his experiences of visiting his grandmother 
who had dementia, during the final years of her life in a care home.  In order to get 
funding to make the film he and the producer, Mia Bays, had put forward a proposal 
to The Wellcome Trust through its Sciart funding stream.  Sciart projects (now 
replaced by Wellcome Trust Arts Awards) were intended to involve artists and 
scientists working collaboratively to explore a scientific subject area using the arts. 
‘These projects aimed to stimulate fresh thinking and debate in both disciplines and to 
reach and engage with diverse audiences on the social, ethical and cultural issues that 
surround contemporary biomedical science’ (The Wellcome Trust 2007).
Two of my colleagues who were fellow members of Bradford Dementia Group and 
lecturers in the Division of Dementia Studies at Bradford University had already been 
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involved at the proposal stage, acting as academic advisors on the scientific side of 
the project.  I became involved myself at the point where the funding was awarded, 
and it was agreed that I would have the dual role of formal evaluator for the end of 
project report required by Wellcome Trust, and as an independent researcher carrying 
out work for my Doctorate in Education (EdD).
Although Wellcome Trust accepted the workgroup readily enough as an arts-science 
interface there were - in reality - no members of the workgroup who considered 
themselves biomedical scientists.  Bradford Dementia Group, following the work of 
its late founder Tom Kitwood, has always had a reputation for being deeply critical of 
the biomedical model of dementia, and has been closely associated with the 
development of an alternative psychosocial, humanistic approach.  The arts-science 
interface was thus perceived by the workgroup members to lie less within the 
workgroup itself than between the workgroup and a practice field, in which 
biomedical ‘neuropathic ideology’ (Kitwood, 1997a) is still the dominant discourse.  
The role of the University-based workgroup members was, then, to contribute to the 
development of the script by showing how psychosocial factors (quality of care, 
social interaction, physical environment) can exacerbate the cognitive problems faced 
by people with dementia.  The main focus of our input was in fine-tuning dialogue 
and interactions between characters in the existing draft script.  This was intended to 
ensure that the representation of the speech and actions of people with dementia, and 
the interactions shown between people with dementia and caregivers, would be 
accepted as authentic by a practice audience.  Among other developments, this 
included the introduction of a number of examples of ‘personal detraction’ drawn 
from Kitwood’s theory of malignant social psychology (1997a), a keystone of what he 
termed the ‘new culture of dementia care’ (Kitwood, 1995).
Kitwood’s ‘new culture of dementia care’
Kitwood’s alternative way of framing dementia, in which personal and social factors 
are recognised to play a part in the process of the condition, has been widely accepted 
as a significant move forward in the field of dementia care practice.  Against the 
biomedical model, which he described as a ‘problematic inheritance’, Kitwood argued 
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that much of the ‘problem behaviour’ and apparent symptom progression in dementia 
can be attributed to insults to ‘personhood’, a status which he believed to be either 
bestowed on, or withheld from, people with dementia in the context of interpersonal 
relationships.  He reconceptualised problem behaviour as needs-related ill-being 
arising from insensitive treatment and social exclusion on the part of others, rather 
than solely from progressive, localised brain pathology.  In particular, he identified 17 
types of ‘personal detraction’ (Kitwood, 1997a: 46-47) which – when observed 
frequently in formal dementia care settings - could be taken to indicate the presence of 
what he described as a ‘Malignant Social Psychology’.  This typology of personal 
detractions has become widely known and used in dementia care practice.  
One of my main arguments arising from the data on which this study is based, and 
other recent work, is that an unfortunate side-effect of Kitwood’s psycho-social model 
has been to encourage an ahistoric view of those with dementia in which the social 
and material reality of the events they have lived through is downplayed, whilst their 
status as citizens with rights remains unrecognised (cf Bartlett and O’Connor 2007). 
Although Kitwood’s work marked a significant move away from biomedical 
orthodoxy, his ‘new culture of dementia care’ is based on bodies of psychological or 
micro-sociological theory (predominantly humanistic, ethogenic and symbolic 
interactionist) which tend to psychologise dementia at the expense of more broad-
ranging historical, socio-economic and political perspectives.  Ostensibly he urges us 
to see each person with dementia as unique, but this is, in fact, to restore (or ‘bestow’, 
in Kitwood’s own terms) a consolatory uniqueness within the already homogenised 
community of those diagnosed with dementia.  The historical particularity of 
experience shared by those generations of people who now have such a diagnosis, has 
already been stripped away.  
The vast majority of people who have dementia in the advanced industrial countries 
of the world are now in their 80s and 90s and came of age during a world war which 
was perhaps the most cataclysmic event in human history.  This is something that has 
been widely overlooked in studies of the emotional and behavioural manifestations of 
dementia. In chapter 1 of this thesis I discuss in detail Kitwood’s critique of the 
standard paradigm, and begin to develop my own argument about the limitations of 
the psychosocial model he offered as an alternative.  
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Using arts-based approaches in health and social care education
I was keen to be involved in the Ex Memoria project for a number of reasons, 
primarily because of the film’s potential to be used educationally.  Our current 
distance learning materials were largely print-based with some on-line support, and I 
wanted to base my thesis on a more innovative, arts-based approach to teaching and 
learning.  The initial training of the nurses and other health and social care 
practitioners who make up our student group has been dominated by the biomedical 
model of dementia and this often shows in the language that they use to describe their 
work with people who have dementia.  Often it seems as though this language is used 
as a kind of distancing technique that limits what practitioners are able to observe in 
their own area of practice, and thus their ability to interpret what might be happening.
During the initial taught, two-year stage of the EdD course, I had done some 
preliminary work on the development of reflective and creative writing with students 
on the Dementia Studies programme, and although this seemed to be welcomed by the 
participants, I was concerned that it merely burdened them with  more written 
material to grasp.  The amount of reading required for the course is a frequent 
problem mentioned by students.  Visual material which presented a different 
perspective on the person with dementia seemed a valuable alternative to didactic 
printed material; one which I hoped would be more likely to lead to deep learning.
Although many of the most thought-provoking insights into the experience of 
dementia can be found in novels, films, poetry and biography, neither biomedical nor 
psychosocial models of dementia have drawn significantly on the arts in teaching, 
research or public information.  In the education of health and social care 
professionals generally there is, however, increasing interest in the use of arts-based 
approaches.  Smith et al (2006) suggest the following as some of the advantages of 
arts-based approaches: developing awareness of the complexity of human experience; 
promoting sensitivity towards difference; encouraging a more complex appreciation 
of meanings of illness; making richer connections between personal experience and 
professional knowledge; and the development of expressive and observational skills. 
In dementia studies, in addition, there is a need to develop skills in interpreting the 
11
words and actions of people with dementia.  Here there is considerable potential for 
certain kinds of artistic technique, such as those used in surrealist or experimental art, 
to offer insights into the experience of dementia.
There is some evidence to suggest that using arts-based approaches is beneficial in 
health and social care education (Staricoff, 2004), and whilst there are fewer sources 
making reference to film specifically, studies involving the use of film in education of 
teachers (Bousted and Ozturk, 2004) and social workers (Downey et al, 2003) indicate 
that there are benefits to using this approach as an adjunct to more formal teaching 
methods.  Bowles (2002) suggests that in our audio-visually saturated culture, film 
should also be viewed as an important means of teaching about historical events. 
Blum (1999: 1) suggests that film can play an important role in ‘providing salient 
cultural imagery of inter-racial co-operation and antiracist activity’, an important 
consideration in the context of dementia care where both service users and care 
workers come from increasingly diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. 
In the context of this study, the need to develop practitioners’ awareness of the social, 
historical and cultural events which have shaped the life experience of their clients 
has emerged as a particularly strong theme.  A detailed discussion of the rationale for 
introducing the arts into dementia care education is provided in Chapter 2, but I have 
also suggested here that there is a need for some scepticism in assuming that arts-
based approaches per se are preferable to more traditional teaching methods.  This 
argument is developed further in Chapter 3 which explores some of the ways in which 
mainstream film reproduces orthodox (but inaccurate) views of the nature of memory 
loss and dementia.  Here I also discuss the more authentic representation, in Ex 
Memoria, of dementia as a condition in which long term memory becomes 
increasingly insistent; hence the film’s sub-title ‘Some memories fade…others keep 
returning’.
Ex Memoria: narrative and style
A number of studies recommend the use of film in health and social care education 
(eg Stuart et al, 2004).  As with mental health problems in general, however, existing 
filmic representations of people with dementia often perpetuate negative stereotypes 
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(Helsby 2006).  This makes their use for educational purposes open to 
misinterpretation, particularly in the context of distance learning.  The Ex Memoria 
project seemed to offer an opportunity to develop a film that would be tailored to our 
own teaching purposes, and would therefore avoid such stereotypes.  I was, moreover, 
interested to know how practitioner-students on the Dementia Studies programme 
would respond to a film that used the experimental techniques and imagery outlined 
in the proposal to the Wellcome Trust; for example, ‘the camera stays locked on the 
woman’s face as she is wheeled around in her chair.  It immerses us in her fragmented 
reality, her bubble of experience, her lack of control of her environment’. The script 
also raised issues such as sexuality, trauma, and cultural diversity that are often swept 
under the carpet in standard sources on dementia care practice.  Whilst allowing space 
for multiple interpretations, it is strongly implied that Eva and her captured brother, 
are targets of the Shoah1, and that Eva herself has adopted a non-Jewish identity and 
used sexual manipulation in order to survive. Although fictionalised to a considerable 
extent, Ex Memoria also has at its heart a real life ‘missing person’ conundrum, and a 
personal memoir of emotional depth and complexity (Appignanesi L 2000).
In the film we first see the central character, Eva, walking in a wood as a teenager. 
By means of off-screen sound effects, including gunfire and German voices, we are 
made aware that her male companion has been captured and taken away.  The 
remainder of the film takes place in the present day care home where Eva is now 
living.  Events unfold on two levels.  First, there are indications that all is not well for
Eva in the ‘here and now’.  She is isolated and ill-at-ease in the nursing home.  
Relationships with her visiting relatives are shown as strained and perfunctory, 
although with moments of ‘near-meeting’.  The care home staff, although not 
intentionally unkind, are dismissive and task-orientated, with the exception of one 
male caregiver, who – near the end of the film – manages briefly to engage with Eva. 
_____________________________________________________________________
1 Although Holocaust is a generally accepted translation of the Hebrew sho’ah meaning destruction or 
annihilation, the terms are not interchangeable.  The term Shoah is used to refer specifically to the Nazi 
programme to exterminate European Jewry. Holocaust is a broader term which incorporates the events 
leading up to the Final Solution and the many non-Jewish victims who were imprisoned and perished. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 7, there are important distinctions to be made here when considering 
the potential scale of post traumatic stress amongst those who now have a diagnosis of dementia. 
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On the second and deeper level, there are numerous pointers within the film that 
Eva’s experience of dementia is being exacerbated by aspects of the care home 
environment and interactions with the other characters that remind her of her wartime 
experience.  It can be deduced (although some work is needed here), that the male 
companion captured in the first scene was Eva’s brother, Adek.  In her dementia, Eva 
is still waiting for Adek’s return and she mistakes her visiting grandsons for him. We 
also learn that Eva ‘avoided the Warsaw ghetto somehow’. In the final scene, some 
insight is offered into the strategies Eva may have had to adopt in order to survive in 
war-torn Poland.
Much of the story in Ex Memoria unfolds, then, as implied rather than explicit 
narrative. In addition a range of film-making techniques are used with the intention of 
unsettling taken for granted perspectives.  Long tracking shots are used to focus the 
viewer’s attention on Eva.  Events appear to be played out in almost real time, but at 
times the cutting and editing process interferes with our own orientation. Other 
characters and sets are seen off-centre and slightly out of focus behind Eva.  Because 
she is in a wheelchair, keeping the camera at her eye level means that other characters 
are also often seen only from the chest down, and loom in and out of view.  These are 
all forms of estrangement - verfremdungseffekt as Brecht (1964) described it - which 
have the potential to unsettle viewers by showing a familiar situation from an unusual 
angle. 
Viewers’ reactions and responses to Ex Memoria
In due course the film was shot and produced on DVD.  Initially it was difficult not to 
see this as the end of a process; the transformation of the script into a ‘frozen’ 
packaged product.  Over time, however, I became aware that – as with the distinction 
Barthes (1977) makes between work and text – the object which was the material 
outcome of the development process (the DVD and supporting booklet in its case) 
existed separately from the ongoing process, the ‘methodological field’ which was the 
film’s reception, discussion and ‘re-writing’ by those who viewed it.  
Through early focus group and conference showings it seemed that viewers reacted 
differently to film than they would to the same incidents witnessed in everyday life. 
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For example, there is a very brief scene in Ex Memoria in which we see Eva being 
manhandled onto the toilet by two care workers.  They are both wearing disposable 
aprons and gloves, and Eva appears to be under the impression that she is being 
sexually propositioned, and perhaps about to be subjected to a sexual assault.  The 
position of the camera outside the bathroom door forces us to adopt the viewpoint of a 
voyeur, witness to a scene that ought to be, but already is not, private.  As a result 
Eva’s privacy is invaded not just by the staff, but by the camera itself.   This was the 
comment of one care home manager on this scene, transcribed from an audio-
recorded focus group discussion
Seeing that…in the film…it just made me cringe.  It’s very hard to watch…
because it makes you think ‘What must she be feeling?  What does she think is 
happening to her?’  But the worst thing for me is that I know I could walk past 
on the corridor in my own [care] home while that was going on, and I’d be – 
you know – going somewhere, some other agenda, twenty other things on my 
mind, and just think ‘Oh, she’s playing up today’.  I’d be more likely to feel 
sorry for the staff if anything.  And that’s hard to admit….that it’s different 
because you see it in a film.
Film’s potential for bringing to conscious awareness things which are otherwise 
obscured by familiarity, has been noted since early in its history.  Lebeau (2001: 4) 
quotes psychoanalyst Hanns Sachs, who observed in the 1930s that ‘Film seems to be 
a new way of driving mankind to conscious recognition…it shows us clearly and 
unmistakeably things that are to be found in life but that regularly escape our notice’. 
The ‘discipline of noticing’ (Mason, 2002) came to seem particularly apposite in 
exploring the ways people respond to Ex Memoria as, later, did Benjamin’s concept 
of profane illumination (Benjamin 1929; Cohen, 1993) and Segal’s work on ‘rupture’ 
(1999).  
Profane illumination, as described by Benjamin, is a sensory, non-cognitive, 
apperception similar to Monaco’s (2000) concept of ‘visceral understanding’. 
Rupture is a term used by Segal in the context of the encounter with a stranger, within 
which the taken for granted rules of the familiar world no longer apply.  According to 
Segal, the familiar – that part of our lives which is so mundane that we have ceased to 
notice it – is ruptured by this encounter. Ironically in this view, it is only when the 
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normal ‘rules of engagement’ are revealed as useless, that we become aware of them. 
As Newman (2006: 215) writes of Augusto Boal’s ‘theatre of the oppressed’, for 
example, ‘When effectively done, it confronts people with unsatisfactory or 
unresolved versions of their world.  In the short term, it can change them from passive 
onlookers to people literally involved in the scene being acted out.  It can stimulate 
passionate debate’.  Mezirow (1991) similarly draws attention to the links between 
‘disorientating dilemmas’ and perspective transformation.  
In Ex Memoria, Eva ostensibly inhabits a world that is familiar to dementia care 
practitioners, but one that is ‘made strange’ by the use of film technique and the 
revelation of her equivocal character and past.  The encounter with Eva may thus be 
experienced as rupture by some viewers, and at some points in the film.  In Chapter 4 
this theoretical material is discussed in relation to the introduction of Ex Memoria into 
the BSc (Hons) Dementia Studies programme.
Introducing Ex Memoria into the Dementia Studies curriculum
The film was introduced into the BSc programme as part of a core second year 
module The Social Psychology of Dementia Care.  The students’ final assignment for 
the module was a critical incident analysis which had, in previous years, been based 
on an incident drawn from each student’s own practice experience.  I led this module 
for several years, and had recurrent concerns about the difficulties students 
experienced in selecting and writing about incidents for analysis. My initial hope was 
that using the film would enable students to make more detailed and nuanced 
observations.  Although I intended from the outset to use their assignments as data, at 
this point I was interested in doing so mainly in order to discover how well the film 
‘worked’ as an educational resource.  The study was thus initially conceived as an 
intervention in practice intended to bring about ‘improvement’ in students’ work.
It was a considerable time after the delivery and assessment of the module before I 
was able to start an in-depth analysis of students’ assignments, and when I did so I 
found, interestingly, that they pointed in quite a different direction.   Although I had 
not intended to use a Glaserian grounded theory approach in which ‘everything is 
data’ (Glaser, 1998) this is, in effect, what happened and it has led to an almost 
complete reversal of what I believed for a long time that the project was about.  This 
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has, however, taken me in the direction of bodies of literature that I had not even 
considered at the outset, and led to a far richer and more invigorating research 
process.  It has also alerted me to the methodological challenges of presenting an 
argument which is reflexively aware of its own construction as an account of a non-
linear process. I have thus attempted to synthesize theory, empirical data and my own 
reflections throughout the study rather than presenting a more standard-format thesis, 
subjected to post hoc narrative smoothing (Sarbin, 1986)
First – unremarkably enough - I found that scenes of particular intensity, complexity 
and – in some cases – ambiguity were foregrounded by viewers (Hakemulder 2007). 
Unlike the previous assignments for this module based on self-selected incidents, 
these assignments are almost totally lacking in references to biomedical categories of 
thinking. On the other hand, there was a consistent tendency for participants to read 
the actions and interventions of Eva’s family more negatively than the film itself 
seemed to warrant, whilst at the same time Eva’s own character and intentions were 
‘airbrushed’ considerably.  It seemed that the imputation either of dislikeable 
characteristics, or of active agency, to Eva as an older woman, were out of the 
question for most participants, regardless of the film’s content.  This was in marked 
distinction to personal traits that viewers had been prepared to attribute to the young 
Eva. 
Finally, the tendency to demonise Eva’s family and the care staff increased in 
accounts where viewers had made little mention of the traumatic nature of Eva’s 
experiences in earlier life.  Where participants had understood the implicit message 
that Eva’s current experience in the home is disturbing because it provides constant 
reminders of traumatic wartime experiences, they were less likely to attribute 
disproportionate blame to interpersonal relationships in the present day context.  In 
addition, there was a significant tendency to overidentify and exaggerate examples of 
personal detraction (Kitwood 1997a), and to make little reference to lines of dialogue 
spoken by Eva herself as a way of interpreting the action.  
There may be a number of factors at work here, either separately or in combination.
Participants may, for example, have lacked confidence in their background knowledge 
of historical events in wartime Europe.  The immersive film-making technique may 
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have brought about such an increase in empathy for Eva that the viewers’ heightened 
sensitivities led them to be more aware of how even minor slights would be perceived 
by her. The film is deliberately ambiguous about what happens to Adek in the first 
scene, and also about what subsequently happened to Eva.  Some participants were 
more forthcoming than others in making interpretations or offering possible scenarios 
using the clues which are provided.  Finally, the Dementia Studies course material 
offers a predominantly psycho-social framework for understanding the experience of 
dementia.  It might, then, be argued that viewers have read the film through a 
particular lens, that of the person-centred approach to dementia care.
Whichever explanation, or combination of explanations, applies they all point back to 
emphases or aporia2 in the Dementia Studies curriculum, and thence to 
corresponding emphases or aporia in the philosophy that underpins the course.  What 
this, in turn, suggests is that adding a psycho-social discourse to the dominant 
biomedical discourse in order to arrive at what is now often described as a ‘bio-
psychosocial’ model of dementia is not in itself sufficient.  Such a model also needs to 
take account of the material, historical, social and economic conditions within which 
people who now have dementia have lived their lives. 
In addition to the student assignments mentioned above, a further 10 students 
completed reviews of the artistic technique and imagery used in Ex Memoria.  The
findings from these reviews appear to demonstrate that when viewers’ attention was 
directed towards particular images or film-making techniques they were more likely 
to make links between the historical aspects of the film and events in the present day.
Academic colleagues and workgroup members completed interviews and a filmed 
focus group on their reactions to Ex Memoria.  I have, however, referred to these 
additional sources of data only where necessary, in order to support or illustrate a 
__________________________________________________________________
2  Meaning, literally ‘pathless’ (Gr), the term aporia is used here to signify an ‘impasse of meaning’ – a 
point where a text’s conscious project is undermined by its  internal inconsistencies.  In Lacanian 
theory aporia is associated with the real, with that which resists symbolisation, and perhaps, I would 
argue (as in Orwell’s 1984) with that which a particular belief system does not permit one to think. 
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particular point arising from the primary body of data from student assignments. 
Findings from the primary data are presented and analysed in Chapters 5 and 6.
Conformist psychology, social amnesia and the ghettoization of dementia
Based on the findings of this study, the main argument of my thesis is that whilst 
Kitwood’s work has been an important corrective to the biomedical model it is not in 
itself sufficiently interdisciplinary to offer the basis for an alternative paradigm or 
‘new culture’ of dementia care.  It has tended to psychologise dementia at the expense 
of more broad-ranging historical, socio-economic and political perspectives.
From an educational point of view it also has the disadvantage of appearing to shift 
the attribution of blame from the person diagnosed with dementia to providers of 
direct ‘hands-on’ care who are, themselves, often marginalised and disadvantaged 
members of society.  Moreover, the person with dementia is presented as too 
passively dependent on the quality of care that is currently provided, and therefore 
rendered one-dimensional, without culture, social class, sexuality or gender identity.  
The dominance of conformist psychology (Jacoby 1975: 19963) has, I suggest, left 
Dementia Studies marginalised (or ‘ghettoized’) as an area outside mainstream critical
theory, or more interdisciplinary approaches.  It has received little interest, for 
example in the fields of social theory, philosophy of mind, or semiotics. Ironically, 
this intellectual disdain for dementia as a subject for critical theorising mirrors the 
social exclusion and invisibility of people with dementia.  Ghettoization is a strong 
word to use in this context; it is certainly one that needs considerable justification.  In 
Chapter 7 I will explain why I think it is warranted.
_____________________________________________________________________
3  Jacoby’s text Social amnesia: a critique of conformist psychology from Adler to Laing was first 
published in 1975, as it’s author says, ‘amid the dying embers of the new left’.  It was reissued in 1996 
under the title Social amnesia: a critique of contemporary psychology.  The 1996 text is identical to the 
original except for the addition of a new introduction by the author.  Page references in this thesis are 
to the 1996 edition.
19
All people with a diagnosis of dementia have experienced the major social and 
political upheavals of the 20th century.  This will inevitably affect the way that they 
experience the onset of symptoms, diagnosis, the provision of services, care 
environments and the intentions of caregivers.  Links between post-traumatic stress 
and dementia are increasingly being recognised.  Much of this work has been done in 
the context of Holocaust survival. David (2003), for example, identifies numerous 
aspects of the healthcare system which may trigger traumatic memories for those who 
have experienced concentration camps, the ghettoes, forced labour, or having to 
remain hidden to avoid capture.  Many of these triggers are connected with medical 
procedures and institutional practices.
By comparison, much  less work has so far been done in relation to the experiences of 
non-Jewish survivors of the Second World War (eg POWs; survivors of bombing 
raids; child evacuees), or other marginalised groups who now have dementia or are in 
the at-risk generations.  There is little reason to think, however, that their experiences, 
on an individual basis, are necessarily less traumatic. Economic migrants, prisoners, 
and victims of domestic violence or sexual abuse have all had traumatic experiences 
which may well be equally damaging on an individual level.  The experience of 
contact with formal services, psychiatric assessments, hospital admissions, being 
bussed to a day centre, or moving into some form of communal living facility are 
likely to reactivate memories of such traumatic events for many more people with 
dementia than we are perhaps inclined to think.  
A forgotten Exodus
Here is one small example – not an unduly dramatic one - from Mass Observation 
archives.  In the autumn of 1940 the East End of London was subjected to repeated 
bombing raids, and the ‘listening tension’ induced by constantly being on the alert for 
the sound of aircraft, or the ear-splitting wail of air-raid warning sirens.  This appears 
to have led to a form of mass hysteria, an exodus of people which took place, ‘entirely 
without planning…[they] went without any plan at all, without money or prospects’ 
(Inglis, 1989: 85).  These were not evacuees, but refugees, mirroring the displacement 
of populations taking place all over Europe in the 1930s and 40s.
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Some six thousand of these refugees from Mile End, Whitechapel, Stepney and Bow 
converged on Oxford, where they were temporarily housed in a cinema with a 
capacity audience of two thousand.  This rapidly became a ‘foetid, nightmarish 
shelter’ where some of those contained felt that they were being treated like 
foreigners, and there was a ‘nasty upsurge of anti-Semitic feeling’.  Whether or not 
those who were whispered against in this way by the townspeople or their fellow 
refugees were actually Jewish or not seems to have been immaterial.  The 
surroundings quickly became filthy; the sanitation was totally inadequate, and there 
was no means of disposing of waste which quickly began to decompose.  There was 
an outbreak of boils due to contact with this infected matter.  Lighting was restricted, 
and worst of all there was nothing to do. Apathy and listlessness were reported as 
among the worst of the problems, the psychological effects of this form of 
incarceration being even harder to bear than the physical deprivation and discomfort.
Of these six thousand people, the youngest still alive will now be in their seventies, 
and the oldest in their nineties.  A recent longitudinal study suggests that at least 30 
per cent of them are likely to have been diagnosed with dementia (Brayne et al, 2006). 
Memories of this war-time confinement may never have appeared consciously to 
trouble them, and they may never have talked about it.  In dementia, however, long-
term memory often remains relatively intact, whilst the ability to discriminate 
between past and present, reality and illusion is diminished.  In this context ‘listening 
tension’, loud noises, crowded places, invasion of personal space, bad smells, 
boredom, communal toilets or gloomy lighting might all trigger threatening 
memories, or perhaps even a literal sense of being back in the same situation.  The 
resulting fear and anxiety may well then manifest itself through various forms of 
‘acting out’ of the original experience. 
LaCapra (2001: 21), writing in the context of Holocaust survival, suggests that in 
order to understand the acting out of past trauma 
it is important to relate deconstructive and psychoanalytic concepts …in post-
traumatic acting out…one is haunted or possessed by the past and 
performatively caught up in the compulsive repetition of traumatic scenes – 
scenes in which the past returns and the future is blocked or fatalistically 
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caught up in a melancholic feedback loop.  In acting out, tenses implode, and 
it is as if one were back there in the past reliving the traumatic scene.   
From the perspective of the biomedical standard paradigm of dementia this ‘acting 
out’ will be constructed as ‘challenging behaviour’ resulting from damage to localised 
areas of the brain.  From the psychosocial perspective, it is likely to be interpreted as 
needs-related behaviour resulting from deficiencies in interpersonal relationships in 
the current context of care provision.  In neither case, I would argue, is the historical 
dimension given due weight or attention.  
The historical turn and narrative biography
It can thus be argued that a ‘historical turn’ is now much needed in the field of 
dementia studies, and that the concept of historical trauma (LaCapra 2001) has much 
to offer this project.  Historical trauma, in the context of dementia studies, might 
encompass both events that meet the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), and lesser events which continue to provoke unsettling or disturbing 
emotions arising in situations reminiscent of the original.  I do not suggest here that 
traumatic experiences are causally implicated in the onset of dementia, but – 
somewhat the reverse - that dementia itself becomes the precondition for a return of 
the repressed in which earlier traumas are reactivated.
The recorded life histories of people with dementia often have a palimpsestic4 quality 
about them, in that the fragments of retained information known to caregivers have 
been reduced to the normative or banal; so, for example, a suspiciously high 
percentage of people with dementia have been ‘happily married’ and become the 
loving parents of devoted children.  When people with dementia are allowed to speak 
for themselves, rather than talked about or ‘written over’, the reality is less 
comfortable.  I met Myra recently in a day centre.  Her speech was difficult to 
____________________________________________________________________
4Palimpsest, n (from Gr ‘palin – again and psestos – rubbed smooth) 1)  a piece of writing material or 
manuscript on which later writing has been written over the effaced original writing  2)  something 
used again or altered but still bearing traces of its earlier form (Oxford Concise English Dictionary 
1995: 984) 
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decipher, but her delivery was forceful and emphatic.  She mentioned her second 
husband. ‘What sort of a man was he, then?’ I asked. ‘’Orrible; bloody ‘orrible’.   
Recent narrative biography work (Brown and Clegg eds 2007) helps to illustrate not 
only how much people with dementia have to say if someone will listen, but also how 
interesting, varied, strange, and difficult their lives have been.  In the final chapter I 
draw on material from Brown and Clegg’s book Ancient Mysteries to explore the 
educational potential of the voices of people with dementia as historical testimony; as 
‘the wound that speaks’ (Caruth 1996).  The narratives I draw on here help to 
illustrate the concepts of ‘extreme’ and ‘everyday’ trauma as distinguished by 
Rothberg (2000).  Such an approach, I would argue, does not merely help us to 
‘humanise’ the biomedical, but brings us into contact with perspectives that 
defamiliarize official history, and foster new connections between the historical 
treatment of marginalised groups in society and the current representation of people 
with dementia.  
  
Writing as methodology:  bricolage and rhizomatic text
At the point where Ex Memoria had been filmed but not yet widely disseminated.
I produced a lengthy record - a thick description (Geertz 1971) - of my own reactions 
to it.  I have drawn on this document at several points in my thesis when reflecting on 
my interpretation of particular scenes in the film.  The most important realisation that 
came out of this process of writing was, however, the complexity and multi-
dimensionality of its themes.  These were not just reactions to the film itself, but also 
reflections back to things that had happened in the workgroup, speculations about the 
‘real story’ on which the film was based, things that had happened during the film 
shoot, and apprehensions about how certain aspects of it might be read or interpreted 
by others.  Themes and connections emerged during the process of writing, almost by 
a process of free association.
In writing up my thesis, rather than following a traditional format, I have tried to 
retain this approach; to conceptualise writing as a methodological process of 
discovery.  ‘I write’, as Richardson (1998: 347) says, ‘in order to learn something I 
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didn’t know before I wrote it’. To be consistent with its content, my thesis draws 
frequently on extracts from poetry, film, literary fiction, biographical material, and on 
found images.  In this I have aspired to Denzin and Lincoln’s notion of research as 
bricolage.  ‘The product of the bricoleur’s labour is…a complex, dense, reflexive, 
collage-like creation that represents the researcher’s images, understandings and 
interpretations of the world or phenomenon under analysis’ (Denzin and Lincoln 
1998: 4).  My arrangement of text, visual images, and quotations also draws on 
Benjamin’s conviction that writing, similar to montage in film, is a form of action; if 
we change the position of the objects, different ideas are produced (Cohen 1993).
My original project was conceptualised along the lines of action research.  The 
introduction of Ex Memoria into the Dementia Studies curriculum was intended to 
bring about ‘improvements’ in students’ work.  This was an intervention in my 
existing practice as an educator, teaching – albeit with some misgivings - from a 
psychosocial perspective.  The study then took off in different directions from those I 
had anticipated. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) would have it, I pursued ‘lines of 
flight’ which make connections between diverse thoughts, ideas, and pieces of data in 
a rhizomatic configuration.  Rhizomatic text is non-linear, intentionally part of the 
research process, and discursively eclectic.  ‘Any point of a rhizome can be connected 
to any other, and must be…A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between 
semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, social 
sciences, and social struggles’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:7).  Honan (2006) notes 
that academic writing often imposes boundaries that convert a research process which 
is non-linear, messy and iterative into linear and unidirectional text. Reflexive and 
creative perspectives on the taken-for-granted world are, however, more likely to 
come about through chance connections and lateral thinking.  
 
Working from Ex Memoria as a starting point within a rhizomatic configuration, it is 
possible to work in any direction, spatially or temporally, to make connections which 
then become the dominant themes of the research.  I have, for example, worked 
backwards in time from the fictionalised account presented in the film to the real-life 
memoir on which it is based, and from this to a consideration of the widespread war-
related trauma experienced by people who now have dementia. Working laterally I 
have explored the potential for film and other arts-based sources to challenge existing 
24
orthodoxies around dementia, and argued that there is an urgent need to listen to the 
first person testimonies of people diagnosed with dementia. Working forward – and 
by analogy – I have argued that the media and the medical-industrial complex (Bond, 
2004) are creating demographic panic around an ever increasing category of older 
people on the basis of ‘memory disorder’ in ways that are becoming reminiscent, in 
some ways, of the totalitarian regimes of the mid-20th century.
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Chapter 1) Problematic inheritances: Kitwood’s critique of the standard 
paradigm and the rise of the psychosocial model of dementia
Introduction
I worked with Tom Kitwood for four years from 1994 until his early death in 1998 
and this was the period during which much of the preparatory work for what later 
became the BSc (Hons) in Dementia Studies was done.  Kitwood’s thinking has thus 
been a significant influence both personally and on the development of my career in 
Higher Education. In this chapter I will discuss what I take to be the strengths and 
limitations of his position, as a way of laying the foundations for my later discussion 
of the assignments based on Ex Memoria completed by students enrolled on a module 
within the BSc course.
In the first part of the chapter I outline Kitwood’s robust, though not widely accepted, 
critique of what he termed a ‘problematic inheritance’ - the positivistic, biomedical 
model of dementia.  In the second part of the chapter I turn to some of the unresolved 
tensions and inconsistencies in the person-centred model of dementia he put forward 
in place of this standard paradigm, and suggest that this model has now itself become 
a problematic inheritance for those, myself included, who have struggled to move 
beyond it.  In this discussion I place particular emphasis on Kitwood’s work on life 
history. 
In conclusion to this chapter I will argue that the current ‘global crisis’ of dementia is 
largely a crisis of representation.  The biomedical (re)construction of older people 
with failing memories as victims of Alzheimer’s disease has served the interests of 
neuroscientific researchers, drugs companies and voluntary sector campaigners.  It has 
also been taken up with enthusiasm by the media.  The rhetorical use of verbal and 
audio-visual imagery in the service of either the biomedical or the psychosocial 
models of dementia thus becomes an important subject for dementia studies.
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Kitwood’s critique of the standard paradigm
It is today almost impossible to overestimate the extent to which Kitwood’s work has 
influenced the field of dementia care.  Before Kitwood the concept of ‘dementia care’ 
was, itself, relatively unfamiliar and expressions such as ‘the management of the 
elderly demented’ were far more commonplace in research and practice literature.  It 
is still rare to come across new publications on the care of people with dementia 
which do not cite Kitwood’s work on the person-centred approach and the 
development of a new culture of care provision.  
Kitwood’s thinking on the nature of dementia evolved as a challenge to what he 
described as the ‘standard paradigm’ or ‘neuropathic ideology’ (Kitwood, 1997a: 36). 
The dominant discourse on dementia is one in which not only the body, but also now 
the mind, has been medicalized.  As Atkinson (1988, cited in Hughes 2000: 14) notes, 
this biomedical discourse is
…reductionist in form, seeking explanations of dysfunctions in invariant 
biological structures and processes: it privileges such explanations at the 
expense of social, cultural and biographical explanations…[it] implies that 
diseases exist as distinct entities…[and] that diseases are to be understood as 
categorical departures from normality. 
                                                         
Kitwood’s central thesis was that much of the apparent ill-being, disordered 
behaviour, and communicative difficulty manifested by people with dementia are not 
the straightforward result of neuropathology, as tends to be assumed by medical 
science, but are compounded by the responses and actions of others towards the 
person diagnosed with dementia.  From this perspective, for example, the ‘problem 
behaviour’ often described as ‘wandering’ can be reframed as an expression of an 
unmet need – the desire for activity, company, or a change of scenery.  ‘Meaningless 
speech’, similarly, can be re-framed as a failure of interpretation on the part of the 
listener.
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Kitwood did not himself claim to have ushered in a paradigm shift in the framing of 
dementia, but some of his writing suggests that he did in fact see his alternative model 
of dementia as one that was a replacement for the standard paradigm 
In one gestalt configuration – perhaps the prevailing one at present – the 
central figure is a process of degeneration…in the gray matter of the brain; 
psychological and sociological factors fade into the background.  Another 
gestalt, however, equally valid, can emerge; in this the figure becomes an 
existential crisis of a person, of an embodied, social and sentient being, and 
indeed a crisis of an interpersonal milieu (Kitwood 1990a: 60 emphasis 
added)
As will be discussed further below, two points are worth noting at the outset.  First, 
Kitwood’s suggestion that his own personal – rather than technical - framing of 
dementia takes the form of a gestalt shift, suggests a binary opposition between two 
models which are competing opposites. Second, Kitwood introduces the idea that 
social factors are important in dementia but limits this to the ‘interpersonal milieu’. 
Increasingly, in his later work, this interpersonal milieu was limited to interactions 
between people with dementia and direct caregivers in formal care settings such as 
residential homes, day care centres, and hospital wards.
The alzheimerization of senility
Kitwood’s critique of the ‘standard paradigm’, or technical frame of reference, in 
dementia care has been less widely engaged with or accepted than his views on the 
improvement of care practice, and in his later work there is some evidence that he 
downplayed this critique to some extent, yet it has proven to be remarkably prescient. 
In a series of papers written in the late 1980s and early 1990s Kitwood cast doubt on 
the evidence underpinning biomedical orthodoxy which suggests that dementia in old 
age is solely the result of organic brain disease.  His critique relates largely to the 
inadequacy of evidence related to Alzheimer’s disease, which is held to account for 
around 60% of all cases of late-onset dementia.  The ‘alzheimerization’ of dementia is 
held by Kitwood (following Fox, 1989) to have taken place for social and economic 
reasons, rather than on the basis of neuroscientific evidence.  
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The disease identified by the German neuropathologist Alois Alzheimer in the early 
years of the 20th century was a form of pre-senile dementia first observed in a 
middle-aged woman (Auguste D) aged 51 at the time of diagnosis, who had 
developed cognitive impairments and was experiencing hallucinations and delusions. 
After her death six years later her brain was discovered by Alzheimer to have the 
same kind of changes that were usually found in old age.  It seems unlikely that 
Alzheimer himself wanted to claim this as a new disease category.  His colleague, 
Perusini (1911: 143) wrote that Alzheimer believed what he had discovered ‘[did] not 
represent anything but an atypical form of senile dementia’ (cited in Porter 1995: 44). 
It was the head of Alzheimer’s laboratory, Emil Kraepelin, driven by competition 
between rival research teams all attempting at this time to find organic explanations 
for mental illness, who actually coined the term ‘Alzheimer’s disease’ in a publication 
of 1910.  As Whitehouse (2008) among others has noted, there was also competition 
during this period between the newly established neuroscientific research laboratories 
and the rising psychoanalytic movement which attributed many psychiatric symptoms 
to repressed memories and desires rather than neuropathology.  Kraepelin himself 
derided psychoanalysis as ‘obviously more art than science…. therefore [it] can never 
be of general value’ (Whitehouse 2008: 88).
Alzheimer’s disease thus became the name for rare, early-onset instances of a 
condition which was much more frequent in older people, in whom it was known as 
senile dementia (or simply ‘senility’).  This classification of Alzheimer’s disease, and 
the distinction between pre-senile and senile dementia remained in place for the 
following 60 years. Indeed, a standard text on psychopathology of 1970 notes that, 
‘Alzheimer’s disease is statistically infrequent and of relatively little interest to 
students of psychopathology’ (Maher, 1970: 276).  Senile dementia, meanwhile, was 
most frequently considered an inevitable, gradual and natural consequence of ageing 
rather than a medical condition.  As a result it, too, was of little research interest.  
There was a culture of ‘therapeutic nihilism’ around senile dementia during these 
years, and care was largely viewed as a matter of physical restraint and tending to 
basic needs.  The ageing of the population during the latter half of the 20th century 
led, however, to markedly increased prevalence of late-onset dementia, whilst 
simultaneously as Porter (1995: 56) noted, declining family support systems meant 
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that ‘the elderly are increasingly herded together in old people’s homes, geriatric and 
terminal wards in hospitals, and in districts specialising in care of the elderly.  There 
they are tended by professionals who…are likely to treat them less as individuals and 
more apt to view them as psycho-medical cases’.
In the mid 1970s, Alzheimer’s disease (or ‘Alzheimer’s’ as it is now increasingly 
rendered) was re-created as the fourth largest cause of death in the USA.  This was a 
deliberate ploy by an alliance of scientists and government representatives who 
wanted to attract more research funding for the study of senile dementia in the face of 
what was now beginning to be anticipated as a global epidemic of age-related 
cognitive impairment (Fox, 1989). On the basis that the neuropathology of both pre-
senile and senile dementia was the same, the classification of Alzheimer’s disease was 
now extended to incorporate both early-onset and late-onset cases.  Most importantly, 
in the process, senile dementia became medicalized as a condition that might have a 
hope of prevention or cure with sufficient investment of research funding.  Indeed the 
budget for ‘Alzheimer’s’ increased from 3.6 million dollars in 1977 to 356 million 
dollars in 1998 (Katzman and Bick 2000).  Whilst this may have appeared to be good 
news from an investment point of view, the vast majority of this funding has gone into 
biomedical research on causes and potential cures for Alzheimer’s disease which have 
not emerged, and comparatively little has been allocated to improving the quality of 
life of people already diagnosed with dementia.
In the alzheimerization of senile dementia, what appears to have been deliberately 
overlooked was that the neurological changes held to be characteristic of senile 
dementia (amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles) are also found to a significant 
extent in the brain tissue of older people who do not have dementia.  These alleged 
biomedical markers of Alzheimer’s disease may thus be due to the ageing process 
itself, rather than being causally implicated in dementia.  Auguste D’s brain was 
considered abnormal because it was, in a sense, 30 years older than she was.  But the 
shift that led to the recognition of senile dementia in a woman in mid-life, cannot 
logically then be reversed to make changes that are pathological at 57 also 
pathological for someone who actually is in her 80s or 90s. Correlation between 
symptoms of dementia during life and neuropathology discovered post mortem is 
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‘Before him the disease didn’t have a name………..’ Drug company advertisement.
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inconclusive. Nor has it been possible for neuroscientists to identify a ‘gold standard’ 
which can distinguish consistently between brain tissue taken from older people with 
and without clinical symptoms of dementia (Kitwood 1987: 133). The position has 
not changed in the 20 years since this article by Kitwood was written.
Even were we to accept that the claimed biological markers play a causal role in the 
onset of Alzheimer’s disease, a definite diagnosis cannot be given in life because post 
mortem confirmation of neuropathology is needed.  So successful has been the rise of 
the ‘Alzheimer’s movement’, however, that the term Alzheimer’s is now increasingly 
used to refer to dementia from all causes.  In a world where no living person actually 
has a confirmed diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, the number of cases is increasingly 
reported to be on the scale of a global catastrophe.  A recent report from the US 
Alzheimer’s Association claims that by mid century 16 million Americans will have 
Alzheimer’s and ‘someone will develop Alzheimer’s every 33 seconds’. Its CEO is 
quoted as saying, ‘We must make the fight against Alzheimer’s a national priority 
before it’s too late.  The absence of effective disease modifying drugs, coupled with 
an ageing population makes Alzheimer’s the health care crisis of the 21st century’ 
(Alzheimer’s Association, 2007).  
There is, moreover, considerable confusion in the way prevalence and incidence 
figures are presented and interpreted.  For example, a recent Department of Health 
press release claims, somewhat paradoxically, that ‘Currently 600,000 people have 
dementia in England and yet more than half of these will never receive a formal 
diagnosis’ (DoH, 2007).  This atmosphere of demographic panic is now becoming 
global.  As Howse (2007: 10) has recently remarked, for example, ‘In a country such 
as China the perceived threat of demographic ageing is that they will grow old before 
they grow rich – which will seriously hobble them in their efforts to become rich’.
Robert Butler, one of the leaders of the US Alzheimer’s movement, admits that 
concepts like ‘the living death of Alzheimer’s’ have been deliberately promoted in 
order to create a ‘health politics of anguish’ (Katzman and Bick 2000: 285).   It 
seems, though, that rather than merely drawing attention to the perils of therapeutic 
nihilism, the aim of this movement has been to promote a pervasive (and largely 
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unjustified) optimism about the possibilities of a medical breakthrough. Kitwood 
(1997a: 140) noted that, ‘The drug companies for their part know that huge profits are 
to be made from the medicalization of old age, and that the market is growing as the 
number of old-old’ people [ie people over 80] increases’.   This continues in the 
present day with major research investment in the development of cognitive enhancer 
drugs, genome research and stem cell therapy.  As Whitehouse (2007: 461) has 
recently suggested, a variable level of cognitive impairment is to be expected in old 
age, so the search for a cure for ‘Alzheimer’s’ is ‘tantamount to a search for the 
neurological fountain of youth’ – a cure, that is, for ageing itself.
Kitwood’s dialectical model of dementia
The alzheimerization of senile dementia is, then, a powerful and ironic example of the 
kind of social construction that can go on in support of biomedical research.  To 
reveal the machinations of the Alzheimer’s movement is not, however, to alter the 
reality that many people do develop cognitive impairments of varying degrees in their 
later years.  Here Kitwood’s argument is that neuropathology cannot be the sole 
determining cause, since the standard paradigm view in which neuropathic change 
leads to dementia in a straightforwardly linear, causal fashion is undermined by a 
number of anomalous cases.  The first is the existence of cases which appear to have 
symptoms identical to those of dementia, but which are reversible because they are 
not due to organic causes (for example, infections, depression, malnutrition or 
hormonal imbalance).  Second are cases where the onset of dementia appears to be 
related to one or more life crises, such as recent bereavement.  Third are instances of a 
dramatic and rapid deterioration in those with already diagnosed dementia following, 
for example, a move into residential care.  Finally, there are cases of apparent partial 
recovery from dementia when the person’s emotional needs are being met (Kitwood 
1993a).  According to Kitwood the standard paradigm has to ‘save the appearances’ 
by making ad hoc modifications to take account of inconvenient cases such as these, 
because they undermine its neuropathic determinism.  These cases suggest that in 
dementia there are factors at work other than neurological impairment and that such 
factors are psychological and social in nature.  As Orrell and Bebbington (1995) 
reported, for example, stressful life events such as relocation are frequently associated 
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with depressive symptoms in people with a diagnosis of dementia. From a biomedical 
perspective, however, depressive symptoms in a person with dementia are frequently 
taken to be evidence of neurological decline.
As time went on, Kitwood began to place increasing emphasis on the view that much 
of the ill-being manifested by people with dementia is the result of negative 
interactions with those who care for them.  From this he developed his concept of a 
dialectics of dementia - an interplay between neurological impairment and 
psychosocial factors in the process of dementia.  Kitwood’s dialectical model of 
dementia was conceptualised diagrammatically (in relation to the specific case of a 
woman called Margaret) in the form of an ‘involutionary spiral’ (see Fig 1 overleaf).  
Kitwood used this model to challenge the mind-brain dualism of the standard 
paradigm, arguing that mental and neurophysiological descriptions refer, in fact, to 
the same reality and that ‘to talk in psychological terms is never to be dealing with a 
domain that is mysteriously independent of brain function’ (1988: 113).  In none of 
his publications did he suggest that neurological impairment plays no part in 
dementia. Instead he pointed to a relative plasticity and interpenetration between the 
structure and function of the brain, in which psychological states can be the cause, as 
well as the effect, of neurological impairment. 
Kitwood suggests that there are three undesirable outcomes of the standard paradigm: 
the exclusion of alternative approaches and the consequent inhibition of development 
of knowledge about dementia; the exclusion of the person with dementia, and a 
pervasive pessimism epitomized in images such as “the prison that waits” or “the 
living death”.  In a much reproduced aphorism Kitwood suggests that ‘our frame of 
reference should no longer be person-with-DEMENTIA, but PERSON-with-dementia’ 
(1997a: 7).
I will argue in the following section that Kitwood’s own revision of the standard 
paradigm has become a problematic inheritance in some ways for those who see it as 
an alternative model which is complete in and of itself.  Whilst Kitwood’s work has 
made comparatively little impression on what Bond (2004) refers to as the ‘medical-
industrial complex’, the current dominance of his thinking in the fields of care 
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Figure 1:  The involutionary spiral of the dementia process (Kitwood 1997a: 52)
                 NI = neurological impairment
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practice and social research has itself worked to exclude alternative approaches.  In 
addition, the person with dementia - although now included in the frame of reference - 
is presented as a relatively ahistorical and asocial being.  To restate this in terms of 
Kitwood’s own rubric the reformulated frame of reference is not so much 
psychosocial as PSYCHO-social.
For its time Kitwood’s work was undoubtedly ground-breaking, but I wish to argue in 
what follows that whilst his critique of the biomedical model remains masterly, the 
alternative ‘dialectical’ model he presented in its place (Kitwood 1990; 1997) is a 
limited one. The main arguments I wish to put forward against this model relate to 
what I take to be its ahistoricism and its moralism.
The new culture and its discontents
Kitwood (1993b: 16) developed the following ‘equation’ to show that ‘any 
individual’s dementia may be considered as the result of a complex interaction 
between five main components
D (dementia) = P (personality) + B (biography) + H (physical health) + NI 
(neurological impairment) + SP (social psychology)
These five components were, however, never given equal weighting in Kitwood’s 
work.  His main publication on dementia (Dementia Reconsidered: the person comes 
first, 1997a) includes just one page on the impact of physical health on the onset and 
progression of dementia, and he also wrote increasingly little on biography (or life 
history).  Late in his career, he described the hypothesis underpinning his work as 
involving only two components, as follows: ‘that the process of dementia arises from 
a dialectical interplay between neurological impairment and social psychology’ 
(Kitwood 1997b).  
Whilst life history awareness is acknowledged as an important part of the experience 
of dementia, the examples offered in Kitwood’s published work are - with one 
exception - divorced from the context of actual 20th century history.  He takes a 
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developmental view of the human life-course which depends for its plausibility on a 
fixed and unchanging social milieu or ‘life as normal’, in which, for example, war, 
persecution, and mass displacement of populations barely feature.  
The adapted self is elaborated in many ways, but primarily through the taking 
on of new roles.  Thus it proliferates throughout childhood and adolescence, 
with each step in the enlargement of skill, opportunity and social life.  The 
process continues into adulthood, as a person enters the world of work (or 
unemployment), and perhaps takes on new responsibilities such as a 
committed relationship, parenting or the running of a home.  With many 
people, it seems to be the case that the adapted self reaches its highest level of 
elaboration in the age period around 40-60, when roles and responsibilities are 
being added faster than they are being lost.  Later life, for many people, brings 
dismantling of the adapted self.  Some major roles, such as that of parent or 
employee, are relinquished; a lowered income or problems of ill-health may 
cause a further diminution.  (Kitwood, 1997c; 17)
Life history conceptualised in this way, as an individual journey through a series of 
fixed life stages which are divorced from any actually-occurring, external, historical 
events or social upheavals, is in Benjamin’s term, history as ‘homogenous, empty 
time’ (Benjamin 1940 trans 1999: 154).  When we think of the period of human 
history lived through by those who now have dementia this has not, however, been the 
nature of their lived experience.  As Birkett (1991) suggests, the 20th century – like 
any other phase of human history - was not a polite, neutral background to the 
development of ‘existential monads’ divided both from each other and from the 
events of their epoch.  The social history which is our past is woven into us, so that 
there can be no separation of the person from the historical nexus of events within 
which he or she has embodied existence.  As will be argued in more detail in later 
chapters, person-centred dementia care, in its current formulation, thus shares many of 
the hallmarks of conformist psychology that Jacoby (1975; 1996) denounced as 
‘social amnesia’; it has forgotten history.  
Malignant social psychology
As mentioned above, Kitwood believed that negative social interaction contributed to, 
and exacerbated, the process of dementia.  He proposed a list of 17 types of ‘personal 
detraction’ he had observed in dementia care settings (see Figure 2), suggesting that 
when such detractions occur very frequently this is an indication of a ‘malignant 
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Figure 2: Indicators of Malignant Social Psychology/Personal detractions
1)  Treachery – using forms of deception in order to distract or manipulate a 
person with dementia, or force them into compliance
2)  Disempowerment - not allowing a person to use the abilities they do have; 
failing to help them to complete actions they have initiated
3) Infantilization - treating a person very condescendingly, as someone lacking 
sensitivity might treat a very young child
4) Intimidation - inducing fear in a person, through use of threats or physical 
power
5) Labelling - using a category such as dementia, or ‘organic mental disorder’, as 
the main basis for interacting with a person and for explaining their behaviour
6) Stigmatization - treating a person as if they were a diseased object, an alien or 
an outcast
7) Outpacing - providing information, presenting choices, etc, at a rate too fast for 
a person to understand; putting them under pressure to do things more rapidly than 
they can bear
8) Invalidation - failing to acknowledge the subjective reality of a person's 
experience, and especially what they are feeling
9) Banishment - sending a person away, or excluding them, physically or 
psychologically
10) Objectification - treating a person as if they were a lump of dead matter; to be 
pushed, lifted, filled, pumped or drained, without proper reference to the fact that 
they are sentient beings
11) Ignoring - carrying on (in conversation or action) in the presence of a person 
as if they were not there
12) Imposition - forcing a person to do something, over-riding desire or denying 
the possibility of choice on their part
13) Withholding - refusing to give asked for attention, or to meet an evident need; 
for example, for affectionate contact
14) Accusation - blaming a person for actions or failures of action that arise from 
their lack of ability, or their misunderstanding of the situation
15) Disruption - disturbing a person's action or inaction; crudely breaking their 
'frame of reference'
16) Mockery - making fun of a person’s ‘strange’ actions or remarks; teasing, 
ridiculing, humiliating, making jokes at their expense
17) Disparagement - telling a person that they are incompetent, useless, 
worthless etc; giving them messages that are damaging to their self-esteem
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social psychology’ in the immediate care environment, or ‘organisational culture’. 
‘The strong word malignant signifies something that is deeply damaging to 
personhood, possibly even undermining physical well-being’ (1997a: 46).
Conversely, Kitwood argued, improving the quality of interpersonal relationships 
would lead to increased well-being and perhaps even to a degree of ‘rementia’. 
Where the person with dementia continues to be treated by others as a person in the 
full sense of the word, Kitwood believed, he or she can fare well in spite of even 
severe cognitive losses.  Particularly important here is a preparedness of the caregiver 
to enter into the person’s own version of reality.  That is to say that rather than trying 
to orientate the person with dementia to our own world view we should be able to 
communicate on the basis of what the person with dementia believes to be happening. 
Whilst this approach has considerable appeal, some of its deeper implications are 
harder to accept. It places immense responsibility on the direct providers of care, 
whilst simultaneously shifting attention away from, for example, the chronic 
underfunding of care services, the profit motivation of independent sector care 
providers, and labour relations under capitalism. It implies that the well-being of 
people who have dementia depends largely on dyadic interactions between 
individuals.  Pathology (in the form of malignant social psychology) is shifted from 
the person with dementia to his or her immediate environment and those employed 
within it.  Kitwood acknowledges that caring for people with dementia is stressful, but 
he makes little reference to the low pay and low status of dementia care work.  At 
times he appears to suggest that the ill-being of people with dementia is the result of a 
moral failing on the part of their caregivers, and in at least one article this is linked to 
a discussion of the gendered nature of care work in which he appears to suggest that 
such moral deficiencies are particularly likely in female caregivers who have had little 
formal education (Kitwood, 1998a).
When I began working with the Dementia Group I was hugely impressed by 
Kitwood’s erudition, and by his courage in challenging the biomedical model of 
dementia, a position which sometimes led to attacks on his work.  As a working class 
woman and single parent who had come late to Higher Education, however, I always 
found myself alienated by the moralistic line in his thinking on care practice.  As time 
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went on, the development of our educational programmes in dementia studies meant 
that we now had a student body many of whose social and educational backgrounds 
were similar to my own.  Learning about the working conditions many of them 
experienced and their determination to succeed in Higher Education, often in the face 
of extreme odds and self-doubt, and not infrequently on a self-funding basis, made me 
even more uncomfortable about the concept of their ‘moral re-education’.
Caregivers also experience all the indicators of malignant social psychology, both 
within the workplace and in broader social contexts, particularly if they are members 
of marginalised groups themselves.  Economic migrants are, for example, 
increasingly over-represented in the direct dementia care workforce. Whilst 
conditions of employment are worsening, if anything, for direct care staff, the 
tendency to hold them responsible for deficiencies in dementia care is increasingly 
prevalent, and there is little current concept of dementia care work as alienated labour. 
Kitwood’s model is, moreover, largely synchronic in that it considers only the period 
from closely before diagnosis to death, rather than involving a diachronic dimension 
which recognises the person in a ‘whole life’ context. Central to my discussion here, it 
also involves a question-begging presumption of ‘normal life’ prior to the onset of 
dementia (see Fig 1, p 35).  Malignant social psychology is not, however, limited to 
people with dementia, nor is it exclusively to be found in the interpersonal milieu.  
Most people will have experienced repeated instances of personal detraction during 
the course of their lives and this can perhaps better be considered as an outworking of 
societal power relationships at an institutional level.  So we can identify, in the 
context of 20th century experience, forms of personal detraction which range from the 
everyday to the extreme: from intimidation by teachers or employers; to the labelling 
of ‘bastards’ and ‘cripples’; the banishment of refugees, or the extreme objectification 
of being herded into a cattle truck.  
Whilst Kitwood acknowledges that ‘the malignancy is part of our cultural inheritance’ 
(1997a: 46) he does not elaborate on this, and thus fails to engage with the possibility 
that a main source of resentment, fear, and anger for people with dementia may be 
that they have already experienced such a malignant social psychology, and often in a 
more extreme form, in the schools, factories, barracks, hospitals, PoW camps or 
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ghettoes they encountered earlier in life. If the concept of malignant social 
psychology is extended to take in diachronic and socio-historical aspects of 
experience, the presumption of ‘normal life’ prior to the onset of symptoms of 
dementia will, in almost all cases, be revealed as a deficient one. 
In the next section I will discuss Kitwood’s  work on life history, suggesting that 
having initially attempted, without success, to establish a causal role for negative life 
events in the aetiology of dementia, he then went on to marginalise the importance of 
lived experience in understanding the actions and words of people diagnosed with 
dementia.  In switching the focus of his attention from aetiology to care practice, it 
seems that Kitwood simultaneously turned away from a macro-social explanatory 
framework.
Kitwood’s work on life history
In questioning the theoretical sufficiency of Kitwood’s alternative model of dementia 
– one which seeks to acknowledge the role of the personal and social – it seems 
appropriate to proceed by following his own example of identifying the anomalous 
cases and phenomena for which it cannot account.   It is striking, for example, given 
that dementia is fundamentally considered to be a disorder of memory, that Kitwood 
makes comparatively little reference to the nature, or manifestation, of memory 
changes in its onset or progression, placing more emphasis on the emotional and 
affective consequences of stigmatization and deteriorating interpersonal relationships.
In particular, Kitwood has little to say about the increasing orientation on the past 
which characterises dementia, about the frequency with which people who have 
dementia appear to ‘act out’ scenes from previous life, or about the urgency they often 
express about needing to find people or places from the past.  As will be discussed 
further in subsequent chapters, once taken out of its biomedical straightjacket, 
dementia is above all a recherche du temps perdu, but this was never a strong theme 
in Kitwood’s work.
As we have seen, in Kitwood’s (1993) ‘equation’ life history was considered to be 
one of five key components contributing to dementia.  Prior to this he had carried out 
41
a series of 44 psychobiographical investigations in an attempt to establish a causal 
link between traumatic personal experience and the onset of dementia (Kitwood, 
1990b).  His aim at this time was to establish that dementia ‘is intimately bound up 
with the vicissitudes of personal and social life’, but he hypothesised that this was 
because a person with a poorly developed ‘experiential self’ was predisposed to 
dementia.  ‘It is as if the self, together with its defences, has been subjected to 
extreme attenuation; then the threats which relate specifically to death and dying 
fasten onto psychotic elements that are already present from earlier life, and their 
invasion is a relatively easy matter’ (Kitwood 1990a: 74 emphasis added).  
What seems to be implied here is that each individual who goes on to develop 
dementia is already inherently defective in some way.  Where biomedical science was 
beginning to suggest target genes for the newly alzheimerized dementia, Kitwood’s 
alternative hypothesis was a personality damaged by the micro-social and emotional 
environment.  There is thus a significant tension in Kitwood’s work between his 
essentially deconstructive approach towards the biomedical model of dementia, and 
his simultaneous suggestion of alternative causation.
The century without a war
Kitwood published a detailed account of just one of his psychobiographies, and this 
includes some inconsistencies which raise questions about the kind of life events he 
was, in any case, prepared to consider significant.   Kitwood’s method was to split the 
person’s life into seven periods of 14 years each and summarise the main life events 
occurring in each period.  This approach has some similarities to the model of eight 
life stages proposed by the prominent American post-war humanist psychologist Erik 
Erikson (1982).  As Bender (1997) points out, Erikson’s model makes no reference to 
war, and thus cannot apply to any living person of the 20th century. 
When we consider the frequency and degree of war trauma…we note to our 
surprise that Erikson never comments on the effects of the two World Wars on 
his theory of life stages…in the Eriksonian liturgy no sounds of gun-fire are 
allowed to disturb the smooth unwinding, albeit difficult and complex, of a 
man’s life. 
(Bender  1997: 339)  
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Rose, the woman in question was born in 1904.  Kitwood’s summary of her life for 
ages 0-14 (ie 1904 – 1918) is as follows
The family was large; material and psychological impoverishment were 
intertwined.  Rose was the fifth child.  Probably she lacked attention and care. 
Her success at school came to nothing.  She suffered a major bereavement. 
Her first job was one in which she adapted to others’ needs.  There is little to 
suggest a strong beginning to an experiencing self (Kitwood 1990a: 70).
It is difficult to avoid the suspicion here that Kitwood selected data to support his 
hypothesis about the underdevelopment of the experiential self in people who 
succumb to dementia in later life.  Inferences about Rose’s ‘probable’ lack of care and 
attention, for example, are not necessarily valid simply because she was a member of 
a large, working class family.  On the other hand, it is difficult to think of any form of 
employment that does not involve adapting to the needs of others.  There seems to be 
little here that would lead of itself to a poorly developed experiential self, unless we 
are to accept, also, that an entire generation and social class were prone to the 
development of ‘psychotic elements’, as a result of belonging to large families and 
working from an early age.
Later in the same article, Kitwood quotes from a letter from Rose’s daughter Sarah, 
the same person who had provided the biographical data, as follows, ‘This lady has 
suffered the bereavement of all nine of her brothers and sisters… caring for the babies 
of working women during the first world war when only a child herself…’ In later 
periods of Rose’s life, however, the deaths of only six brothers and sisters are noted 
by Kitwood, leaving three unaccounted for. It is impossible not to wonder whether the 
‘major bereavement’ mentioned in the period between 1904 and 1918 was the loss of 
several male members of the family as the result of the First World War.  Whether or 
not this is the case, it is noticeable that Kitwood does not make any reference to that 
war or the one that followed it, as ‘vicissitudes of personal and social life’.
From Kitwood’s whole series of psychobiographical studies, ‘critical life events’ were 
noted in 27 out of 44 cases, a fairly inconclusive finding, and from this point on his 
interest in a precipitating role for life events in the aetiology of dementia began to 
wane.  In Lakatos’ (1970) terms it appears to have become a degenerating research 
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programme.  Kitwood’s subsequent work continues to refer quite often, in passing, to 
the importance of life history knowledge in providing care for people with dementia, 
but the concept of history advanced here tends to be individual and limited to what 
Smail (1993) describes as the proximal sphere, the person’s immediate environment. 
Kitwood also frequently treats biographical material as though it is a merely allusive 
or metaphorical response to the current experience of dementia. 
Lived experience as metaphor
Three examples are given to demonstrate the importance of life history in Kitwood’s 
main text Dementia Reconsidered (1997a: 75). The first of these relates to Janet 
whose references to trains passing by the residential home - when there are in fact no 
trains present - is explained in terms of her often having visited her family by train in 
the past, and wishing she could still do so.  Henry who ‘had a career as an academic 
before retirement’ is now distressed by his inability to use a computer.  Finally, there 
is Arthur who ‘had been a highly respected member of the community and a pillar of 
his local church…now…he often offends people with his foul language, and some 
care staff are afraid of him, because when they come close he often punches or bites 
them’.  These examples imply a homogeneity in the class background, ethnicity, and 
social status of those concerned, suggesting that dementia is the sole tragedy that 
disrupts a previously unremarkable life.  Kitwood’s tendency to use fictional 
examples, or ‘vignettes’ as he called them, perhaps also contributes to this lack of 
diversity; as a clergyman-turned-academic he may have tended to formulate fictional 
examples close to his own experience.
By contrast, two real life examples quoted by Kitwood (1997a: 74) taken from group 
work carried out by Cheston (1996) both make explicit reference to wartime 
experience - itself an indication that this is an ongoing preoccupation in situations 
where people with dementia are encouraged to speak freely.   The first is a man whose 
war service was in the Malayan jungle.  He spoke about ‘the persistent advance of the 
vegetation and the constant battle to keep it back’.  This is interpreted as a metaphor 
for the experience of dementia - ‘a way for him to talk about his own struggle with 
dementia’ (Kitwood 1997a: 74 emphasis added).  The second example is of a woman 
who describes her employer’s return from the Second World War - thin and 
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bewildered - ‘looking like someone who had really lost his way’. Again, Kitwood 
supports the interpretation that this is a metaphor for her own feeling of being ‘lost’ as 
a result of dementia.  Real experiences of traumatic situations thus have imposed upon 
them an interpretation which denies their importance as first person testimony.  
In the first case, referring to this man’s ‘own struggle with dementia’ suggests a split 
with the past, as though the historical experiences he is describing are not merely 
unimportant, but are not even his own.  The Malayan conflict was, even at the time, a 
secret war and has now largely been expunged from popular memory.  Never 
officially acknowledged as a war by the government of the day, it nevertheless 
involved 545,000 tons of bombs being dropped, the internment of 34,000 people, and 
the exfoliation of hundreds of acres of land.  Hostilities in Malaysia continued for 
almost 20 years from 1948 to 1966.  Until 1960 this was a war fought by conscripts 
on national service, in itself a corrective to the popular myth that, post-1945, an 
unbroken peace returned.  It is not surprising that having been involved in such a 
conflict should continue to loom large in someone’s memory in a literal rather than 
metaphorical way.  The same image can, of course, be both literal and metaphorical, 
but Kitwood does not appear to consider the traumatic nature of the former.
Kitwood’s humanistic perspective and corresponding interest in progress, self-
actualisation and the maximisation of well-being also no doubt prevented the turning 
of his attention to the darker aspects of social and cultural history.  In his person-
centred philosophy of care it is imperative that caregivers realise that their own 
approach towards, and interaction with, the person with dementia are paramount in 
influencing that person’s well-being or ill-being; that there is always something that 
can be done in the here and now that will lead to increased well-being.  This is, of 
course, an important humanitarian aim but it seems, for Kitwood, ultimately to be a 
moral issue, rather than an empirical one.    
In a late publication, Kitwood (1998b) does in fact make one reference to the 
importance of seeing each person with dementia as a historical being.  He goes on to 
outline a role play exercise in which (as part of the programme for a short course on 
dementia care) he took on the character of Richard, a man in a residential home about 
whose life history very little is known.  During the course of the exercise the 
45
participants are asked to note down clues about Richard’s possible life story.  Part of 
the mystery to be unfolded is Richard’s reference to ‘Anzio’, and his cowering under 
a table following a loud noise. Commenting on the denouement to this exercise, 
Kitwood remarks that some participants ‘even thought that Anzio was a person and 
had no inkling that it was the scene of a famous landing in World War II where there 
was heavy loss of life’.  This is the only example I have been able to find in 
Kitwood’s work of an accepted connection between the experience of dementia and 
the reactivation a traumatic historical event.   
Representations of dementia
This chapter raises many epistemological questions related to the representation of 
people with dementia.  The Alzheimer’s movement draws on biomedical concepts and 
images to create a propagandist view of dementia as a scourge, a threat to the 
economy, an approaching demographic tidal wave.  Kitwood’s psychosocial model 
humanises the person with dementia but in a way that simultaneously homogenises 
‘the person’ (singular) as safe, unthreatening, acceptable, but simultaneously 
somewhat passive and characterless.  There are thus many ways that images of people 
with dementia can be used rhetorically to persuade particular groups of people, or 
society at large, to adopt a particular viewpoint, or to condone or protest against 
various forms of social arrangement.  
In 2007, for example, considerable controversy arose over a television documentary 
(Love’s Farewell, directed by Paul Watson) in which it was alleged – wrongly as 
turned out to be the case – that Malcolm Pointon, a man with dementia, had been 
filmed at the moment of his death.  A newspaper reviewer had this to say about the 
film
The fact is there was nothing faked about Malcolm's catastrophic decline into 
mental illness. Nor was there anything essentially false in the portrayal of how 
a not-so-old man suffered and died in a way many people die in this country 
every day…Watson's style doesn't allow for much context but the Alzheimer's 
Society estimates that 700,000 people in the UK currently suffer from 
dementia. And that one in three of us will experience it in some form before 
we die. What Watson's film indisputably and unflinchingly put the spotlight 
on was the sheer living hell of this condition…
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What was ‘essentially false’ here was not the film itself, but the message it was used 
to convey.   Malcolm Pointon was diagnosed with Alzheimer-type dementia at the age 
of 51, and died aged 67.  He conforms to the clinical picture of what might be termed 
‘classical’ Alzheimer’s disease, the form of pre-senile dementia that Alzheimer 
originally identified in 51 year-old Auguste D.  There is no doubt that Malcolm 
Pointon died from a devastating neurological disease; Alzheimer’s disease, of this 
classical form is, however, exceedingly rare. Less than 0.1% of the population aged 
45-64 are diagnosed with any form dementia, and the condition that affected Malcolm 
Pointon is different both in type and degree from the age-associated memory changes 
characteristic of late life.  On the basis of one rare case, ‘this condition’ is, however, 
represented as one that will not only affect one in three of the population, but will also 
determine the manner in which they die.
Examples such as this help to demonstrate the power of the arts and media to 
influence the ways that dementia is constructed by society.  As will be argued later, 
such constructions are often very different from the impression gained from sources 
that pay direct attention to the voices of people with dementia themselves.  It seems 
vital, then, that dementia studies should focus on such constructions and the media 
used to convey them.  This subject is taken up in the next chapter in relation to the use 
of arts-based approaches in health and social care education.  
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Chapter 2)  Using arts-based approaches in dementia care education: 
interpellation and resistance
       Abra was ready ere I called her name
                And, though I called another, Abra came            (Matthew Prior, 1718)
Introduction
As would be expected from my critique of Kitwood’s work in the previous chapter I 
have had, for some time, an ambivalent teaching relationship with the person-centred 
approach to dementia care.  On the one hand, I am aware of its considerable potential 
for challenging the perceptions of practitioners whose initial training has been in the 
biomedical tradition.  On the other, it has always had, for me, moralising and 
homogenising tendencies that I found difficult to live with.  Most of the time I 
managed to subdue my misgivings, but they came into sharp focus during the period 
that I was working on this thesis, because at the same time I was also co-editing a 
critical reader of Kitwood’s work (Baldwin and Capstick 2007).  The critique in 
Chapter 1 thus represents the articulation of an unease about what I was teaching that 
had been mounting for many years.   These observations are by no means irrelevant to 
the content of this chapter, which considers the ways in which professional discourses 
both interpellate, and can be resisted by, those who are called upon to perform 
particular roles.
At the outset of this study, however, my purported area of concern was the tendency 
for students on the Dementia Studies programme to reproduce uncritically in their 
assignments assumptions derived from the biomedical model of dementia. This was 
often evident in the terminology and concepts that appeared in their written work.  I 
hoped that the introduction of audio-visual material in the form of fiction film would 
help to encourage different ways of seeing the person with dementia.  Beyond this I 
was interested to find out whether writing in response to a film would be perceived as 
more interesting and enjoyable by students, and whether this might lead to a more 
fluid and reflective writing style.  To illustrate this initial area of concern I will begin 
by outlining the background to the BSc (Hons) Dementia Studies course and then go 
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on to discuss a specific student assignment submitted in the academic year prior to the 
introduction of Ex Memoria into the curriculum.  
I will then go on to discuss the arguments that have been put forward for using arts-
based approaches generally, to ‘humanise’ subject areas in Higher Education that 
have traditionally been dominated by medical-scientific perspectives.  Recent authors 
(eg Staricoff  2004; Larkinson 2005; Smith 2006) have suggested that such 
approaches have many benefits, pointing out, for example, that ‘the capacity for 
empathy, compassion and sensitivity required for work as an allied health professional 
cannot easily be taught through pedagogic methods’ (Smith, 2006: 421).  There is also 
to be considered, however, a long tradition of theoretical debate about the possible 
deceptions of art, and about the challenges of representing both particular groups of 
people, and historical events.  
A third strand of debate, also relevant to my subject area here, is the potential for 
works of art to create effects of alienation, estrangement, and defamiliarization - 
devices which disturb our taken-for-granted assumptions by presenting familiar 
images in unusual ways, by, for example, ‘prolonging the length of perception and 
emphasising the new meanings and emotional effects of the forms’ (Miall and 
Kuiken, 1994: 389).  It may be argued that drawing on sources that create such effects 
is particularly appropriate in the context of dementia care education since the 
condition itself is characterised by confusion and disorientation, and people who have 
dementia often appear not to experience time in a linear fashion.  At the same time, 
this may be considered a pedagogically risky strategy as it requires a faith in 
experiential learning, as opposed to more didactic teaching and control over the 
curriculum.
The BSc (Hons) Dementia Studies
This course is currently the only full undergraduate degree programme in dementia 
studies offered by a UK university, and is a development of earlier continuing 
education programmes provided by Bradford Dementia Group at the University of 
Bradford from the mid-1990s onwards.  The curriculum was designed in response to 
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Kitwood’s increasing conviction that accredited programmes of learning and named 
University awards were needed in order to raise the status of dementia care work as a 
specialised field of practice, to change organisational cultures, and to meet the 
impending demographic ‘crisis of care’.  
In Britain the recognition is slowly dawning that there is a vast training and 
educational deficit, and that none of the existing forms of professional 
preparation properly address the issues arising in dementia care.  The scale of 
the problem is gigantic, and it should be tackled at the meta-level…This 
means that it is essential to have specialist courses in dementia care at both 
first and higher degree levels (Kitwood, 1997a: 143).
This project was not completed during Kitwood’s lifetime, and after his death the 
development and validation of the dementia studies programme became my main role.
The BSc (Hons) has been running since 2001 and a Masters degree was introduced in 
2004.
All students on the BSc programme are existing dementia care practitioners who 
study part-time by distance learning whilst continuing with their usual work role.  The 
majority of the coursework assignments are practice-based and require students to 
draw on their own experience of working with people who have dementia. More than 
80 per cent of students are women, and the majority have a nursing qualification, 
although the course also recruits from other occupational groups involved in dementia 
care, such as occupational therapy, social services, and the voluntary sector.  
Students who have already completed a Diploma of Higher Education or equivalent 
enter the course at final-year undergraduate level as a two-year, part-time ‘top-up’ 
programme.  This is a popular route for nurses qualified since training began to be 
delivered by Higher Education Institutions in the early 1990s, as it enables them to 
convert a generic nursing or mental health nursing diploma into a specialist degree. 
Those who qualified longer ago, or have not previously studied in Higher Education, 
generally enter at second-year undergraduate level and can register for either a 
Diploma of Higher Education (completed in two years) or a BSc (four years).  
Soon after the course started I began to develop an interest in the practice-based 
written work that students on the course were submitting for assessment.  This was, I 
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realised, a rich and largely untapped source of narrative data about practitioners’ 
experiences of working at the coal-face of dementia care.  At an obvious level, it 
offered fascinating insights into real life care practice.  As a result, we began to ask all 
students, on entry to the course, whether they were open to having extracts from their 
work used for purposes of educational research.  
I came to realise, however, that students’ work was often revealing in less 
immediately obvious ways. As Reynolds (2007) has also noted of practitioners’ 
written work, it showed evidence of a complex interplay between lived experience, 
earlier training and education, prior acculturation to a practice field, and students’ 
attempts to assimilate what they were now learning on the course.  These were 
practitioners whose previous ways of conceptualising their work had been dominated 
by biomedical orthodoxy, and who were now expected to engage not only with 
complex bodies of theory, but also with the challenge to the very nature of their work 
required by the psycho-social model.  In order to explore a specific example of the 
effects of this internal tension between models of dementia I have analysed below an 
assignment submitted for the module HD2003D The Social Psychology of Dementia  
Care.  It will be helpful first, however, to outline the content of the module and the 
way it was assessed.
The Social Psychology module
This module aimed to provide students with a basic understanding of five different 
bodies of psychological theory: behaviourist, cognitive, humanistic, psychodynamic, 
and symbolic interactionist.  Students were encouraged to consider how these bodies 
of theory lead to different considerations of what it is to be a person.  They were also 
asked to apply each body of theory to the care of people with dementia and to 
consider how different interventions in dementia care are linked to theory.  For 
example, reality orientation (based originally on the work of Taulbee and Folsom, 
1966) is underpinned by ideas derived from cognitive psychology.  It involves the 
constant provision of prompts, reminders, and aids such as large format clocks and 
calendars, and colour-coding systems. Although this is intended as a helpful way of 
compensating for memory deficits, it assumes, for example, that the aim of dementia 
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care is to readjust the person with dementia to our version of reality.  Concepts such 
as ‘clock-time’, which drive working-age adults, are considered equally of concern to 
older people who are living at a different tempo.  Post (1998: 72) among others, has 
commented on the ‘hypercognitivity’ of modern society, and the inappropriateness of 
considering the losses of dementia from a purely cognitive perspective.  His re-
writing of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, as ‘I feel and relate therefore I am’, is more in 
keeping with Kitwood’s humanistic approach.
The Social Psychology module had always evaluated well.  Completion rates were 
high, and marks tended to be above average.  This was, however, partly explained by 
the first of the two assignments being a short-answer comprehension exercise on 
which students tended to score highly.  The second assignment was a critical incident 
analysis which required students to identify an incident from their own experience of 
care practice and analyse it using the psychological theory introduced in the module. 
Students found this assignment much more challenging, and a frequent comment was 
that it was difficult for them to pick anything from their own practice experience that 
‘stood out’.  Although the nature of critical incidents was explained in detail in the 
module, many students wrote comparatively superficially about the care of a 
particular person with dementia over a period of weeks or months, rather than writing 
in depth and detail about a particular incident.  
These assignments often lacked personal content related to the people involved, and 
tended to contain little observational or interpretative detail of what was said and 
done, particularly by the person with dementia.  Third person, passive voice accounts 
were common, as were uses of technical/medical terminology.  Suggestions for 
improving care practice tended to be vague and general, rather then related 
specifically to the person in question.  These tendencies were also noticeable in 
practice-based assignments for other modules, and had been commented on by 
colleagues.  Although there was a sense, at times, of frustration that students’ received 
ideas were so resistant to change, there is no suggestion here that the problem lies 
with individual students.  As I will discuss further below I believe that students are 
struggling – and to a greater or lesser extent, aware that they are struggling – with an 
inherited and inadequate language.
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Interpellation and resistance
Potter (1996) notes that we all have existing scripts, or interpretative repertoires - 
systematically related sets of terms drawing on familiar and frequently used images - 
that are difficult to change.   Communications are made up of existing, taken-for-
granted concepts that do not need to be explained to those working within the same 
context.  Hamilton and Manias (2006) carried out an analysis of patients’ files and 
records which showed that there was a predominance of medical, objectifying and 
bureaucratic language to be found there.  Students on the Dementia Studies 
programme are similarly used to writing and reading about people with dementia in 
the context of routine assessments and case notes, and this no doubt influences the 
way they perceive people with dementia as a relatively homogenous group of people 
about whom there are a limited number of things that can be said, and a limited 
linguistic repertoire for saying them.  
From the standpoint of critical discourse analysis, Fairclough (2001) points out that a 
dominant discourse (as with the biomedical standard paradigm of dementia) is 
subject to a process of naturalization in which it appears to lose its connection 
with particular ideologies and interests and become the common-sense 
practice of the institution.  Thus when ideology becomes common-sense, it 
apparently ceases to be ideology; this is itself an ideological effect, for 
ideology is truly effective only when it is disguised (Fairclough 2001: 89).  
The ideologies and interests that link the biomedical model of dementia to the 
medical-industrial complex (Bond 2004) through the use of certain discursive 
practices, thus, in this view, permeate the situations in which formal dementia 
services are delivered, but are unrecognisable as such to those who practice within 
such services because they have taken on the semblance of common-sense.  
As Geertz (1983) suggests, common sense is a cultural regime like any other; 
historically and culturally contingent, ‘Common sense is not what the mind cleared of 
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cant spontaneously apprehends’ but rather ‘what the mind filled with presuppositions 
concludes’ (1983: 84).
The all-pervasiveness, or hegemony, of this discourse in society at large, in media 
imagery, and in training and education, inevitably has a great deal of influence on the 
values and beliefs people bring to bear on their work with people with dementia.  If 
the shared language of the workplace stresses the concepts of disease, meaningless 
behaviour, and inevitable deterioration through fixed stages of neurological 
impairment, then practitioners are constrained to adopt this language in order to be 
understood and recognised as part of the professional group.  Althusser (1971) 
conceptualised this as an ‘interpellation’ of the individual by hegemonic discourse. In 
this view the subject is ‘called into being’ in its entirety by ideology.  It was also 
Althusser (1968) who first suggested that the presence of such a hegemonic discourse 
could be detected through the practice of ‘symptomatic reading’.  Stronach and 
MacLure (1997: 6) similarly write of the need to ‘open up to interrogation 
institutional discourses that define the limits of the speaking subject before he or she 
ever speaks  .’
In the sample assignment discussed below, however, I suggest that there is evidence 
of the struggle of the writing subject to resist such all-encompassing domination by 
the discourse of the workplace. If I am correct, this tends to support Zizek’s (1989) 
Lacanian re-working of the notion of interpellation.  Here Zizek argues that the object 
called into being by ideology is never identical with the subject who comes to occupy 
the pre-assigned place.  There will always be an ‘excess’ – a protest against the 
identity assigned by the Other  .
       
Analysis of a report based on a self-selected critical incident 
The assignment in question was selected randomly from among those submitted by 
students who had given consent for their work to be used for research purposes.  My 
analysis of the text is based on Fairclough’s model of critical discourse analysis 
(Fairclough 2001).  The account is dominated, at least in terms of its manifest content, 
by ‘common-sense’ views and perspectives, which cloak the presence of the 
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biomedical discourse on dementia.  I suggest, however, that there is evidence of 
latent, or symptomatic, content which can be made to tell a different story.  
Students were asked to give the incident they wrote about a title, and the title chosen 
by this student (‘I still wonder if Mrs B really did remember me’) suggests in itself an 
excess arising from the student’s desire to be more than the role ascribed to her.  As in 
the lines by Matthew Prior at the beginning of this chapter, then, the person who 
appears is never synonymous with the person called into being.
The analysis is based on the 500 word narrative account of the chosen critical 
incident, with which students are asked to begin their assignment. My first reading of 
it involved the highlighting, transcription and listing of words and phrases (or ‘formal 
elements’ as Fairclough describes them) which were foregrounded for me.  That is, 
the words and phrases which cause me, as I read, to pause or reflect.  When marking 
assignments, rather than analysing them as data, this often involves reflecting on how 
to give constructive feedback to the student (for example: querying why a particular 
word has been used in preference to another; suggesting additional information that 
might have been given).  On second reading, I carried out a further exploration of 
repetitions, parallels, and ‘overwording’.  Overwording is defined by Fairclough 
(2001: 96) as the frequent use of synonyms, or words which are near synonyms, and 
which may thus indicate ‘a locus of ideological struggle’.
The student in question had clearly engaged with the content of the module and her 
assignment showed considerable evidence of concern for people with dementia, and 
commitment to improving practice.  There is, however, a lack of observational detail 
related to how things looked or what people said.  Speech is reported.  Some terms are 
used in scare quotes, suggesting that the student is aware that there is something not 
quite right about them, but is unable or unprepared to explain what this might be, or to 
use other less problematic terms.  This has something in common with the 
deconstructive practice of using a term which is necessary but inadequate ‘under 
erasure’.  A term from the hegemonic discourse has been noted as inadequate or 
deformative; the writer cannot, however, see a way to question the meaning of the 
word, without using the word itself.  As Heidegger put it ‘Because the word is 
inaccurate it is crossed out; since the word is necessary it remains legible’ (cited in 
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Spivak 1997).  Scare quotes are used then, in this kind of transitional discourse, to 
indicate a dissatisfaction with the prevailing ideology, which has not yet become an 
outright challenge.
Critical incident report:  ‘I still wonder if Mrs B really did remember me’
The assignment describes two occasions, four years apart, when the writer met the 
same woman with dementia in hospital – the first time on an acute medical ward and 
the second on an orthopaedic ward.  The writer (J) suggests that the woman in 
question (Mrs B) remembered J fondly, due to having been treated kindly by her on 
the first occasion.  
The formal elements identified in this text were as follows
1)  elderly medical patients/elderly lady
These are initial classification schemes used to allocate the subject of the text to a 
particular group (in this case old, ill, female, dependent).  ‘Elderly’ and ‘lady’ are 
euphemisms whose use implies that to use the term ‘old woman’ would be 
disparaging in some way.  Such euphemisms indirectly underline the inequalities that 
they seek to avoid mentioning.
2)  ambulant/“wandering”/wandering 
‘Ambulant’ is a term used in medical case notes, rather than to write about ourselves 
or people with whom we identify.  Being ambulant (able to walk) is initially viewed 
as a desirable indication of Mrs B’s recovery from the physical illness for which she 
was admitted to the hospital ward. Mrs B’s ‘wandering’ (used once with scare quotes 
and once without) describes the same action, but now this has become undesirable  
problematic behaviour related to her dementia. 
3)  she constantly tried to leave the ward/ asking for the way out
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There is an emphasis throughout on keeping Mrs B still. Mrs B does not conform to 
the requirements of a hospital patient either by remaining passive and immobile, or by 
getting better and going home.  This interferes with the real work of the ward.  
4)  staff were always trying to get her to sit by her bed/if I spent a little more time  
with her she would settle/[she] settled back in her chair
It is implied that members of staff other than the writer should not try to immobilise 
Mrs B, but simultaneously that the writer is more successful than others in keeping 
Mrs B ‘settled’.  The use of the word ‘settled’ is interesting in this context, as it is an 
informal, non-medical one.  Using this term helps the writer to present keeping Mrs B 
still as a caring act, rather than a matter of convenience.
5) “problem” behaviour/ behaviour ‘too difficult to manage’
Scare quotes are used to indicate that the writer recognises to some extent that the 
perceived “problem” – Mrs B’s activity – arose from the unsuitability of the care 
environment.  This is, however, left as an implied reading rather than being made 
explicit, or rendered in terms other than those used in the dominant discourse.
6)  Four years later… I’m sure she remembered me too
It is on the whole unlikely that someone with the short term memory loss 
characteristic of dementia would remember a nurse met several years earlier.  J’s 
conviction on this point seems, however, to provide a strong indication of the desire 
for a transformative role that practitioners involved in this kind of work may have.  
7) home
The word home is used seven times in this brief account.  Mrs B says that she must go 
home as her husband (who died several years earlier) will be waiting there for her. 
On both occasions when she is in hospital Mrs B is ‘reassured’ by being told that she 
can go home when she is better, but without acknowledging that the ‘home’ she will 
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be returning to is not the one she is seeking (ie the home where she formerly lived 
with her husband) but the care home from which she was admitted.  
Whilst a different framework for presentation and analysis has been used here, these 
points were all included in feedback to the student at the time, in a way that 
encouraged her to question what was being taken for granted in her writing.  I 
mention this to avoid any suspicion of commenting on a student’s work for research 
purposes in a way that has not been communicated to her in person.
Emotional labour and dementia care
My purpose in exploring the self-selected critical incident above is not a ‘before and 
after’ comparison with the assignments based on Ex Memoria, but merely to 
demonstrate that when a foregrounding approach is adopted patterns, repetitions, and 
parallelisms that might otherwise be overlooked emerge more clearly.  On first 
reading this assignment I had not, for example, realised how much emphasis there 
was on ‘settling’ Mrs B; a term that gestures towards an interpersonal relationship, but 
one which we might more readily associate with fractious infants.  
There is an economy of care in which patients and clients have to be kept still, or have 
their feelings explained away, in order that the staff can go about what is perceived to 
be the real work of physical care.  Normally, ambulant (ie physically recovered) 
patients would be discharged.  People with dementia – who neither get better nor 
comply with the rules of being a patient - are always threatening to disrupt this 
economy.  What also becomes apparent is that accounts analysed in this way tell more 
than the students had intended.  For example, there appears to be a latent message 
about how emotionally draining it can be to work with people who don’t remember 
what you have done for them.  
These needs can foster the development of a personal script or way of seeing in which 
praise or blame are allocated on the basis of who it is who is doing broadly the same 
thing.  The complementary beliefs that ‘I am doing well’/’you are doing badly’ can be 
held intact simultaneously, whilst the conflicting beliefs ‘Mrs B is troublesome and 
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needs to be kept still’/’Mrs B is expressing a legitimate right to freedom of 
movement’ cannot. If one consistently takes the latter view it becomes impossible to 
work within the existing economy of care.  If Mrs B is acknowledged as a person, 
reacting in a way similar to anyone else held against his or her will, and for reasons 
that have not been explained or cannot be understood, her plight becomes too painful 
to contemplate.  
In the field of health and social care generally there is a large body of work on the 
emotional labour of caring. This focuses attention on the need for practitioners who 
come into contact with people who are frightened, in pain, or non-compliant, to 
manage their emotions, by either ‘pushing down’ authentic feelings in favour of 
emotional distance, or by ‘pumping up’ feelings which are not genuinely there in 
order to appear more empathic (eg Brotheridge and Grandey, 2002).  In the field of 
dementia care specifically, Balfour (2006: 340-341) points to the culture of  blame 
that can quickly materialise in care settings when things are not going well; ‘the staff 
conveyed the sense that if they found words for their feelings, there was a fear of what 
would emerge, particularly negative feelings rather than compassionate ones’. 
Balfour suggests that this fear often takes the form of inter-professional rivalries over 
role and identity, of a ‘maiming of the capacity to think’ and a retreat into ‘too busy-
ness’ as a defence against thinking about the experience of patients. He stresses the 
need to provide opportunities for care staff to process their feelings in a way that does 
not have a negative impact on the care they are able to provide.
If we take these two factors together – the ‘interpellation’ of the environment by the 
dominant discourse, and the emotional labour of caring – the challenges of this kind 
of work become increasingly apparent.  It is little wonder, then, that the traces of this 
conflict are often apparent in students’ assignments, in the suppression of their own 
feelings beneath the acquired language of the dominant discourse.  It is not surprising 
either, that they often appear to struggle with adopting different ways of 
conceptualising a situation, or that they find reflection disturbing.  Programmes of 
professional education need to be underpinned, then, by an understanding of the 
struggle that practitioners returning to study are likely to face when asked to look 
differently at the nature of care practice in their workplace.   Arts-based approaches 
are increasingly promoted in the health and social care field as an alternative approach 
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in which one benefit is the potential for practitioners to explore their feelings outside 
the immediate environment of the care setting, by engaging with fictional cases.
Arts-based approaches in health and social care education: the case in 
favour
If biomedical science has provided the dominant discourse on dementia, artistic 
discourse as found in literary fiction, poetry, drama, film and biography would seem 
immediately to offer a different register and set of conceptual tools for engaging with 
this condition.  Here, for example, is an extract from a contemporary fictional text 
The Madonnas of Leningrad (Dean, 2006) in which Marina, the central character, 
reflects on the experience of dementia
One of the effects of this deterioration seems to be that as the scope of her
attention narrows, it also focuses like a magnifying glass on  smaller pleasures 
that have escaped her notice for years.  She keeps these observations to 
herself.  She tried to point out once to Dmitri the bottomless beauty in her 
glass of tea.  It looked like amber with buried embers of light, and when held 
just so, there was a rainbow in the glass that took her breath away.      (Dean, 
2006: 72)
                                  
Ian McEwan’s (2006) novel Saturday, includes a scene in which the central character 
Henry Perowne visits his mother, Lily, in a care home.  McEwan’s rendition of Lily’s 
circuitous and evocative speech is drawn from his experience of his own mother’s 
dementia (personal correspondence).
I’ve got plenty of them cups and saucers.  So I can always go out with one of 
them.  But the thing is, the space between people is so tiny – she brings up two 
wavering hands to show him a gap – that there’s hardly enough space to 
squeeze through.  There’s too much binding…….If you turn the picture round 
and take the back off like I did you get such a lot of pleasure out of it.  It’s all 
what it meant.  And the laugh we had out of it!
(McEwan 2006: 162-163)
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In a general overview related primarily to the use of literary fiction and drama, 
Larkinson (2005) suggests that using the arts in health professional education can 
foster the development of
Creative imagination – an understanding of the other person’s reality and 
experience
Perspectival vision - ability to take the other person’s point of view
Sensitivity to language – interpretation of signs and clues, understanding of 
hidden meanings
Capacity to be fully present – bearing witness
Emotional engagement - ‘whole person’ understanding
Sense of mystery – a sense of the depth and complexity of life that helps to retain 
a sense of wonder and curiosity
In a review of the literature on arts and health, Staricoff (2004) further notes the 
potential for visual arts to help in developing confidence in observational skills.  This 
suggests that visual representations may lead to a heightened awareness which would 
be advantageous in dementia care practice.  Comments from students that ‘nothing 
seems to stand out’ or ‘nothing much really happens’ in their workplace suggest that 
they may not be attuned to the micro-level of individual experience; that they tend to 
overlook a lot of the fine detail of small interactions or revealing comments made by 
people with dementia.  Such incidents are, however, often what provide real insight 
into the person’s experience.  
I remember, for example, watching a woman in a nursing home who was sitting  in 
one of a row of chairs turned away from the window, facing a blank wall, and who 
was ‘picking’ the flowers off her dress, transferring them carefully to her other hand, 
and then ‘eating’ them, like sweets, with signs of great relish.  Another woman, left 
on her own in the dining room at the end of breakfast, began ‘walking’ two toast 
crusts towards each other, apparently acting out some kind of wordless conversation 
between them as though they were puppets.  A man with dementia in a residential 
home would frequently approach people in state of great indignation because he had 
been told he was ‘no good to the British army’.  
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Often such behaviour suggests extremes of role loss and sensory deprivation – the 
latter described by Perrin (1999) as being literally ‘bored to death.  It is well 
established that sensory deprivation leads to disorientation, confusion, sleep 
disturbance and, in extreme cases, hallucinations (Zubek, 1969).  All of these are also 
considered to be symptoms of dementia, yet research has shown that people with 
dementia are frequently left for long periods of time with nothing at all to do (eg 
Hancock et al, 2005).  Such examples also suggest, however, the immense 
resourcefulness that people with dementia can often bring to bear in making 
something happen in the least propitious of circumstances.  This will also tend to be 
overlooked if practitioners are not attentive to the minutia of day-to-day practice.
Mason (2002: 7) makes the important point that what is noticed in the practice domain 
depends on what is valued and that ‘every act of caring and supporting depends on 
noticing’.  Thus, what is not noticed in the first place cannot be acted on or responded 
to.  In a study based on student engagement with a photograph by Diane Arbus (see 
following page) of a masked woman in a wheelchair, Benin and Cartwright (2006) 
suggest that the tendency to look away from people who have visible disabilities is a 
gesture of shame.  Tomkins (1995) describes this shame as ‘a taboo on looking’. 
Freud himself suggested that shame is the force which opposes scopophilia, or the 
normal pleasure of gazing at someone attractive to us (Freud 1924 in Gay 1995),  and 
it seems likely that there are various kinds of ‘looking practice’ which for all of us 
have been subjected early in life to parental prohibition.  Typically, this will have 
included being told that ‘it’s rude to stare’ at people whose appearance or behaviour 
are unusual in some way.  This may suggest another reason why practitioners tend to 
avert their gaze from people with dementia as far as possible. 
Taylor and White (2006: 944) suggest that in the current education of social workers 
there is an increasing tendency to a positivistic ‘education for certainty’.  By 
comparison, they suggest, social work in the 80s was conceptualised as art and the 
important practitioner attributes were considered to be intuition, imagination, 
reflection and personal experience.  They quote Jordan (1978) who suggests that 
literature and poetry offer more perceptive insights into human experience than 
psychology textbooks, and Downie and McNaughton (2000) who argue that 
assessment of health practitioners might include writing an essay based on the 
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portrayal of doctors in fiction. ‘This kind of imaginative teaching can help move 
professionals towards practising more reflexively, since it exposes them to different 
ways of representing what they do’ (Taylor and White, 2006: 948).  Nussbaum (1997) 
makes a similar point about the value of literature and art in developing ‘narrative 
imagination’.  Other sources (eg Van Voorhis, 1998) promote the use of fictional 
forms including drama, novels, poetry and auto/biography to encourage 
‘compassionate engagement’ in practice.
Estrangement - Diane Arbus, 1970:  Masked woman in a wheelchair
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In relation to film, specifically, Downey et al (2003: 403) suggest that ‘films, used as 
case studies, can deepen a student’s engagement with the subject matter and 
characters, permitting the student to empathize, identify, and develop feelings of 
closeness, respect, affection, revulsion, fear, [and] anger’.  Alexander et al (2005) 
make similar points about the use of film in ‘narrative medicine’, an approach in 
which medical students engage with storied accounts of the lives of patients, and 
where illness – rather than being the main focus of the practitioner’s attention – is 
viewed instead as an interruption to the ongoing plotline.
These sources all suggest that drawing on the arts will have beneficial influences on 
the development of empathic, compassionate, imaginative and perceptive 
practitioners.  In other words, they take the humanistic view that the arts per se have a 
civilising, and what Freire (1972) would describe as a ‘concientizing’, effect on the 
learner.  In this they adhere to a concept of emancipatory education, in which educator 
effort is devoted to the enlightenment of the learner and his or her liberation from 
mistaken perceptions and ‘inauthentic language’.    Freire used stylised drawings of 
scenes that would be familiar to the impoverished Brazilians he was teaching, in order 
to encourage them to produce their own ‘authentic’ words for their experience. 
Newman (2006) explains how Freire would, for example, use a drawing of water 
standing in the street of a shanty town, and encourage the ‘renaming’ of water, first as 
dirty water, then as sewage, then as a threat to their children’s health, and so on, until 
they were able to name it as an example of injustice.
Whilst this is an approach that has many attractions, it is not without its own 
ideological implications.  It is evidently viewed as a move from falsity to facticity, for 
example, and it also involves an acceptance of the ‘teacher-as-liberator’, and arbiter of 
‘authentic’ language. With hindsight, many of my own early attempts to correct, 
rather than explore, students’ use of language, shared these hallmarks.
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Art, representation, and ideology
C P Snow (1956; 1959) first drew attention to the different languages spoken by the 
arts and sciences over half a century ago, arguing that these were two separate 
cultures between which communication or synthesis were increasingly impossible.  ‘I 
believe’ Snow wrote, ‘that the intellectual life of the whole of western society is 
increasingly being split into two polar groups…literary intellectuals at the one pole – 
at the other scientists’.  Although Snow’s work has since gone out of fashion, it seems 
that little in Higher Education has changed.  The requirement for undergraduate and 
postgraduate degree programmes to be categorised as either arts or sciences is one 
indication of this, as is the automatic categorisation of health studies courses as 
science degrees.  
Interestingly, however, Snow’s original argument was not that the sciences should be 
subjected to the humanising influences of art, as has been the case with the resurgent 
‘arts and health’ movement in education.  Snow saw science as the culture concerned 
to solve social problems, and scientists as those who ‘have the future in their bones’. 
He also advocated the rise of a third culture concerned with ‘how human beings are 
living, or have lived’.  This is very different from the current perception that art is 
invariably ‘a good thing’ and that including the arts per se in the education of 
scientists, medical practitioners and health and social care workers generally will have 
a humanising and beneficial effect.  As will be discussed further below the potential 
for art to deceive or misrepresent also needs to be borne in mind.  
More recently Carey (2005) has taken up an argument similar to Snow’s, challenging 
the commonly held idea that the arts are necessarily ‘good for us’.  He refers to the 
tendency for dictators to use art as a way of distracting the masses (Hitler’s 
programme of arts subsidy was one of the largest in the history of civilization) and 
draws attention to the kind of artistic snobbery that could allow Bloomsbury Group 
member, Clive Bell, to ask why, since all artists are by definition aristocrats, they 
should bother about the fate of humanity. Clover (2006) also draws attention to the 
cultural supremacism of European ‘high’ or ‘fine’ art which relegated the artwork of 
subordinate cultures and indigenous peoples to the margins. The current body of 
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literature on the use of the arts in health and social care education does not, however, 
tend to problematize art itself by raising questions about the possible distortions to be 
found in some arts sources.  In other words, it may not yet have located itself in 
relation to theories of representation.
According to Helsby (2006) representation theory has, over the years, passed through 
three main phases: reflective theory suggested that art merely mirrors back what 
already exists; intentionalist theory suggested that the intentions of the author should 
shape the analysis of the work, and constructionist theory focuses on the discursive 
aspects of the work in producing meaning and controlling or responding to the beliefs 
that are dominant in society. The arts and health movement currently seems to accept, 
without criticism, a blend of the ‘art as mimesis’ reflective theory, and the ‘pre death 
of the author’ intentionalist theory.  As Helsby points out, however, most media 
analysis work within the field of representation theory today takes a constructionist 
approach, and here the propensity for art to perpetuate dominant ideologies, and to 
stigmatize and exclude marginalised groups has tended to be a focus of major 
concern. Even apparently benign representations can be deceptive. The extract from 
Dean (2006) quoted above, for example, offers a dramatically different and more 
human perspective on the experience of dementia than does the biomedical model. 
These are not, however, the words or thoughts of a person who has dementia, and as a 
result the authenticity of the experience that is being presented here remains 
questionable.
Whilst little work has been done on the portrayal of dementia in visual media, the 
representation of people with mental health problems has been problematised, and 
Dunn (1999) among others has pointed to the immense power such media have to 
create and perpetuate discriminatory attitudes.  As Cassey (2005) notes, this is often 
because the representation of mental illness in film is angled to suit the needs of the 
plot and producers (ie the market), rather than to provide a view that is more 
authentic, but less dramatic or emotionally manipulative. 
Three recent feature films related to dementia, for example - Iris, The Notebook, and 
Away from Her – all tell the story of male spouse carers for female partners with 
dementia. In each case the representation is of the male partner’s loss, of the burdens 
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of caring for someone who is ‘disappearing’, and of the inexorable progress of 
destruction of brain tissue. As will be discussed further in Chapter 3, in each of them 
– and in varying ways - memory loss is used either as a plotting device, or as a filmic 
trope, resulting in depictions that may mislead about the memory changes 
characteristic of dementia.  
A recent text by Alexander et al (2006: 62) Cinemeducation: a comprehensive guide 
to using film in medical education describes a scene from the film Folks (dir Kotcheff 
1992), in which a character with dementia, somewhat stereotypically, burns the house 
down.  Alexander suggests using this scene to facilitate discussion of ‘the most 
common forms of dementia’ and ‘the office tests that can be used to screen for and/or 
diagnose dementia’.  It seems unlikely that medical students will derive any of the 
benefits identified by the arts and health movement merely from discussing standard 
biomedical model questions in the context of a film.  What is also needed is a critical 
engagement with the film itself in terms of its representation of the person with 
dementia.
Defamiliarization, estrangement and rupture
The literature on arts and healthcare education makes little reference to the tendency 
of experimental and surrealist art forms deliberately to reject verisimilitude in favour 
of a distorted view of the world intended to challenge the reader or viewer’s existing 
perceptions – to bring about a rupture in the world of taken-for-granted normality.  
As Eagleton (1983: 187) argues
Such transfigured forms might jolt the audience out of the reassurance of 
recognition – the self-security which springs from contemplating a world 
which is familiar…Bertolt Brecht…uses certain dramatic techniques (the so-
called ‘estrangement effect’) to render the most taken-for-granted aspects of 
social reality shockingly unfamiliar, and so to rouse the audience to a new 
critical awareness of them.  Far from being concerned to reinforce the 
audience’s sense of security, Brecht wants, as he says, to ‘create contradictions 
within them’ – to unsettle their convictions, dismantle and refashion their 
received identities, and expose the unity of this selfhood as an ideological 
illusion.
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The shockingly unfamiliar is, of course, often the already secretly familiar – the 
unheimlich/heimlich1 - and if this were not the case it is unlikely that the estrangement 
effects adopted by modernist texts such as those of Brecht, Beckett and Conrad would 
have any resonance for those who watch or read their work. This is also, no doubt, the 
level on which the Diane Arbus photograph discussed earlier in this chapter works to 
trouble and disturb viewers. Freud’s (1919) essay on the unheimlich (or ‘uncanny’) 
suggests that two dominant influences on our experience of fictional events as 
uncanny are the context within which the events are experienced (rather than the 
events themselves), and the character/s with whom we identify.  In the next chapter 
these debates will be developed further in relation to the characteristics of films on 
dementia, and the educational potential of Ex Memoria.
______________________________________________
1The English translation ‘uncanny’ does not do justice to the contradiction inherent in the German 
terms heimlich (literally ‘homely’) and unheimlich (‘unhomely’) which are often used interchangeably 
in German, suggesting an association between the familiar and the strange.
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Chapter 3) Dementia and memory loss in film: mainstream cinema and 
Ex Memoria
MAN:  There’s a lot of Poles here…?
HELENA: Yeah, Poles, you know, Russians, English.  She’s Polish.
MAN:  Oh, good. So’s my mother.  Got out just before the war.
HELENA:  Mum made it through Warsaw. Managed to avoid the ghetto 
somehow…
(from the script of Ex Memoria:  Appignanesi J, 2006)
Introduction
As mentioned in the previous chapter, films which touch on dementia – either as a 
central theme or a sub-text - often misrepresent the nature of the condition because 
they are too dependent on standard paradigm sources, or because they wish to use the 
theme of memory loss as a plot device.  They may also misrepresent, or exclude 
altogether, the former life of the person who now has dementia and its historical 
context.  In this chapter, I want to consider how contested ideas about the nature of 
dementia and the definitional problems which surround it feed into films on the 
subject, and the challenges this raises related to genre, content and message.  
In the latter part of the chapter I will argue that Ex Memoria offers a different view of 
dementia, one which is more grounded both in naturalistic observation of a person 
with dementia and in historical context, but also – and perhaps because of this - 
potentially more challenging to the viewer than standard filmic treatments of 
dementia.  Here I will use examples and extracts from the film, and the memoir on 
which it is based, to explore dementia in the context of 20th century history, and its 
interpretation in terms of Freud’s concepts of repression and the uncanny.
Importantly, the theory that will be discussed in this chapter did not inform the script 
development process.  Rather the events shown in the film itself, throw into sharp 
relief the way that past experience is revived in dementia. This opens up an 
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understanding of dementia experienced as a trauma which is simultaneously 
synchronic (of the here and now) and diachronic (related to past experience).  
The nature of dementia: from cognitive impairment to terminal disease 
As mentioned at the end of Chapter 1, dementia is a term which eludes determinate 
meaning, and any attempt to complete the statement ‘dementia is….’ inevitably takes 
us into debates about ontology and epistemology.  Unsurprisingly, then, there is no 
single, accepted definition of dementia; in fact many sources contradict each other on 
its nature, underlying causes and progression.  Definitions of dementia have, of 
course, changed over time, but in the following section I will focus on four current 
definitions from different sources. Whilst all have features in common – notably the 
emphasis that is placed on memory loss - these definitions lie on a continuum between 
what might be termed ‘soft construct’ and ‘hard construct’ dementia.  At the ‘soft’ 
end of the scale dementia is a syndrome - a form of cognitive impairment common in 
later life - at the hard end of the scale it is terminal brain disease.
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Revised (DSM-IV-R) - the diagnostic ‘bible’ of 
psychiatry – states that dementia is a clinical syndrome from which nothing can be 
inferred about underlying causes.  The criteria recommended to diagnose dementia 
are 
Evidence of impaired memory (which must be present in all cases) together 
with at least one of the following: language disorder; impaired movement or 
handling of objects, when there is no physical disability to account for this; 
impaired ability to recognise objects, when there is no sensory impairment to 
account for this; disturbance in ability to carry out complex tasks that require 
planning, reasoning, organisation, or abstract thought.
(First et al, DSM-IV-R, 1997/2000)
According to DSM-IV-R, a diagnosis of dementia is only justified when the 
problems are so severe that they interfere with the person’s ability to work or take 
part in social activities; when there is a significant decline from the person’s 
previous level of functioning; when there is no evidence of delirium (eg acute 
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confusion resulting from infections), and when the observed symptoms cannot be 
attributed to other mental disorder (eg severe depression).
If we turn to the US Alzheimer’s Association website, dementia is defined here as 
follows
The loss of intellectual functions (such as thinking, remembering, and 
reasoning) of sufficient severity to interfere with a person’s daily functioning. 
Dementia is not a disease itself but rather a group of symptoms that may 
accompany certain diseases or conditions. Symptoms may also include 
changes in personality, mood, and behaviour. Dementia is irreversible when 
caused by disease or injury, but may be reversible when caused by drugs,  
alcohol, hormone or vitamin imbalances, or depression [emphasis added]
www.alz.org/Resources/Glossary.asp
This definition differs from DSM-IV-R in its association of dementia with underlying 
disease, in its reference to changes in personality, mood and behaviour, and in the 
suggestion that dementia may be caused by depression.  This last point is striking 
since DSM-IV-R suggests that dementia should not be diagnosed if depression is 
present.  The Alzheimer’s Association does, however, recognise that dementia may be 
reversible depending on the nature of the underlying cause.
The latest definition of dementia provided by the World Health Organization in its 
International Classification of Diseases (2003) is
A syndrome due to disease of the brain, usually of chronic or progressive  
nature, in which there is a disturbance of higher multiple cortical functions, 
including memory, thinking, orientation, comprehension, calculation, learning 
capacity, language and judgement.  Consciousness is not clouded.  The 
impairments of cognitive function are commonly accompanied, and 
occasionally preceded by, deterioration in emotional control, social behaviour 
or motivation.  This syndrome occurs in Alzheimer’s disease, in cerebro-
vascular disease, and in other conditions primarily or secondarily affecting  
the brain [emphasis added].
In this definition, dementia - whilst still recognised as a syndrome - is related in all  
cases to underlying disease, and the main candidate diseases are named.  It is, 
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however, implicitly acknowledged that in some cases dementia may not be chronic or 
progressive.
Finally, in the recent UK National Audit Office report Improving Services and 
Support for People with Dementia (2007: 4) we find that
Dementia is a term for a range of progressive, terminal, organic brain  
diseases.  Symptoms include decline in memory, reasoning and 
communication skills, ability to carry out daily activities, and loss of control  
of basic bodily functions caused by structural and chemical changes in the  
brain.  The emotional impact on people with dementia and their families can 
be enormous, with depression and high levels of stress common [emphasis 
added].
Here dementia is no longer a syndrome at all, but a range of diseases.  All such 
diseases are progressive (none are reversible), all are organic (resulting from damage 
to the brain) and, for the first time among these definitions, all are terminal - that is, it 
is implied that  people die from, rather than with, dementia.  Depression is mentioned 
only as a consequence of dementia, rather than a condition requiring differential 
diagnosis (DSM-IV-R) or a possible cause of dementia (US Alzheimer’s 
Association).
Most importantly, for the first time, loss of control of basic bodily functions is 
attributed directly to ‘changes in the brain’.  This implies that in people with dementia 
who become incontinent or suffer falls, this is a consequence of neuropathology, 
rather than an indication of the quality of care and support they receive, or the 
appropriateness of the drugs they are given.  
Inevitably, the purpose for which each definition has been designed will have a 
bearing on its construction.  The diagnostic definition from DSM-IV-R conforms to 
what I described above as ‘soft construct’ in that it is cautious, based on clinical 
observation alone, and works by exclusion of other possible causes of confusion and 
memory impairment (delirium or depression). The Dementia UK report, which is 
concerned with social policy and funding of dementia care takes a positivistic ‘hard 
construct’ line.  In this it owes more to rhetoric - aided by subtle and progressive 
shifts in terminology - than to new research data.  This is an indication that 
neuropathic ideology owes more to the Alzheimer’s movement than it does to 
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psychiatry.  Psychiatry may have medicalised senescence, but it is the Alzheimer’s 
movement that has pathologised it.
Memory changes in dementia
Memory loss is central to popular understandings of dementia, and as would be 
expected, impaired memory is common to all four definitions given above, although 
for DSM-IV-R it is a necessary rather than sufficient diagnostic indicator.  None of 
these four sources problematize the concept of memory, however, nor do they specify 
the particular domains of memory that are affected in dementia.  Typically it is a 
deterioration in short term memory that is one of the first manifestations of dementia, 
whilst long term memory remains intact for much longer.  ‘Initially the amnesia is in 
relation to recent events, while recall of more remote occurrences remains well-
preserved.  Relatives often comment on this’ (Burns et al, 1995: 37, emphasis added). 
The preservation of long term memory in dementia, together with the likelihood that 
the person’s most significant experiences will have taken place in the past, and the 
reduced ability she or he now has to maintain cognitive control over emotion related 
to past life, combine to ‘[force] the affected person farther and farther back into his or 
her long term memory’ (Valle 1998).  Muller-Hergl (2007: 11) takes this further, 
pointing out that ‘it is too easy to say that people with dementia live in the past …
actually they live in a boundless present, in which the past is experienced as present’. 
As Burns et al (1995) note this is something that anyone who has ongoing close 
contact with someone with dementia will recognise.  It is not merely supported by 
anecdote, however.  It is also capable of explanation in neuroscientific terms as a 
changing dynamic between the neocortex and the amygdala (Goleman, 1995).  As 
neurones are lost in an ageing brain, the cognitive control exercised by the neocortex 
weakens, allowing freer expression of the emotions associated with the amygdala 
which have been suppressed in earlier life.  Memories – and the emotions associated 
with them – come flooding back.
Here is an example from fieldnotes I made in a residential home as part of a previous 
observational study.  Throughout the morning Nora had seemed unsettled and had 
asked staff repeatedly, ‘Have they been round with the wages yet?’  Now
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Nora is standing in the middle of the lounge, rocking on her feet slightly, 
craning her neck towards the office.  She looks very tense. It’s as though every 
fibre of her being is fixed on the office window.  The office is locked and 
empty, the lights have been turned off, but there’s enough light from the lounge 
to be able to see a desk, a filing cabinet, a telephone, health and safety posters. 
Nora raises her fist; she looks furious, rigid with anger, ready to cry. “The 
buggers; they’ve locked up - gone home - and they haven’t been round with the 
wages”.
Precisely what Nora was experiencing here is, of course, open to interpretation.  Her 
verbal and non-verbal communication seems, however, to make some interpretations 
more likely than others. Nora may have been employed in a mill or factory where the 
wages were distributed manually each Friday; perhaps, like many women of her 
generation, bringing up children on her own, or in a ‘hand to mouth’ way. If so, the 
non-appearance of her pay packet would be deeply anxiety-provoking.  Nora’s 
worries may have been based on one or more occasions in the past when she had been 
unable to buy food or pay the rent.  Perhaps, also, her wages had been an assurance 
that she was self-supporting and could pay her way.  Without money she may have 
feared that she would be evicted; and this fear may have returned in the context of her 
new state of unwaged dependency in the home.  Even for people who never 
experienced serious debt or homelessness directly, the fear and shame of eviction 
were a significant form of social control in the lifetimes of people who now have 
dementia.
Practice examples of this kind abound; very commonly someone with dementia will 
develop anxieties about, for example, needing to get home in order to feed the 
children, or needing to find their mother, who has been dead for many years. 
Dementia is characterised, then, not only by the loss of short term memory, but also 
by the insistent return of long term memory, and because of this it is more appropriate 
to talk about memory changes, than memory loss, in dementia. Importantly for my 
argument later, it is also significant that something in the present day care home 
reminds Nora of a past experience.  There is in ‘real/present time’ a locked office shut 
off from the lounge, which is reminiscent of her earlier life experience of a locked and 
inaccessible office separating factory workers from their earnings.  Here, rather than 
an event from the past becoming a metaphor for the present experience of dementia – 
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as in the examples from Kitwood (1997a) given in Chapter 1 - it is as though the 
opposite happens.  
The resurgence of memories from earlier life suggests that dementia may be 
particularly open to exploration using a psychoanalytic approach.  Psychoanalytic 
theory sheds a very different light on some of the phenomena commonly observed in 
dementia.  Often, when a person has dementia it is as though the social veneer of what 
we tend to consider ‘civilised behaviour’ has been stripped away.  As cognitive skills 
are lost, the underlying unconscious ways of relating and responding become more 
evident.  A psychoanalytic approach would suggest that there is significance in the 
apparent overemphasis, fragmentation and repetition of speech that are often apparent 
in dementia.  What tends to be described from a medical point of view as 
perseveration (the ‘stuck needle’ phenomenon, in which the person constantly returns 
to the same question or statement), may be understood in psychoanalytic terms as a 
repetition compulsion (Freud 1920, in Gay 1995: 602), an attempt to resolve, by 
repeating, some particularly threatening repressed experience.
Quite often, also, something like a transference reaction (Freud 1905, in Gay 1995: 
234) may take place.  Current carers may be accused of having hurt or deceived a 
person in some way, for example, when the source of the feelings being expressed lies 
in the distant past.  This can be particularly noticeable because a person with dementia 
will often relate to a family member as though s/he is someone else; so a niece may be 
recognised as the person’s mother, or a grandson as a long-dead husband.  What is 
happening here may not be simply a process of cognitive decline, but an unconscious 
attempt to complete some form of unfinished business. 
Dementia and memory loss in mainstream cinema
My purpose in exploring differing definitions of dementia and memory impairment in 
this chapter is to consider how such contested and competing claims find their way 
into arts and media representations – and specifically film.  Such representations then 
compound, or influence in various ways, popular understandings of dementia. Films 
aimed at the mass market need to have dramatic appeal and rely on themes that 
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audiences will find thrilling or moving.  Aspects of mental health in general, when 
represented in film, thus tend to follow well-worn themes of love triumphing over 
adversity, the madman-criminal, or the presumed link between insanity and genius 
(Cassey 2005).  Greenberg (2003: 807, emphasis added) notes that in its treatment of 
mental health issues ‘mainstream cinema especially, if not always reliably, 
foregrounds amnesia, multiple personality disorder and other dissociative reactions 
because of their inherent melodramatic potential’.  Baxendale (2004) argues that from 
the viewpoint of clinical neuropsychology, most amnesic conditions in Hollywood 
films bear little relation to reality.
If mainstream cinema is at all interested in dementia, then, this is likely to be because 
exciting things can be done with the concept of memory loss. There have been 
relatively few mainstream feature films with dementia as a major theme to date, and 
those that are in existence focus on memory loss as their central trope.  These films 
fall into two clear categories.  The first consists of thrillers and action movies 
featuring male protagonists whose early-onset dementia or traumatically induced 
amnesia must be overcome in order to complete their quest (Safe House 1998; 
Memento 2001; Memory of a Killer 2005). In these films memory loss is a sub-plot 
which adds to the dramatic tension, and it seems unlikely that the makers of films of 
this genre will be particularly interested in authenticity of representation, provided the 
storyline works effectively.  
The second category consists of romantic dramas in which the central female 
character has dementia.  These films clearly aim for a much greater degree of 
verisimilitude with real life cases, and have in most cases been conscientiously 
researched.  Unsurprisingly, though, when we consider the differences of ‘expert 
opinion’ discussed above, each of them presents a distorted view of the nature of 
memory changes in dementia.  I now want to consider in a little more detail three such 
films that were mentioned briefly in the last chapter (The Notebook 2004; Away from 
Her 2006; Iris 2001) in order to show how definitional problems related to dementia 
impinge upon the representation of the characters in those films.
76
The Notebook: long-term memory lost
The Notebook (dir. Nick Cassavetes) is a romance, described by one viewer as ‘senile 
dementia meets Mills and Boon’. Told largely in flashback, the film shows a male 
visitor recounting to an old woman in a care home the story of the central characters, 
Noah and Allie.  Born on different sides of the Southern US tracks in the 1920s, Noah 
and Allie fell in love and were then separated by war and parental deceit. Gradually 
we realise that the man reading the story is Noah, that Allie now has dementia, and 
that he is reading her their story because she can no longer remember it. As Basting 
(2005) points out, Allie is, however, able to follow the story being told to her in the 
present day, and to ask relevant questions about it without any evidence of stumbling 
over words.
The representation of Allie in The Notebook – as someone who is coherent in the 
present, but has forgotten the most significant events in her past - is thus almost a 
direct reversal of what would usually be observed in life. A more typical scenario 
would be one where Allie remembered and talked about the past – particularly events 
of emotional importance – whilst having relatively little ability to follow what was 
happening in the present.  
Away from Her: short term memory regained
Away from Her (dir. Sarah Polley) tells the story of a husband (Grant) struggling to 
cope with his wife, Fiona’s, early-onset dementia.  Following her diagnosis they read 
to each other from standard texts about the bleak prognosis. At one point we are 
shown an exterior shot of their Canadian lakeside cabin at night with the lights going 
off in rapid succession to symbolize the death of neurones.  Following an incident in 
which Fiona gets lost away from the cabin, she decides, unilaterally and somewhat 
peremptorily, that it is time to go into residential care.  The nursing home has a no 
visiting policy for the first 30 days (Polley has acknowledged in an interview that this 
is not typical in Canadian care facilities, but says it is ‘an important device in the 
film’).  During this time Fiona appears to forget Grant’s existence and forms a strong 
attachment to another resident, Aubrey, who is mute and wheelchair-bound.  
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Grant suspects – and we are encouraged to sympathise with him – that Fiona’s 
‘forgetting’ of his existence is really revenge for his infidelities with his college 
students 20 years earlier.  When Aubrey’s wife removes him from the care home 
having run out of money to pay for his care, Fiona declines into apathy and 
disorientation.  In a rather contrived ending, Grant heroically brings Aubrey and Fiona 
back together, only to find that Fiona now magically recognises him again.  Earlier in 
the film Grant has been warned by a nurse that Fiona will continue to have occasional 
lucid moments, so this ending can be read as a concealed twist.  On the other hand, it 
leaves the impression of dementia as a form of memory loss that can be magically 
reversed by the self-sacrificing acts of others.  
Iris:  the death that leaves the body behind
Iris (dir. Richard Eyre) is a biopic about the novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch, 
who was diagnosed with dementia in her 70s.  The most serious of the three films 
considered here, it has received considerable critical acclaim.  More impressive as a 
film than The Notebook or Away from Her, the flashback style in which scenes from 
Murdoch’s final years are intercut with scenes from her Oxford heyday and early 
relationship with her husband John Bayley is both effective and disturbing.  At many 
points it seems to convey the message that everything about Murdoch’s life is to be 
understood in terms of it having ended with dementia.  McColgan et al (2000) note 
that obituaries that appeared at the time of Murdoch’s death, almost all referred in 
some way to the irony of a great mind ‘destroyed’.
Iris is based on John Bayley’s memoir of Murdoch, and thus on his own subjective 
memory and version of reality.  The idea of dementia as a ‘death that leaves the body 
behind’ - in which social death precedes physical death - is a strong theme, and its 
essential dualism is exacerbated by the near-relish with which the camera lingers on 
scenes of Murdoch transfixed in front of the Tellytubbies, by contrast with flashbacks 
showing her incisive debating skills at Oxford dinner parties.  
Twenty five years ago Pitt (1982: 39) said of dementia, ‘sometimes it seems as if the 
true self dies long before the body’s death, and in the intervening years a smudged 
caricature disintegrates noisily and without dignity into chaos.’   This is a view that 
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continues to be perpetuated in audio-visual media. For example, an episode from a 
recent TV drama series (Afterlife, ITV, 24.9.05) claimed, ‘It’s Alzheimer’s…it’s 
worse than death…The brain dies and the body carries on without it’.  This idea of 
dementia as a living death, the ‘death that leaves the body behind’, and of the person 
with dementia as an automaton or zombie is a striking cultural metaphor and one to 
which I will return later. 
For the moment I want to reiterate the point that films such as those discussed above, 
used uncritically for educational purposes, may well perpetuate misunderstandings 
about dementia and reinforce stereotypical views.  They may, of course, stimulate 
discussion, and that discussion, if skilfully facilitated, may lead to the development of 
an increased critical awareness.  Mainstream feature films are not, however, 
necessarily the automatic route to enlightenment that some advocates of arts-based 
approaches to health and social care education have suggested.
Film and collective consciousness: memory loss as a cultural phenomenon
Whilst films with an overt theme related to dementia are still rare, as Basting (2005) 
points out, memory loss itself is an increasingly popular theme in Hollywood films 
aimed at mass audiences.  Interestingly, in terms of my thesis, Basting traces the 
beginnings of this movement in a post World War II wave of imagery where the 
impetus was to ‘forget’ that war and pursue the American Dream of the future.  Films 
which form part of this wave of literal and symbolic post-war amnesia include 
Random Harvest 1942; Deadline at Dawn 1946; Somewhere in the Night 1946 and 
Hitchcock’s Spellbound 1945, the first film to introduce Freudian psychoanalysis to 
the mainstream cinema.
A new wave of films related to memory loss followed in the 1980s and 90s.  Perhaps 
in keeping with the shift in perception of Hollywood as a wish-fulfilling ‘dream 
factory’ in the post war years, to increasing recognition of the trashiness of ‘La-La 
Land’ and the end of the post-war dream, the common themes have now become 
darker.  Often they seem to centre on unease over the real or perceived potential for 
technology to manipulate human memory. Blade Runner (dir. Ridley Scott 1982) is an 
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obvious example of this type of film.  In it, replicants created to do menial work, and 
with limited life spans, are implanted with memories that convince them they are 
human, ie real, until the time arrives for them to be ‘terminated’.   Post (1998: 78), in 
his critique of the ‘hypercognitivity’ of modern Western society, suggests that Blade 
Runner is an apt allegory for the differential value that society places on those who 
do, and do not, have dementia.  If we believe that memory is what makes us human, 
Post asks, will it become socially acceptable to terminate those who do not have 
memories? ‘In future decades, as more people lose their memories, will we find 
ourselves so burdened by economic and caregiving pressures that nonvoluntary 
euthanasia of the most deeply forgetful becomes commonplace?’ Whilst this is 
another example of the somewhat crude misrepresentation of dementia as global 
amnesia, the question itself, as will be discussed further below, has become an even 
more urgent one in the years since Post raised it.  Cooley (2007), for example, has 
recently suggested that people diagnosed with dementia are under a Kantian moral 
obligation to take their own lives in order to prevent the loss of their moral identity as 
the condition progresses.  An Internet search today reveals more than quarter of a 
million sites on dementia and euthanasia.
Standard definitions and mainstream films locate memory loss within the person and 
attribute it to neurological impairment. Sources such as those discussed in this section 
suggest, however, that there is a collective, societal forgetting in film, which 
corresponds to Jacoby’s (1975; 1996) concept of social amnesia.  Basting (2005) 
suggests that the current plethora of films related to memory loss from accidental, 
technological or criminal causes (by comparison with the tiny number that are overtly 
about dementia) is evidence of a repressed fear of dementia in society among the post-
war baby boom generation.  Whilst baby boomers tend to be thought of as an 
articulate and powerful group in society, the baby boom generation in the US is also 
of course the Vietnam generation. Selig (1994) points to the damage to the national 
psyche arising from the Vietnam war, which he suggests is recognised increasingly 
not just as having been ‘lost’, but as having been ‘wrong’.  Many Hollywood films 
about Vietnam, Selig suggests, attempt to heal the national psyche through the 
character of a male hero who remains honourable in the face of the dissolution and 
ineptitude of older male authority figures (Apocalypse Now 1979; Platoon 1986).  In 
this way, Selig argues, ‘a victory can be contrived for a history which is experienced 
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as a loss, desire can be satisfied while the particulars of social history are sacrificed…
This subordination of history to subjectivity permits the reconstitution of a national 
identity based on moral judgement rather than political actions, an identity that is  
fundamentally ahistorical’ (Selig 1994: 5 emphasis added).  Vietnam films are, in this 
view, another vehicle for social amnesia.
The provenance of Ex Memoria
I want to turn now to Ex Memoria, and examine the ways in which it differs, in its 
depiction of dementia, from the mainstream feature films discussed above and how it 
helps to contribute to an understanding of dementia as an interplay between past and 
present, in which time is not experienced in linear progression but through repetition 
and return.  Specifically, Ex Memoria is based on personal observation and 
biographical data.  It references historical events which have, in some way or other, 
shaped the lives of all those in the Western and post-colonial worlds who now have 
dementia.  It raises the possibility that those who have dementia may experience the 
return of repressed memories of such events.  Finally, it draws our attention to the 
ways in which present day dementia care may prompt the resurfacing of traumatic 
memories.
The script of Ex Memoria, already in existence at the time Wellcome Trust funding 
was awarded, was not underpinned by any specialist knowledge or existing model of 
dementia.  It took a personal slant on writer/ director Appignanesi’s experiences of 
visiting his Polish grandmother, Hena Borenstejn, in the final years of her life when 
she was in a Jewish care home in London, and on his attempts to find some way of 
connecting imaginatively with her.   
She could no longer construct the story or image of herself.  Her language had 
disintegrated into fragments of sense and stray words, often spoken in a Polish 
or Yiddish she had rarely used in 50 years, and addressed to people long since 
departed…Grandma was someone ‘known’ who suddenly became unknown – 
thereby revealing what had been lost in the forms and conventions of social 
life, namely that she was never known and had always been a stranger 
(Appignanesi J and Baum 2006: 85-86).
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I do not wish to suggest in what follows that I am wholly uncritical of Ex Memoria. 
There are some scenes in the film that I think work less well than they might have 
done, and some awkward lines of dialogue. The script in its original form, however, 
already showed an engagement with the experiential nature of dementia not present in 
the mainstream feature films discussed above – the return of memories, relationships 
and ways of being that social convention has required the person to suppress. People 
with dementia, it is noted, are frequently in search of the dead; they wish to speak 
with the dead.  Often they mistake the living for the dead, as Eva – the central 
character in the film - mistakes her grandsons for her lost brother.
Appignanesi’s original script was, then, based on a form of naturalistic observation – 
a detailed phenomenological engagement with what is happening at the minute-by-
minute micro-level of one person’s experience.  Whilst using some artistic licence, Ex 
Memoria is also based loosely on Hena Borenstejn’s life story - material which 
grounds it in a historical past and encourages consideration of lived events as they 
resurface in the context of dementia.  The requirements of assimilation to a new 
culture, the silencing of wartime experience, the need to keep family skeletons firmly 
in the cupboard, all emerge here as aspects of repressed experience which return in 
dementia. Although Ex Memoria is a storied version of events, then, it is also based 
on things ‘as they happened’ on both interpersonal and historical levels.  There is no 
suggestion that we are being told ‘what really happened’ – indeed the film is 
deliberately, if not wilfully, enigmatic on this score - but there is a moral concern with 
the authenticity of representation and memorialisation of a singular woman.
Ex Memoria is based on an earlier memoir, Losing the dead, written by Hena’s 
daughter about the family’s attempts to find out many years afterwards what had 
become of Hena’s older brother, Adek, who disappeared without trace in the latter 
years of the war.  When Hena developed dementia, she became fixated on the idea of 
Adek’s return, frequently misrecognising other people for him.  ‘It is to happen again 
and again.  She sees her brother here, there and everywhere.  He is a restless ghost, 
unburied’ (Appignanesi L, 2000: 78).   The search for Adek is carried out in a present 
day Poland where the past has been mythologised, disowned, re-written.  Documents 
are missing; landscapes are altered; graves remain unmarked.  Such absences from the 
official records and censorings of history are also absences in the accepted history of 
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dementia.  Missing from both the dominant discourse on dementia and its conformist 
psycho-social corrective is any real consideration of the centrality of the ‘war years’ 
(the parentheses of 1939-45 are not broad enough to capture them) in the experience 
of people who now have dementia. 
‘Some memories fade – others keep returning’:  the return of the repressed
In the memoir Losing the dead, Hena last sees Adek from the window of a tram in 
1943 when she is already a married woman in her mid-20s with a young child. ‘She 
waves gaily.  She points Adek out to the others and for a moment they all wave.  They 
are delighted to see him, but they do not leap off the trolley to embrace him.  They do 
not realise that they will never see him again’ (Appignanesi L, 2000: 173).  Although 
Adek’s real-life loss was traumatic, then, this was something which became apparent 
only later, by association, and by speculation on the many different fates that might 
have befallen him.  The last sighting is an everyday occurrence which is only later 
revealed in its true – extreme - significance (Rothberg, 2000).  
In the dramatised version, by distinction, the time scale is shifted; the separation 
between brother and sister shown here is abrupt and violent, taking place soon after 
the invasion of Poland when Eva (the character based on Hena Borenstejn) is a girl 
still only in her teens. Here the traumatic nature of the separation between Eva and 
Adek is very clear. Off-screen German voices, gunshots, the sound of a receding 
vehicle and Adek’s desperate cry to his sister add to the dramatic tension.  
Later in the film we see Eva driven to distraction by the cumulative effect of small 
coincidences, repetitions and parallelisms between her wartime experience and life in 
the care home.  The sights and sounds of the home – the ghetto Eva has not managed 
to avoid – bring back in all its visceral immediacy the familiar dread of discovery, 
containment, annihilation. Eva finds the care home where she is now living out her 
final years so reminiscent of her wartime experiences that she makes a second bid for 
freedom by offering herself to a member of the care staff she takes to be a high 
ranking official - whether German or Allied we should perhaps not rush to judge.
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In these scenes, there is also a strong sense of the unheimlich (or uncanny).  The first 
line spoken by the older Eva in the lounge of the care home is, ‘I think we should 
go home now…’  Whilst Eva is now in what is euphemistically described as a ‘home’, 
then, she is not at home, and in a doubly ironic sense, the home to which she wishes 
to return no longer exists.  As for many people with dementia in long-term care 
settings, who become restless at particular times of day and want to go home, the 
desired destination is now a place in the memory and in the heart only.  In a literal 
sense, of course, someone who repeatedly states the wish to return home may mean, 
‘Please take me back to 27 Milton Street where I used to live happily with my 
family’.  Beyond this, however, there often seems to be a desire – as in Eva’s case - to 
return to a safe place before all the trouble began, a place which now only exists in 
fantasy; which perhaps only ever existed there.  
All people with dementia who have to move into formal care, become to some extent 
displaced persons, and the experience of this ‘un-homing’ is likely to be exacerbated 
by anything in the new environment that reminds the person of unpleasant past 
experiences, or even experiences that were not perceived as disturbing at the time, but 
which become so because of their untoward repetition.   As Freud puts it in his 1919 
essay ‘the uncanny is that class of the frightening which leads back towards what is 
known of old and long familiar’ (Strachey, ed 1953: 220).  Looking back at the 
fieldnote on Nora earlier in this chapter we might see her fear of not being paid at the 
end of the week as a legitimate source of anxiety but not sufficiently threatening to be 
considered traumatic.  If, however, we think of this as Nora encountering again in the 
residential home something which is eerily (and at the same time drearily) familiar – 
the old grinding worry in this new context of having no money, and not being able to 
pay for things – this perception of somehow having come back to the same place 
becomes genuinely uncanny, unheimlich (alzheimlich we might almost say, in this 
context).  In Ex Memoria, similarly, there is a scene where Eva is left sitting alone 
beside a glass lift, which - for some reason we can only guess at - fills her with deep 
misgivings.  It seems fair to assume, however, that anxieties from her past related to 
enclosure and visibility coalesce here (see illustration on following page).
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From Ex Memoria: Eva beside the glass lift
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Many people who lived through the war years will have had directly traumatic 
experiences of loss, violent separation, and the various compromises made in order to 
survive that were equivalent to, or worse than, those implied for Eva in Ex Memoria. 
The very extremity of Eva’s experience may lead, however, to doubts about its 
general relevance in understanding the nature of dementia.  The challenges of 
condensing ‘Eva’s war’ to fit the constraints of a short film with a limited budget, to 
do this with dramatic intensity, and without the need for excessive narration or 
additional sets, mean that everything has to be conveyed in one scene a couple of 
minutes long.  We see what is happening only through Eva’s immediate reactions to 
off-screen events.
The events depicted in the original script of Ex Memoria thus already raised 
interesting, if as yet inoperational, theoretical questions which will be discussed 
further in subsequent chapters. The final section of this chapter outlines briefly some 
of the changes and additions to the script that were made during the advisory 
workgroup process.
Developing the script of Ex Memoria
The workgroup appointed to act as advisors on the development of the existing script 
consisted of three lecturers in Dementia Studies, a representative of the local 
Alzheimer’s Society branch, and two practitioners (one a reminiscence project 
worker, and one an occupational therapist).  The group met twice in December 2004 
and January 2005 and the remainder of the discussion was carried on by email over 
subsequent months leading up to the film shoot in July 2005.  In all there were five 
versions of the script from the point of funding award to film shoot, and – no doubt 
inevitably – there are still differences between the version of the script used on set and 
the finished film.  Whilst there were numerous changes to the script during the 
development process, however, the core content and order of events shown in the film 
in fact altered very little.  
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Rather than detailing exhaustively here the changes that were made and discussions 
about them, I propose to pick this up in detail when discussing the findings in a later 
chapter.  Here, I will just comment on three particularly significant aspects of the 
script development.  The first relates to Eva’s use of lipstick in the film.  One 
contributor to the first script development meeting felt strongly that a woman with 
dementia living in a care home would not be capable of forming the intention to put 
on lipstick, let alone to complete the action – as in the film – without a mirror. 
Appignanesi was, however, adamant that his grandmother continued to put on bright 
red lipstick every day, almost up until the end of her life.  In the film itself the lipstick 
theme was actually strengthened, in such a way that it makes a link between Eva’s 
past and her present.  
From a biomedical perspective, this underlines the dangers of generalising about the 
actions of any one person with dementia on the basis of a ‘stage’ model of cognitive 
decline. From the arts side of the project, however, it has also since occurred to me 
that lipstick is a potent symbol in film, and particularly so in film noir.  In Black 
Narcissus (dir. Powell and Pressburger 1947) for example, there is a lingering scene 
in which the application of bright red lipstick is used to indicate the fall from 
innocence of a nun, Sister Ruth. In some ways what we are given in Ex Memoria 
could be regarded as the before and after of film noir; scenes from a life that we don’t 
usually see.  In the first scene Eva is the femme who has not yet become fatale, and in 
the rest of the film a much older woman who still believes that she can use her 
feminine wiles to seduce men into helping her.  In this sense there may well have 
been an artistic incentive to retain the lipstick as a cultural icon of the feminine.
The second sticking point related to the scene just mentioned where Eva makes 
advances to a young male careworker, apparently under the impression that he is a 
high ranking official who can help her to get her papers sorted out.  The film clearly 
attempts to present Eva as someone whom staff will find challenging in various ways; 
we are made to confront her as Jewish, as a refugee, as a non-native speaker of 
English, as potentially racist, as manipulative.  All of this seemed to be accepted 
within the workgroup without demur.  The idea that Eva might make overt sexual 
overtures and use explicitly sexual language seemed, however, to arouse more 
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disquiet; in the form, for example, of assertions that people with dementia become 
uninterested in sex and only want affection.  
Whilst there is little published research in this area, Miller et al (1995) claimed that 24 
percent of people with dementia became sexually apathetic, whilst Cummings and 
Victoroff (1990) claimed to have found evidence of increased libido in 14 percent. 
This would suggest, perhaps, that levels of interest in sex or sexual expression remain 
relatively unchanged in the remaining 62 percent.  Ward et al (2005) have more 
recently pointed out that the almost constant surveillance in most long term care 
facilities makes any overt sexual expression almost impossible.  This scene in the film 
is intended to be an indication of the lengths Eva was prepared to go to in order to 
retain her freedom, but the script is ambiguous about the extent to which this is the 
result of a traumatic event, as it has her speaking the lines to the careworker 
‘lasciviously’.  In the event, however, this scene was watered down considerably; 
predominantly, I think, to avoid ‘embarrassment by association’ for members of the 
workgroup.
Finally, two main contributions to the script from the dementia studies side were, first, 
the incorporation of some examples of the speech of people with dementia which 
came from research interview transcripts and, second, the integration of  items from 
Kitwood’s list of types of ‘malignant social psychology’ (see Fig 2).  My impression 
is that the interview transcript material genuinely enhanced the script.  It was taken 
from life, and showed a variety of ways in which the speech of people with dementia 
may change, something which is very difficult to get right in dialogue.  Some people 
in the interview transcripts had word-finding problems and were very hesitant, whilst 
others had what tends to be described as ‘fluent dysphasia’ – rambling, circuitous 
speech - in which the form of normal speech is preserved but the meaning is difficult 
to discern.  This latter example was used to good effect for the character, Jenny, one 
of the care home residents in the film.  In a stylistic twist, some of Jenny’s 
‘disordered’ speech is then echoed in the mobile phone conversation of Eva’s visiting 
grandson.  By contrast, in my own view, the speech of Eva herself convinces less as 
that of a person with dementia, since it is more syntactically intact and less 
fragmented or allusive than might be expected.  This is, perhaps, why a colleague not 
involved in the workgroup commented that the acting of the central character was 
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‘good if you overlook that it was dementia that was being portrayed…she just seems 
mildly confused’.
The second contribution - the addition of examples of malignant social psychology – 
whilst it does not detract from the film’s value for general audiences – has, I think, 
had implications for its educational use in the context of the module The Social  
Psychology of Dementia Care. This emerges as one of the main themes in my later 
discussion of findings in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Chapter 4) Introducing Ex Memoria into the dementia studies 
curriculum: visuality, ethics and identification
…by focusing on the hidden details of familiar objects, by exploring 
commonplace milieus under the ingenious guidance of the camera, the film on 
the one hand extends our comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives: 
on the other hand, it manages to assure us of an immense and unexpected field 
of action…With the close-up, space expands; with slow motion, movement is 
extended…Evidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to 
the naked eye…
                                                          (Benjamin, 1936: 15)
Introduction
In the previous chapter I suggested – somewhat against the current assumptions of the 
arts and health movement in education – that mainstream feature films on dementia 
and memory loss may often work to perpetuate stereotypes and misinform viewers. I 
also discussed the reasons why I believed Ex Memoria might offer a more authentic 
representation of dementia than many mainstream feature films.  In this chapter I want 
to develop this argument further by focusing specifically on the visuality of moving 
image.  This is also the point in my thesis where I move from theoretical background 
to intervention in my own practice, and I discuss here the benefits and potential 
disadvantages I foresaw in introducing Ex Memoria into the Dementia Studies 
curriculum.   The question of authenticity is also one of ethics, and ethical 
considerations of one kind or another are the main subject of this chapter.
First, there is the ethics of visual representation of those with dementia, and the ways 
in which viewers may identify, fail to identify, or overidentify with the person so 
presented.  Ex Memoria - according to the funding proposal to Wellcome Trust - is 
intended to ‘teach empathy’; that is – according to the Oxford Concise English 
Dictionary (1995: 442, emphasis added) - ‘the power of identifying oneself mentally 
with, and so fully comprehending, a person or object of contemplation’.  Fully 
comprehending the other is a humanistic, enlightenment project consistent with the 
aims of the arts and health movement.  Ex Memoria seeks, however, to bring about 
this identification by way of rupture, disturbance and the ‘unsettling’ of more familiar 
ways of seeing. The proposal to the Wellcome Trust suggests that it will present ‘a 
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vision of dementia that actively, powerfully confounds their assumptions and 
prejudices’.  This raised interesting questions about how it would be received by 
practitioner audiences who were not (any more than I was myself) practiced film 
critics, and whose previous encounters with educational film were more likely to have 
been through didactic and instructional training material.  
In addition, I needed to consider the basic research ethics of ‘doing no harm’ toward 
students in the conduct of the intervention in my own practice required for the 
doctorate in education.  This intervention involved introducing Ex Memoria into the 
module The Social Psychology of Dementia Care and basing an assessed assignment 
on the film. These assignments were then treated as data. Any decision about 
changing the nature or content of assessed work which might have implications for 
students’ confidence in tackling the assignment or the marks they subsequently 
achieved for it clearly had to be based on sound andragogic1 principles and could not 
be justified for research purposes alone.  There was a possibility that students might 
find the film confusing or ambiguous to the extent that they could not interpret the 
action or apply the theoretical material covered in the module.  The need to avoid 
subjecting part-time, working student-participants to additional pressures on their time 
had also to be balanced against any possible disadvantages of using their assignments 
as data.  
There is also an ethics of authenticity and accountability in my own writing of the 
research.  Particular dilemmas arose over the ‘order of telling’ and the voice(s) I adopt 
at each stage.  The time of writing research is asynchronous with the time of doing 
research and the temptations of being wise after the event are very great.  At the point 
where I initially constructed the rationale for introducing Ex Memoria into the 
curriculum I still conceptualised this intervention as an action research project. This 
would imply that some form of ‘improvement’ in students’ assignments should be 
discernible as a result of the intervention.  I was, however, reluctant to define what 
might be the criteria for recognising such an improvement.  Simultaneously I took it 
____________________________________________________________________ 
1 Andragogy is a term popularised by Knowles (1984) in order to draw attention to the differences 
between adult education and the education of children (pedagogy).  
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for granted that any difference that was apparent would be solely the result of the 
film.  Brown and Jones (2001: 99) suggest that action research “begs key questions 
about where our ideas about what counts as ‘improvement’ come from…these issues 
are more complex than action research has so far acknowledged”.  At the end of this 
chapter I have identified a point at which my initial, implied project – my use of film 
as an intervention in practice designed to ‘cure’ participants’ writing of its biomedical 
persuasions – turns back on itself in a reflexive movement which requires me to re-
examine both my own educational practice and the temporality of research writing.
Visuality and moving image
In this first section I discuss the advantages I originally perceived in introducing 
visual media into the predominantly print-based distance learning programmes we 
were providing at the start of this project.  An obvious and pragmatic one was the 
capacity for moving image to break up the reams of written-word material that 
Dementia Studies students receive in the form of set books, core study material, 
learning support material, and reading lists.  In addition students also receive generic 
print-based material from both the School of Health Studies and the central 
University, much of which – because it is aimed at full-time school leavers – is 
irrelevant to adult, part-time, distance learners and may even have an alienating 
impact.  I suspect that some students feel overwhelmed from the outset by ‘text-
overload’, and that this material all too rapidly takes on a similar status as ‘things that 
should be read’, but which offers little stimulus actually to do so. Students may thus 
make little distinction between the centrally important case study on page 58 of their 
latest course module, and student handbook information about facilities at the sports 
centre.  
Using moving image as an alternative way of presenting case study material thus 
seemed an attractive option to the static, print-based approach. It seemed likely that 
students who saw reading as a course-related chore would have more positive 
associations with film, not only as the visual representation of a practice setting, but 
also because of its association with pleasurable leisure activities. Miles and Plate 
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(2004) among others, point to film’s potential for creating identification with the other 
through the intensity of the visual experience itself, and MacDougall (1998: 262) 
suggests that in film ‘we achieve identification with others through a synchrony with 
their bodies made possible in large part by vision’.  Mullarkey (2007: 54) takes this 
further, suggesting that filmed fiction, specifically, creates an identification with its 
characters – an experience of feeling real emotion towards people who are not real – 
through the perception of movement, which is what ‘makes people come alive for us, 
not just in make-believe, but at a very present and real level of our perception’.  
As mentioned in chapter 2, when students were asked to base assignments for The 
Social Psychology of Dementia Care on self-selected incidents from care practice 
they often struggled to identify a specific critical incident, or to be able to recall it in 
sufficient detail.  Using film, they are provided with an incident that can be watched 
several times in order to draw out its details and engage with the sequence of events in 
depth.  The intensive focus on a specific person with dementia – the foregrounding of 
her experience by visual and auditory means – might be expected to encourage a 
greater awareness of the impact of moment-by-moment care. Observational studies of 
dementia care practice (eg Hallbierg et al, 1995; Ward, 2005) indicate that episodes of 
verbal or non-verbal communication between caregivers and people with dementia are 
generally brief in duration, and tend to be restricted to the exchange of greetings, or to 
giving task-orientated instructions or routine information, such as the time of the next 
meal.  Even though it is a short film, Ex Memoria thus demands a much longer period 
of engagement, and a greater intensity of encounter, than would routinely happen in 
day-to-day care environments.  
Additional advantages I anticipated were that students would be able to discuss the 
actions of fictional care staff without having to reveal real life incidents which might 
be felt to reflect badly on themselves, their colleagues or their workplace.  This would 
go some way towards meeting Balfour’s (2006) recommendation that caregivers 
should be enabled to express feelings arising from their work in such a way that their 
own emotions do not affect the quality of care they are able to give. Academic staff 
assessing the assignment would also know what the student had seen, and - when 
giving feedback - would be able to refer students to specific events or interactions 
whose details they may have overlooked.   
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Many aspects of the rationale for adopting Ex Memoria as the basis of a coursework 
assignment were thus based on considerations of its visuality.  Whilst postmodernism 
has often been described as the ‘linguistic turn’ because of its critical attention to the 
centrality of the word (logos) and text, a number of writers have argued that the 
increasing dominance of the visual image (ikonos) in postmodern culture demands a 
visual or pictorial turn.  
The visual turn
Debate about the primacy of visual imagery in the modern age goes back at least to 
the work of Benjamin (1936) whose essay on the Work of art in the age of  
mechanical reproduction has been an influence on many later writers.  Benjamin 
suggests that film enriches perception in much the same way that the Freudian notion 
of parapraxis (jokes, slips of the tongue and so on) can enlighten our understanding of 
what is happening beneath the surface of a conversation; ‘for the entire spectrum of 
optical, and now also acoustical, perception the film has brought about a similar 
deepening of apperception’ (1936: 14).  Benjamin’s work is cited by Berger (1972) as 
an inspiration for his own seminal text, Ways of seeing.  Berger (1972: 7) points out 
that ‘seeing comes before words…It is seeing which establishes our place in the 
surrounding world; we explain that world with words, but words can never undo the 
fact that we are surrounded by it’.  
More recently, Mitchell (1994) suggested that a transition is taking place from a 
culture dominated by the book, to one dominated by cinema, video and other forms of 
pictorial representation.  Devereux and Hillman (1995) predicted a time when 
university students would understand the world predominantly through the 
representations of the visual media, with written texts and books in a subordinate role. 
Bowles (2002), whilst noting a traditional hesitance on the part of historians to use 
film as a teaching resource, also argues that the dominance of cinematic images in 
today’s audio-visually saturated culture will inevitably continue to grow.  As 
discussed in the next section, however, things become considerably more complex 
when we consider the different set of associations and contexts within which each 
person encounters a film.
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In a recent publication, Jamieson (2007) supports the notion of the primacy of the 
visual, based fundamentally on the direct physiological connection between eye and 
brain.  Sight, he reminds us, is a sense – belonging to nature – in a way that language 
is not.  Jamieson is, however, careful to point out that the apparent ‘innocence’ of 
seeing – the notion of an unmediated one-to-oneness between eye and world - is 
illusory, and he quotes Barthes (1973) on the dangers of assuming that visual images 
can ever have the innocence we associate with nature. As Barthes suggested, in 
accepting any image as ‘natural’ (or given) we ignore its history and all the culturally 
and ideologically contingent ways in which it can be construed.  It is interesting to 
note here that the call for a visual turn ultimately requires recourse to the all-
pervading logos if we are to do anything with images beyond merely registering their 
existence.   Hence the vast array of books, reviews and journal articles devoted to film 
studies today.
Denotation and connotation
Barthes (1977) distinguishes between denotation (in this case what is represented in a 
film – its intended reading) and connotation (the way its meaning is interpreted on the 
basis of the viewer’s lived experience and unconscious associations). Although what 
is denoted in Ex Memoria is the same in each copy of the DVD provided to students, 
at a connotative level no two people will ever see the same film.  As Jamieson (2007: 
70) puts it, there is a ‘proliferation of connoted meanings that visual images can set in 
train…at the tacit level, below that of consciousness…a maze of pathways which 
have not been envisaged by the image maker’.  
My own reactions to the first scene in Ex Memoria show several instances of this 
form of connotative meaning.  For example
Having watched the film several times, I started to think about its broader 
religious and ideological connotations.  Here are Eva and Adek (in one script 
version he was, briefly, called Adam until the association was pointed out) in a 
kind of pre-lapsarian Eden.  Eva is presented as paradoxically naïve but 
knowing – a proto-temptress, about to fall from innocence.  This fall is 
somehow linked to Adek’s own ‘fall’ (his capture) whilst Eva herself goes on 
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to survive ‘somehow’ by stealth.  Has Eva betrayed her brother to the Nazi 
serpent? Has she eaten fruit from the wrong kind of tree? 
At the beginning of the next scene, in the lounge of the nursing home, the first 
member of staff to enter crosses the room and picks up – from somewhere 
behind Eva – a half eaten apple…
And elsewhere
There are fairy tale elements here….the young girl walking through a wood 
carrying her bag of goodies; the ‘wolf’ hiding behind a tree…Then we come 
to the grandmother’s house.  Is it more frightening to find out that grand-
mother and wolf are one and the same, or that grandmother and young girl are 
the same?
Connotation is, of course, culturally relative and viewers familiar with different 
creation myths, folklore or oral histories would be likely to draw on these traditions – 
consciously or otherwise - to produce different connotative meanings.  It seems likely 
also that my political commitments and stance on gender inequalities will have 
coloured my dislike of the way the younger Eva – intended to be 16 but played by a 
considerably older actor - is presented to the camera in the first scene.  In this scene 
Eva, believing herself unobserved, checks her appearance in a compact mirror and 
practices a seductive walk (see illustration on the following page)
My recorded reactions included the following
Young Eva seems to be a bit of a caricature.  Her pouting and preening are 
rather studied - almost like a mime act. I felt uncomfortable with this when I 
first watched it.  There's something unpleasantly voyeuristic about watching 
somebody who – whilst believing she can't be seen - is simultaneously putting 
herself ‘on display’.  Whilst we watch Eva looking at herself in the mirror; 
Eva imagines herself seen by invisible admirers…
Berger (1972: 51) points out that the mirror has often been used as a symbol of the 
vanity of women, when ‘The real function of the mirror was otherwise.  It was to 
make the woman connive in treating herself as, first and foremost, a sight’. The way 
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From Ex Memoria: Young Eva in the wood.
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Eva is presented in this first scene, direct to camera, ‘offers up her femininity as the 
surveyed’.    The camera’s treatment of young Eva in this scene perhaps pre-figures 
the intensity of the forced encounter with her older self in the remainder of the film. 
In the next section I discuss how aspects of the ‘film as a film’ may help or hinder 
viewers’ engagement with it, and the risks this may involve in the context of 
practitioner education.
Using arthouse film in an educational context: what are the risks?
The original script of Ex Memoria was not written with practitioner education in 
mind, and whilst the funding from Wellcome Trust was for projects intended to 
increase public awareness, this was quite broadly defined.  My decision to use what is 
essentially an arthouse film in a specific educational context is one that I have to take 
full responsibility for. This decision was influenced to some extent by my views on 
the nature of teaching and learning in adult education, which I take to be a non-
didactic exchange between equals.  Although I have no reason to think that care 
practitioners are less likely than anyone else to be able to engage with a film that is 
deliberately ambiguous and open to interpretations, I was also aware that there were a 
number of risks in introducing Ex Memoria into the curriculum.  
The film’s avoidance of standard cues such as voice-overs or subtitles to provide 
context may, for example, make it difficult for students to work out what was 
happening in the first scene, or where and when the action was intended to be taking 
place.   Eva’s appearance in the first scene is, intentionally, Aryan and assimilated. 
Her Jewishness can only be deduced from the one line in the script that refers to her 
avoidance of the Warsaw ghetto.  Some Polish and German phrases are used without 
interpretation, and whilst all the characters with speaking parts are given names in the 
end credits, a number of their names are not actually used during the film.  I realised 
rather belatedly that this makes it difficult for viewers to link specific lines of 
dialogue with the characters who speak them.  As will be discussed further below, this 
meant that I had to make some decisions, as an educator, about how much extra-filmic 
information to provide students with.
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Making the familiar strange: mise en scène in Ex Memoria
As with all films there is in Ex Memoria, not just a narrative (or implied narrative) to 
be considered but also the film ‘as a film’, its mise-en-scène  or ‘repertoire of 
elements’: that is the set, lighting, costumes, props, camerawork, and the directorial 
style with which these elements are presented (Monaco, 2000).  Much of Ex 
Memoria’s effect was intended to be achieved by using techniques which estrange us 
from familiar, everyday perspectives.  Estrangement effects were first used in the 
theatre by Brecht to transform taken-for-granted aspects of social reality into the 
shockingly unfamiliar, and so to provoke in his audience a new critical awareness of 
the mundanities of everyday life.  Brecht was uncompromising about the purpose of 
his work – which was to create contradictions in the spectator; to ‘expose the unity of 
selfhood as an ideological illusion’ (Eagleton 1983: 187).  Estrangement effects are 
evident, for example, in the following aspects of camerawork, sound use, set, and 
imagery in Ex Memoria
Camera work - Because the camera remains at Eva’s eye level throughout most of the 
film the source of sounds and voices is often uncertain. From Eva’s position it isn’t 
always possible to tell who is speaking, or who is being spoken to.  The viewer’s 
unsettlement is invoked by a cinematic experience which is, in itself, somewhat 
‘dementia like’.  Ex Memoria is also unusual in that it does not include any ‘point of 
view shots’ (sometimes known as ‘subjective camera’) which enable viewers to see 
what a particular character is seeing.  As discussed further below, this means that 
although we see Eva, we do not see things from her subjective viewpoint.
Audio tracks – Much of Eva’s experience is conveyed through the sound editing. 
Audio effects are heightened in volume and slightly distorted in places. Sounds along 
the corridor of the care home include groaning, shouting, and a hectoring male voice. 
We can’t tell whether these sounds are coming from people in the adjoining rooms or 
from a TV or radio.  The sound of Eva’s breathing was edited into the film afterwards 
at high volume to accompany some scenes where she is in a state of emotional 
arousal.
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Set – The film was made on location in a working care home.  Whilst this was not 
itself an unduly institutional care setting, certain features have been foregrounded to 
create an atmosphere of unhomeliness: so the camera shows us, for example, lengthy 
ill-lit corridors and people slumped asleep in armchairs.  There are lingering views of 
eerie lifts and hoists, the ‘moving and handling’ paraphernalia of homes for the 
physically infirm. 
Imagery – There is a (perplexing to many) scene late in the film in which a bird flies 
into shot and lands on the back of the wheelchair which Eva has recently vacated. 
This is the one overtly surreal moment in the film.  It might be considered to be a 
symbolic reference back to the birds startled by gunfire in the first scene, but for some 
viewers it may raise questions about how much credence we are being asked to give 
to the other events that are shown.  Might the whole film sequence be a dream or a 
hallucination?
The extent to which such techniques might help or hinder viewers’ engagement with 
the film was difficult to anticipate; there is, however, a potential tension between the 
aim of ‘teaching empathy’, and the film’s presentation of Eva as someone radically 
‘other’.  
Heteropathic identification:  empathy and estrangement
Silverman (1996) points out that idiopathic identification is a frequent reaction to 
Hollywood film. This form of identification is aspirational; it can be represented in 
terms of Lacanian theory as ‘want to be’, or manqué á être.  For the duration of the 
movie at least, we can have the illusion that we are, if not actually the hero or heroine, 
able to share his or her feelings and experiences.  To this idiopathic form of 
identification, Silverman counterposes the concept of heteropathic identification. 
Here empathic awareness comes not only from respect for the other, but from the 
realization that the experience of the other is not one’s own.  In this view, empathy 
resists the dictionary definition given at the beginning of this chapter which suggests 
that complete comprehension is possible; now the other demands my respect precisely 
because he or she is ultimately unknowable.
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Drawing on Levinas’ (1961) concept of the face-to-face encounter, Miles and Plate 
(2004) also suggest the need to look outside Hollywood for films which bring us 
closer towards a heteropathic identification with the other.  This is, they suggest, more 
likely to happen in response to independent films that do not conform to the aesthetic 
standards of capitalist/industrialist film. Appignanesi and Baum (2006: 88) directly 
cite Levinas as an influence on the face-to-face encounter with Eva in Ex Memoria.  
The conceit of the film is as follows: for 15 minutes with almost no cuts, the 
camera is locked onto the face of an old woman [with] dementia….The 
shifting backgrounds, nurses and family visitors flit in and out of her domain 
as half-seen shades…This is a cinema of immersion whose aim is to bring the 
‘face-to-face encounter’ directly to the audience.  The viewers will be  
compelled to look closely at a face from which they would normally avert  
their gaze. 
(Appignanesi J and Baum, 2006: 87, emphasis added)
The intended ‘bewilderment’ of the viewer in the face-to-face encounter with Eva is 
the result of what Levinas terms ‘radical alterity’; the notion that the Other is 
ultimately unknowable, a stranger.  Levinas uses the  unusual term ‘alterity’ in 
preference to the more familiar ‘otherness’, precisely because the Latin ‘alter’ means 
‘the other of two’.  The relationship Levinas refers to as the ‘face-to-face’ is thus 
perceived as a strictly dyadic encounter between individual self and individual other. 
It does not involve the recognition of the collective ‘other’ of politically marginalised 
or dispossessed groups that Brecht, for example, sought to highlight through his use 
of estrangement techniques.  
Central to Levinas’ view of the significance of the face-to-face encounter is, 
moreover, that it is never symmetrical or reciprocal.  The face of the other 
(characterised as a stranger, widow or orphan) Levinas argues, demands my respect 
and responsibility, but has itself neither power nor responsibility. The ‘Levinasian 
conceit’ of Ex Memoria may, then, come close to Kitwood’s (1997a: 8) notion of 
personhood as a status that is given to the person with dementia by others in a kind of 
unidirectional, messianic gesture, ‘a standing or status that is bestowed upon one 
human being, by others, in the context of relationship and social being.  It implies 
recognition, respect and trust’.  
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 Zizek (2006) argues that Levinas’ claim that we are morally responsible for the other 
‘depoliticizes those we would be ethical towards’ – that it is an ‘ethical ideology’ 
which creates an imbalance between the self and the other, in which the other is 
vulnerable, because in need of my recognition and respect in order to exist as a human 
being.  This imposes upon the other the status of a victim, and implies that ethics 
consists of a unilateral decision by the relatively powerful self to accord human rights 
to the impotent other, rather than a confrontation of the material causes of injustice or 
inequality.  
My record of my own reactions to Ex Memoria includes the following note
I had difficulties during the script development phase in envisaging how this 
‘immersive’ approach would work…I was also concerned about the 
implications of the ‘clinical (or anthropological) gaze’, which might objectify 
Eva and make her an oddity.
The unusual camerawork in Ex Memoria – the lack of subjective point of view shots; 
the lingering tracking shots and their potential objectification of Eva – may thus have 
implications for the kind of identification viewers develop with Eva.
The Social Psychology of Dementia Care
The title of the module into which I planned to introduce Ex Memoria, it should be 
explained, does not refer to ‘social psychology’ in the usual sense; a sub-division of 
psychology pertaining to individual behaviour in social contexts.  Rather, it reflects 
Kitwood’s theory that the psycho-social ambience surrounding people with dementia 
is responsible for their emotional and mental state. The module included material on 
the Rogerian humanistic approach which informed Kitwood’s person-centred 
approach, and on the more ‘classical Freudian’ material on repression, repetition and 
transference which I added during subsequent revisions of the module.  
The module within which Ex Memoria was to be introduced was, then, already one 
which might be considered to ‘speak with a forked tongue’ due to the uneasy 
juxtaposition of humanistic and psychoanalytic approaches to dementia and dementia 
care presented within it.  With hindsight, it seems obvious that the resulting data from 
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student assignments would be a product of this mix of components and messages, 
rather than merely a response to the film itself.  At the time, however, I did not 
anticipate these complexities, and as will be discussed further, it was largely my 
struggle with the data that led to the turning point on which my thesis hinges.
At this point in the process, however, there were also a range of pragmatic decisions I 
needed to make about introducing the film into the module and these are outlined in 
the following sections.
Introducing Ex Memoria into the curriculum
An immediate concern to be addressed before the module began was whether Ex 
Memoria should stand alone as the basis of the assignment in question.  The film’s 
confusions, ambiguities and lack of closure were intended to be an important part of 
its overall effect as a work of art.  It would, however, be unethical to risk the film 
being so incomprehensible to students that they lost marks on the assignment based 
on it.  The final DVD package includes a booklet with background information and 
suggestions on the film’s use for staff development, including questions to guide 
discussion.  At the time the Social Psychology module started, however, this 
additional material had still to be produced, and only the DVD was available.  In my 
research role I would have preferred in many ways to have students’ unmediated 
responses to the film, but in order to reduce the risk of anxiety or confusion for 
participants I added material explaining the background, splitting it into six ‘scenes’, 
and providing - in order of appearance - the names and roles of the characters in each 
scene (eg ‘Helena, Eva’s daughter’; ‘Grace, a member of the care staff’).  This 
additional information can be found in Appendix 1.
I also carried out a mapping exercise to ensure that the material in the film would 
offer students sufficient opportunity to apply the theoretical material covered in the 
module, and came to the conclusion that it did.  As part of this process I made my 
own assessment of the number of instances of Kitwood’s 17 types of personal 
detraction in Ex Memoria.  By my own judgement there were eight clear examples of 
personal detraction in the film, some of which had been added intentionally as part of 
the script development process. 
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Student assignments as ‘advertent’ data
I discussed some of my reasons for becoming interested in student assignments as 
data in Chapter 2.  Whilst this does not seem to be a widely used approach in 
educational research involving adult learners, Lamont Hill (2006) used students’ work 
to provide a critical source of data for his study of an evening education programme 
and Brown (1996) discusses the use of students’ writing on classroom practice as data 
within practitioner research enquiry. For purposes of this study, continuing with such 
an approach to data creation had both pragmatic and ethical advantages.  It was a way 
of obtaining rich data without making additional demands on the time of working, 
part-time students.  It would not have been possible to interview distance learning 
students face to face because of the time and resource implications, and the kind of 
evaluative questionnaire used for the report back to the Wellcome Trust, whilst useful 
for processing and analysing large volumes of data, cannot provide the kind of 
qualitative detail that may be found in a 2000 word assignment.  In addition this is not 
‘grey’ or inadvertent data, since all students had consented at the outset to its use for 
the particular research purpose in question.
Having made these preparations I handed module leadership over to a colleague and 
had no direct teaching involvement with the students enrolled on it during its delivery. 
The project was carried out in accordance with the British Educational Research 
Association revised ethical guidelines for educational research (BERA, 2004). Ethical 
approval for the project was granted by the School of Health Studies Ethics Panel at 
the University of Bradford in May 2006.  I contacted each student individually by 
letter asking his or her consent to participate in the project.  Copies of the information 
letter and consent form are included in Appendix 2.
Participants in the study
At the beginning of the 2005-06 academic year 19 students were registered for the 
module HD2003D The Social Psychology of Dementia Care, of whom 15 were white 
British, two Zimbabwean and two black South African. By the Semester 2 start date 
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for the module, however, five of these students had withdrawn and one had deferred 
the module until the following year.  The five students who withdrew included all 
four who belonged to minority ethnic groups.  This limited the scope for exploring 
how the film might be interpreted by viewers with varying cultural backgrounds, 
particularly those who may not be familiar with 20th century European history.  
The dementia care workforce is an increasingly multi-cultural one, and this is 
reflected in the casting of Ex Memoria. Members of direct care staff are often 
recruited from the most disadvantaged socio-economic groups, where black and Asian 
people and recent economic migrants from Eastern Europe are over-represented.  In 
order to address chronic understaffing in this field of work, there is also an increasing 
tendency to recruit qualified staff from overseas (Gerrish and Griffiths, 2003). 
Recruitment onto Dementia Studies courses does not reflect the cultural diversity of 
the workforce, however, and the relatively high attrition rate among students from 
minority ethnic groups who do apply may itself suggest that they are not well-
supported in the workplace.  Whilst there is no selection procedure – all applicants 
who meet the entry criteria are currently offered places - the course places high 
demands on students whose first language is not English, and the University currently 
provides no language support for students in this situation.  This is unquestionably 
another factor in the attrition rate.
The 13 remaining students due to begin the module – three male and ten female – 
were asked for consent to their assignments being used for research purposes.  All but 
one student (who started the module late following a road traffic accident) consented 
to this.  All 12 students who consented to taking part completed and passed the 
module, and all were provided with a certificate of research participation recording 
their contribution to the project (See Appendix 3).  
At the end of the academic year, students currently registered on the Dementia Studies 
programme who had not taken the Social Psychology module during that year were 
invited to take part in the study. Exceptions were those who had assignment 
resubmissions to complete over the summer, those who were currently intercalating, 
and those who had ongoing mitigating circumstances.  The consent procedure was 
identical to that described above, but these students were asked to write a guided 
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critical review of Ex Memoria.  Although producing a review involved students in 
additional non-coursework related writing this was to be done during the summer 
break and the process was entirely voluntary.  
Of 40 eligible students, 20 agreed to take part.  Students were able to complete their 
reviews anonymously if they wished, and two did so.  An administrative system was 
set in place so that anonymous respondents could still receive the certificate of 
research participation. Ten students reviewed the support material provided with the 
DVD package which had by then been produced. These reviews informed the report 
back to Wellcome Trust but data from them have not been included in this study.  The 
remaining ten students completed reviews of Ex Memoria, with particular reference to 
the artistic techniques and imagery used in the film (See Appendix 4 for participant 
information sheet).  In total then this study is based on substantial pieces of writing 
produced by 22 participants, all of whom were required to engage with Ex Memoria 
in considerable detail. Although I have treated the data from student assignments as 
the main source of data on the film’s use for educational purposes, the student reviews 
have been used as a source of supplementary data on particular points raised in the 
discussion of findings. 
Before moving on to the chapters on data presentation and discussion of findings, 
however, I want to draw attention to a methodological turning point that I reached 
during the time that I was attempting to analyse this data.
The reflexive turn:  inadvertent data and lines of flight 
Myerhoff and Ruby (1992: 307) describe reflexivity as 
a possibility that loosens us from habit and custom and turns us back to 
contemplate ourselves just as we may be beginning to realize that we have no 
clear idea of what we are doing.  The experience may be exhilarating or 
frightening or both, but it is generally irreversible…Reflexive, as we use it 
here, describes the capacity of any system of signification to turn back upon 
itself, to make itself its own object by referring to itself: subject and object 
fuse.
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During the period that the intended data for this project was being collected Ex 
Memoria was also being shown and distributed more widely at conferences and in 
other public contexts.  The Wellcome Trust evaluation, which I coordinated and wrote 
up, involved the distribution and return of several hundred evaluation forms which 
included some Likert-scale questions, but also left space for brief qualitative 
responses to the film (Capstick 2007a; 2007b). When shown in group contexts the 
film also invariably generated a lot of discussion, much of which I recorded in field 
notes.   From the outset, then, there were questions about what counted as data for my 
thesis.  I made a conscious decision to limit the research for my EdD to a small group 
of students doing a specific module because I thought this would ensure that ‘the 
story’ had clear (and clean) parameters. I also wanted to take an in-depth approach to 
a relatively small number of participants.
At this stage I was also very fixed on the potential of visual imagery to enhance 
awareness of practice issues, and I had given much less thought to the film’s implied 
narrative. This seemed, however, to be what preoccupied viewers most.  A 
commentator at one conference was, for example, quite vociferous in her view that 
the events Eva had experienced in the past were so extreme that the film’s message 
could not be generalised to other people with dementia.  Many other viewers, on the 
contrary, cited similar examples of the return of traumatic past events in the context of 
dementia; a grandfather – now long dead - who had gone back to the trenches of the 
Somme; a father reliving forced labour on the Burma-Siam railroad; a mother still 
searching for a child drowned in infancy.
Around this time I also discovered the work of David Clegg, director of the Trebus 
Projects.  Edmund Trebus was a Polish war veteran – featured in the BBC 
documentary A Life of Grime (20.4.99) who filled his home with things that other 
people considered to be rubbish, the detritus of history, convinced that eventually a 
use would be found for them.  The Trebus Projects named for him are a range of arts-
based approaches to working with people with dementia, which struck me as being 
different from anything I had come across before.  The people involved in these 
projects were not the stereotypical ‘cuddly old dears’ frequently used to popularise the 
concept of person-centred care.  The book of narrative biographies, Ancient Mysteries 
(Brown and Clegg eds 2007) in particular, chronicles some very chequered, eventful 
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and, sometimes insalubrious, lives. No attempt had been made, however, to censor or 
sanitise what the contributors said. Whilst I was struggling to make any sense of my 
‘official data’ – the student assignments and reviews - I was therefore also beset by 
the real voices of people with dementia; people whose experiences were just as 
strange and surreal as anything shown in Ex Memoria. 
A dilemma arises in writing up research that pursues such rhizomatic ‘lines of flight’, 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987) because what has emerged by the end of the process did 
not inform its early stages.  My thesis as I originally planned it would not, for 
example, have included the critique of Kitwood’s work. Whilst this now appears near 
the beginning of the study, it is the result of my having looked at the data from student 
assignments in a different light once the concept of social amnesia became a central 
one.  Until I became aware of the ways other viewers constructed the narrative of Ex 
Memoria, I could not work out what to look for in the data from student participants.
Most significantly, although I was already aware of Jacoby’s work on social amnesia 
(1975: 1996) it only really became a critical perspective for my purposes here in the 
context of Catherine’s story, told in Ancient Mysteries.  My discussion of Catherine’s 
story comes later, in Chapter 8, but may not have appeared at all had I not been struck 
by the irony of a woman with dementia recounting what seem to be fragmented 
memories of the Holocaust, and wondering if she is ‘the only person who remembers 
that incident’ (Brown and Clegg eds 2007: 143). 
In order to demonstrate reflexivity in the writing of research, then, some form of 
doubling back becomes necessary.  The temporality of the narrative – its 
chronological ordering – is inevitably disturbed.  The temptations are either to write 
with guilty sophistication a ‘cooked’ (or ‘overwritten’) narrative which suggests that 
everything eventually found out was known at the outset, or, alternatively, to write a 
faux naif account which interjects breathless amazement at its own processes of 
discovery (‘at this point I found…’; ‘I was surprised to discover…’) as though the 
researcher were a tabula rasa with no prior commitments or opinions.
In writing up this research – and referring to myself in the process of writing it - I 
have tried to avoid either of these strategies.  As Denzin (1997) notes, a certain 
amount of ‘messiness’ is needed in order to develop a text which ‘announces its 
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politics and ceaselessly interrogates the realities it invokes’; ‘messy texts [are]…many 
sited, intertextual, always open ended and resistant to theoretical holism’ (Denzin 
1997: 224). I am thus interposing these comments at the point in my description of the 
process of doing the research where this ‘turning point’ became unavoidable.  That is, 
at the point where my official data would not answer my somewhat hesitant research 
questions, whilst the unintended sources would not keep quiet.  In the end, Ex 
Memoria proved to be less an isolated intervention in a bounded methodological field, 
than a catalyst for a much more wide-ranging and rhizomatic study.  In the process, 
however, it has drawn attention to the profound ethical dimensions of society’s 
response to people diagnosed with dementia and the directions such responses may 
take in the next 40 years or so, until prevalence of dementia in the Western world is 
predicted to peak around the mid-21st century.
My analysis of student assignments and reviews based on Ex Memoria is presented 
and discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  In Chapter 7, I return to the broader, extra-filmic 
context and the implications of social amnesia in the post-War world.
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Chapter 5) Analysing students’ narrative accounts of Ex Memoria:  
          syuzhet, style and fabula
In fiction film, narration is the process whereby the film’s syuzhet and style 
interact in the course of cueing and channelling the spectator’s construction of 
the fabula (Bordwell, 1985: 5)  
Introduction
The 12 student assignments which form the main body of primary data for this study 
are each approximately 2000 words in length and consist of a primarily descriptive 
500 word narrative account summarising the content of Ex Memoria, followed by a 
1500 word analysis in which students link the theoretical material covered in the 
Social Psychology module with the events shown in the film.  In this chapter I have 
focused only on the first part of the assignment - the narrative synopsis of Ex 
Memoria.  I outline below the process by which the initial narrative accounts were 
analysed in order to discover how students construct a storyline from the events 
shown in the film.   The longer and more analytical sections of the assignments are 
the subject of Chapter 6.
In Chapter 2, I presented an analysis of a single narrative account using critical 
discourse analysis (Fairclough 2001).  The incident analysed there was one selected 
by the student from her own observation of real life practice on a hospital ward.  As 
mentioned above, a disadvantage of using self-selected incidents as the basis of the 
assignment for the Social Psychology module was that assessors had no access to 
what students had seen, making it difficult to give feedback that suggested alternative 
interpretations or approaches.  A perceived advantage of using Ex Memoria was that it 
was possible to cross-reference the content of students’ narrative accounts with the 
incidents, interactions and dialogue in the film in order to know how much had been 
observed.  Since students would not be able to provide an analysis of aspects of the 
film they had either not noticed at all, or not considered sufficiently relevant to 
include in their synopsis, I decided to start by categorising the elements of the film 
that appeared most frequently in these accounts.
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The 12 narrative accounts were analysed using the structuralist method known as 
foregrounding (eg Hakemulder, 2007) and the associated concepts of fabula, syuzhet 
and style in film analysis (Bordwell, 1985).  Following this approach, I explore the 
ways that participants have worked from the narratively ordered elements in the film 
(its syuzhet) in order to construct a fabula for analysis.  This primary organisation and 
analysis of data showed that there were patterned regularities (Wolcott, 1994) in 
students’ responses to the film. Four elements of syuzhet mentioned with particular 
frequency by participants and discussed further below were:  Eva’s lipstick; the 
gunshots in the first scene; Eva’s misidentification of her grandsons, and the 
intervention of the male staff member, Martin, in her attempted ‘escape’.
The ten additional student reviews were then analysed in order to check whether 
aspects of the film’s style appeared to have contributed to the foregrounding of these 
four elements, and whether reviewers had made consistent reference to any additional 
cinematic devices or aspects of mise en scène.  Whilst there were a number of 
correspondences here, some of the recurring themes and tensions in students’ 
assignments suggested that extra-filmic influences had played their part in the 
application of theory to the events shown in the film and that their analysis thus 
required a process of ‘reading against the grain’ (Jameson 1981) which has been 
followed in Chapter 6.
First impressions of the data
I had access to the anonymised data from student assignments following the end of 
year exam board in July 2006.  At that point I remember starting to read them with 
great enthusiasm, but quickly developing a sense that there was ‘nothing there’ to 
interpret; that they were not going to yield up any striking insights.  On reflection, I 
suspect that I was still hoping that that these assignments would prove to be markedly 
‘better’ in some way than the assignments based on incidents students had selected 
themselves in previous years, thereby vindicating my enthusiasm for arts-based and 
audio-visual approaches to teaching dementia studies.
On first reading, it was certainly noticeable that there was little, if any, use of 
language or concepts derived from the biomedical model of dementia in this body of 
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work. No-one, for example, suggested that any of Eva’s actions were related to a 
‘stage’ of dementia or that Eva should be kept still and quiet for her own good; nor 
did they construct her accusations of stealing against care staff, her attempt to escape, 
or her sexual advances towards Martin as ‘problem behaviours’ arising from her 
dementia.  Instead, these viewers interpreted Eva’s experience within the film’s own 
terms of reference as a response to interpersonal and environmental aspects of the 
present day care home. They also generally recognised her present day experiences 
and actions as being interwoven with her earlier life experiences.  Although they were 
often tentative about making explicit reference to historical events or locations, most 
students had made at least some specific links between events in Eva’s past and 
present day reminders of them in the care home.  In this sense the film could be 
considered successful in its original aim of challenging the biomedical standard 
paradigm by encouraging viewers to identify with Eva face to face through the 
medium of film 
On the other hand, certain characteristics were still in evidence which I found hard to 
define, and which I had previously also attributed to the dominance of the biomedical 
discourse.  There was a tendency, for example, to generalise in a sweeping way 
(‘Throughout the entire film no one takes the slightest notice of Eva’), to be 
prescriptive about what Eva’s family and the care staff should have done, and to 
discount alternative viewpoints or interpretations.  In the final section of the 
assignment students were asked to make specific recommendations for improving 
Eva’s quality of life, and these were often confined to general suggestions about staff 
training, or doing life history work, rather than specific recommendations based on 
what we are told in the film about Eva’s life story and experiences.  I had a sinking 
feeling; my action research experiment wasn’t working.
One of the findings from the separate evaluation of Ex Memoria carried out for 
Wellcome Trust was that respondents to the questionnaire spontaneously commented 
on the film on three different levels: events shown in the film; how these resonated – 
in their view – with real life care practice, and aspects of the film ‘as a film’ 
(Capstick, 2007b).  These different levels of response correspond interestingly with 
the distinction made between syuzhet, fabula, and style in formalist film theory, and 
there seemed to be some mileage in also applying this theory to the student 
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assignments as an initial means of identifying patterns of response in what 
participants had written.  This stage in the data analysis marked a methodological shift 
from hypothesis testing (‘Does film enhance students writing?’) to a more emergent 
approach in which students’ writing was used to generate theory about factors that 
may have influenced their responses to the film.
Formalist film theory and foregrounding
Early Russian formalists such as Shklovsky and Jakobson who were concerned with 
the idea of art as estrangement, developed a distinction between fabula or ‘story’ and 
syuzhet (‘narrative’ or manner of telling).  Translating this approach to film Bordwell 
(1985) suggests that the fabula is the storyline itself set within a chronological 
timeline, the syuzhet is the ‘plot’ presented in the order it is shown on screen, and 
style is the systematic use of cinematic devices. In other words, events portrayed on 
the screen, and the way they are presented, work together to allow the viewer to 
construct a fabula.   For Bordwell, the fabula is ‘an imaginary construct we create 
progressively and retroactively’; that is, both during watching a film and for some 
time afterwards (1985: 49).  It is a non-linear process and the fabula is subject to 
repeated revision.  
The fabula of Sixth Sense (dir. Night Shyamalan, 1999) for example, has to be 
completely refigured at the very end of the film when we come to realise that 
psychologist Malcolm Crowe, played by Bruce Willis, is a ‘dead person’.  Here the 
combination of syuzhet and style work throughout the film to convince us that Crowe 
is alive and visible to other characters.  Following the final denouement, however, 
many viewers had to watch Sixth Sense again before being able to accept that Crowe’s 
presence was never actually acknowledged by anyone other than his child patient, 
Cole, who ‘sees dead people’.
Foregrounding is a term used within the formalist school to describe the ways in 
which texts achieve their effects by giving prominence to something by the use of 
innovative and unexpected devices. It is the means that are used to make objects 
unfamiliar in order that they can be re-perceived with fresh awareness. Although more 
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commonly applied to the analysis of literary text, foregrounding has also been applied 
in the context of visual arts and spectator response (eg Krampen 1996; Hakemulder 
2007).  
In film, as Van Peer and Hakemulder (2006: 551) point out
the term refers to drawing spectators’ attention to some element …by means 
of unusual filmic devices.  Wollen (1982) uses the term to define counter-
cinema (opposing mainstream cinema); for him it describes spectators’ focus 
on processes of construction of meaning.  Examples would be fixed 
positioning of the camera and the deformation of familiar objects through 
filters, mirrors and extreme close-ups.
Key terms in foregrounding theory include deviation and parallelism.  The former is 
used to describe textual or filmic devices which use ‘artistic licence’ of various kinds, 
and the latter to refer to repetitions, reoccurrences and ‘echoes’ within the work.
Examples of such devices can be found in Ex Memoria.  The bird which appears on 
Eva’s empty wheelchair may, for example, be considered an example of deviation, 
There are also numerous parallelisms, including Eva’s two uses of lipstick, her two 
journeys along the care home corridor (the first from right to left and the second from 
left to right) and the reappearance of the actor who plays young Eva in the role of the 
care assistant, Becky.   A more complex parallelism can be traced in the two scenes in 
which Eva is first kissed by her dark-haired grandson kneeling alongside her 
wheelchair, and then kisses the blond careworker who occupies a similar position in 
mirror-image (see illustrations on the following page).
I decided to apply this body of theory to the assignment data, as an initial way of 
discovering what - in their watching of the film - had been foregrounded for, or by, 
the participants.  In order to do this, I started out by creating a kind of meta-text, 
independent of the script or film itself, which was the result of aggregating all 12 of 
the 500 word descriptive accounts in which students were asked to summarise what 
are for them the key events and interactions in each scene of the film.   Each student’s 
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Parallelism in Ex Memoria:  Jacob and Eva/Eva and Martin
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narrative summary of the film thus represents what has been foregrounded for that 
viewer within the given limit of 500 words.  What has had little resonance, or failed to 
stand out, is less likely to be mentioned.  Amalgamating the accounts in this way also 
meant that the most detailed or elaborate description of each of the elements identified 
by two or more viewers could be incorporated.  The purpose of this first stage was 
thus to establish how much had been noticed by the group collectively, and in how 
much detail this had, optimally, been described.  The amalgamated data represents the 
fullest obtainable syuzhet – a thick description of what the participants collectively 
had seen in the film.
Foregrounding method
My first step was to reproduce electronically one of the 500 word summaries selected 
at random.  I then worked through each of the remaining 11 accounts in turn 
amending this ‘base text’ whenever a participant mentioned something new, or made 
reference to something already included but with more information or narrative detail. 
For example I included a line mentioned in the form of reported speech when it first 
occurred.  If it then occurred in a subsequent account in the form of direct speech I 
changed it accordingly, whether or not the direct speech was an accurate rendition of 
the line spoken in the film.  If I then came across a mention in a later account that was 
in direct speech and more closely corresponded to the line as spoken in the film, I 
amended that item again. 
Eg    First occurrence:     Eva says they have the wrong one.
        Amended 1 to:         Eva says ‘You have the wrong one, it isn’t me.’ 
        Amended 2 to:         Eva says: ‘You’ve got the wrong one, the wrong one; it  
isn’t me.’                               
If there was more than one version of an incident or line that seemed equally rich in 
content, I kept both until they were replaced by something with more detail 
Eg     First occurrence:     Gertrude is told to sit down and wait for tea.
         Second occurrence: Martin tells Gertrude that tea will be served later.
         Eventually amended to: Gertrude asks for a cup of tea and Martin tells her to  
go     
                                                and sit down, repeating information about what time 
tea         
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                                                is served.  This seems to displease her and she moves  
                                                away muttering in German.          
The collective syuzhet of Ex Memoria created by this process is provided in Appendix 
5.  Two points need to be noted here.  First, the amalgamated narrative account is 
considerably longer than 500 words, so the intention is not to present this as a ‘model 
answer’ to this part of the assignment.  Individual students had to be much more 
selective about what they included.  Second, my own preference for certain words and 
phrases over others will inevitably have been a factor in the creation of this meta-text, 
or collective syuzhet.  My purpose here is, however, merely to provide the most 
elaborate version possible from this body of data in order to incorporate everything 
that had sufficient resonance to be foregrounded by at least one of the 12 participants. 
Identifying aspects of the syuzhet that were most frequently foregrounded for the 
group as a whole was the next stage of the process.
Patterned regularities in the syuzhet
My next step was to reduce each element of narrative in what I describe as the 
collective syuzhet, to a simple economical statement representing an action or 
interaction shown in the film, and noting how many participants had made reference 
to it, no matter how briefly.  So for example, the collective narrative for Scene 2 
begins, ‘We see an older woman in the foreground staring ahead.  She says, “I think 
we should go home now”’.  This was the most elaborate account of these few frames 
in the film that emerged from amalgamating all 12 individual accounts.  In order to 
assess how frequently Eva’s desire to go home had been considered sufficiently 
important to be mentioned by individual students, this was reduced to ‘Eva wants to 
go home’, and a count was made of participants who had made any reference to it 
whatsoever.  Eight participants had done so.
In total 93 such elements were identified (see Appendix 6). Some of these had been 
mentioned by only one viewer (eg ‘Helena goes to enquire about Eva’s knees’; ‘Eva 
appears to flirt with Martin’), while others were mentioned by the majority (‘Eva 
talks about stealers/blacks/schwartzes’; ‘Jacob talks on his mobile phone’).  The most 
strongly foregrounded elements mentioned by all, or almost all participants proved to 
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be Eva’s use of lipstick, the sound of gunfire in the first scene, Eva’s misidentification 
of her grandsons, and Martin’s intervention in Eva’s attempted ‘escape’.  Before 
discussing these elements in detail, I want to refer briefly to some of my observations 
about students’ naming of characters in Ex Memoria.  
Character naming in Ex Memoria
Since students had been provided with names of the characters appearing in each 
scene of the film, it seemed worthwhile also to discover which of them had been most 
frequently mentioned by name.  These characters were also likely to have been 
perceived as particularly central to the construction of a fabula.  My analysis of 
character-naming in the film (see Appendix 7) shows that after Eva herself - who was 
named by all participants - Robbie, the younger of her two grandsons is the second 
most frequently named character (11 out of 12 participants), with Martin (mentioned 
by nine participants) and Jacob (mentioned by eight) following closely behind. 
Although there are more female characters in the film than male (11 as opposed to 
seven), it is, thus, the male characters who appear to have been foregrounded. 
Although these male characters do, by and large, have more central roles than many 
of the female ones, this seems unlikely to account fully for the bias towards naming 
males.  For example, Jim – the male careworker involved in the bathroom scene - 
does not have a speaking role in the film.  Jim is, however, still named more 
frequently than Delores – the female careworker in this scene – who appears twice 
and has several lines.
Eva’s brother, Adek, was not included in the list of characters given to this group of 
students because he never appears on screen.  Since this name was unlikely to be 
familiar to English-speaking students, this was an unfortunate oversight, and perhaps 
as a result, the majority of students (seven out of 12) do not mention Adek by name. 
Those who do have invariably misspelt the name, and whilst this is unimportant in 
itself, it may suggest that participants were reluctant to use a name they could not 
reproduce accurately.  More significantly, uncertainty about Adek’s identity, or the 
nature of his relationship with Eva, may also have led to a disinclination to mention 
him by name.  There are indications in some of these assignments – as in other 
sources, such as online reviews of the film – that viewers have not always realised 
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that the man who calls out to Eva at the beginning of the film, and Eva’s lost brother, 
Adek, are intended to be one and the same person.  A reviewer for Culture Wars (the 
reviews website for the Institute of Ideas), for example, asserts that at the beginning of 
the film Eva is ‘awaiting her lover in the woods…She fusses over her appearance, 
anxious to please him.  But he is late.  Suddenly she hears him calling her, telling her 
to run, as shots in the village announce the arrival of the Gestapo’ (Martea, 2006).  In 
the scripted version of the film, this mystery lover does not exist, but – as will be 
discussed further below - he is an interestingly tenacious character in viewers’ 
construction of the fabula.  It may be that uncertainty about Adek’s identity, and a 
consequent sense of puzzlement about the missing person/mystery lover account for 
at least some of the tendency to foreground male characters in the remainder of the 
film.
Foregrounded elements in the syuzhet of Ex Memoria
The key findings during this stage of the process were that in participants’ narrative 
summaries of the film four elements of its syuzhet were mentioned with particular 
frequency.  These are discussed below
1) Eva’s use of lipstick
This was mentioned by 10 out of 12 participants when it occurs in the first scene and 
by all participants on the second occasion when Eva applies lipstick on the corridor of 
the nursing home.  As one reviewer put it
There was application of lipstick which stood out and appeared twice during 
the film (emphasis added)
In the first scene, it seems reasonable to assume that viewers are trying to orientate 
themselves to what they are being shown, not just in terms of the characters and 
events, but also the film’s genre.  In this scene viewers appear to have made 
associations between the lipstick and aspects of Eva’s character and personality.  She 
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is described, for example, as: sexual, seductive, naïve, frivolous, self-indulgent, and ‘a 
private person’.
Several participants took the lipstick – and Eva’s apparent concern with her 
appearance – as an indication that she was waiting to meet someone in the wood.  Her 
actions during this scene are interpreted as evidence that she is, for example
Playing out and practicing her …sexuality prior to meeting someone there
Waiting for her date
Wanting to look her best for someone
Other viewers suggest – more obliquely - that
Adek is on look-out
It appears that someone is approaching 
There are also indications that some viewers suspect Eva may be guilty of leading 
Adek into danger, or that she protects herself at his expense.
Her brother calls to her desperately, but she does not call back or go to him
This helps to demonstrate how viewers are already, at this early stage in the film, 
beginning to work from the elements of syuzhet and style to develop a story (or 
fabula).  The film itself provides little narrative information at this point but it seems 
that viewers draw on certain elements – pretty girl, sunny day, lipstick - in order to 
construct what they are about to see as a romance, and perhaps already as a mystery. 
Lipstick and cigarettes are frequent elements in film noir which, even in this 
naturalistic setting, work to mark Eva out as a proto-temptress.  Since she evidently 
doesn’t want Adek to know she is smoking, we may be inclined to ask where she has 
been getting her cigarettes – particularly given their status as currency in wartime. 
For several participants it seems that a ‘second man in the woods’ is invoked in 
response to these perturbations.  Whether consciously or not, connotations of this kind 
are, then, inevitably coloured by other films, and types of film, viewers have seen.
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Eva’s second application of lipstick on the corridor of the care home is frequently 
taken as an indication that she believes she is about to meet someone connected in 
some way with the first scene
Eva identifies this with something from her past, which prompts Eva to put on  
her lipstick
Lipstick…links both to her time of youth and attractiveness, but also to the  
time when…someone valuable was taken away
It seems likely, then, that viewers form a connection between the application of 
lipstick and the disappearance of Adek.  This may then intensify their response when 
Eva mistakes her grandson, Robbie, for Adek in the later scene set in the care home.
2) Gunfire in the first scene
Eleven students refer directly to the sound of gunfire when Adek is captured in the 
woods during the first scene.  The action in this scene takes place largely off camera, 
and a considerable amount of work has to be done by the viewer in order to 
understand what has, or may have, happened.  Having known in advance of seeing the 
film that Eva’s brother is rounded up and taken away at gunpoint in this scene, it is 
difficult for me to estimate how much of a sense of rupture might accompany this for 
first time viewers.  The initial impression for many seems to be, however, that they 
are watching a romance in which a young girl is preening herself in a woodland glade 
in preparation for meeting her boyfriend.  This is now disrupted by the sound of 
gunfire, orders barked out in German, and the cries of the captured man.  The 
language used by participants often suggests a sense of dislocation at this point
She hears a commotion; gunshots and her brother crying out her name
The peace is disturbed by shouting voices of German soldiers and the sound 
of gunshot
She witnesses the possible shooting of her brother by the SS
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Retroactive construction of narrative can be seen at work in some of these extracts, 
where information external to this scene is used to interpret the action.  Eva’s later 
reference to Adek being ‘lost’ seems to have indicated to a number of viewers that he 
did not survive the war, although there is nothing in the film itself which actually 
corroborates this
Presumably she never saw him again
Eva survived the war, but unfortunately Adek did not
The concrete certainty with which some of these statements are expressed is striking. 
It is unclear, though, whether this is because viewers’ identification with Eva leads 
them to feel they know what has happened, or whether it is because they genuinely 
believe they have been told that Adek died.
Following this aural intimation of disaster it seems that viewers’ perception of the 
film’s genre changes.  This is particularly evident in comments on the use of sound in 
the film by the 10 student reviewers who were asked to focus specifically on style and 
filmmaking technique.
The gun fire in the opening scene helps prepare us in some way for what’s to  
come...it conjures up pictures of fear and flight
Reviewers make frequent reference to sinister sounds that link this first scene to Eva’s 
later experience of the care home (‘echoing’, ‘whispering’, ‘sounds like somebody is 
whispering in the background’ and TV noise that ‘sounds like one of Hitler’s rallies’). 
They also refer to ‘harrowing’ sights; ‘eerie lighting on drab corridors, and ‘cell-like’ 
side rooms as Eva is wheeled along the corridor
It made me think of a corridor leading to death (a lamb taken to the slaughter)
Individual people are kept in single ‘cells’ along a very long, stark corridor  
adding to the sense that Eva is in jail, or being kept against her will.
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Complete despair to those who are trapped within these walls
These comments taken from reviews of the film suggest that its style now begins to 
contribute to a growing sense of foreboding and a recognition of the links between 
Eva’s past and present.
3) Eva’s misidentification of her grandsons
At different points in the film Eva greets both her grandsons fondly as though they are 
her lost brother, Adek.  On the first occasion when the family have just arrived to 
visit, it is the younger grandson, Robbie (aged 12) who is mistaken for Adek, and all 
participants have made some reference to this.   The second occasion when Eva 
addresses her older grandson Jacob (aged 27) as Adek in the bedroom was, however, 
mentioned by only four people.  There is a second misidentification of Robbie which 
takes place in Eva’s bedroom, where she wakes up after nodding off to sleep and 
greets Robbie (in the absence of his mother and older brother,  and in decidedly un-
grandmotherly tones) with the words, ‘Such a handsome young man – be careful, or 
what will the ladies be thinking?  Come…give me a nice kiss’.  One participant 
interpreted this as ‘flirting’ on Eva’s part, but other participants who make reference 
to Robbie’s reaction to being asked to kiss his grandmother in this scene have 
interpreted it, somewhat implausibly, either as a second occurrence of Eva believing 
Robbie to be her brother, or a merely affectionate grandmother-to-grandson request.  
When she wakes, she again believes her grandsons to be her brother
She attempts to kiss her grandson but he refuses and runs away
One participant misquotes the line as ‘such a handsome boy… give me a big kiss’ and 
suggests that Eva is being ‘playful’, thus softening the impact on a 12 year old boy of 
being asked to kiss his grandmother as though he is a secret lover.  Whilst four 
viewers acknowledge that Robbie is frightened, uncomfortable or embarrassed at this 
point, others clearly feel that his retreat from the situation is inappropriate
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Robbie refuses to kiss Eva and runs off (withholding)
If the elements of the first scene which stood out for participants have been 
foregrounded because of their role in retroactive construction of a fabula (‘What is 
happening here?’ ‘What kind of film is this?’), something more complex seems to be 
happening here.  Robbie is misrecognized on the second occasion as a character the 
film’s syuzhet does not help us to identify.  This ‘handsome young man’ cannot 
coherently be made to correspond either with Adek, or with the male authority figure 
for whom Eva mistakes Martin in a later scene.  This is something that is consistently 
foregrounded for viewers, in the sense that they have registered the interaction taking 
place.  They have, however, made implausible interpretations, given the actual words 
Eva speaks (‘Such a handsome young man – be careful, or what will the ladies be 
thinking?  Come…give me a nice kiss’) and her coquettish tone of voice (see 
illustration on following page).
Viewers have, then, either overlooked the complexities of this scene, or they have 
used various forms of narrative smoothing in order to avoid dealing with its 
implications.  As will be discussed further in Chapter 6, the double misidentification 
of Robbie does not easily yield itself up to interpretation.  This is, moreover, the one 
point in the film at which Eva looks back at the viewer, not as a frightened girl or a 
sexually-compromised victim, but as a character in a position of power and 
knowledge. She looks back, in other words, from a position at which we cannot see 
her.  She resists the forms of symbolization currently available for representing people 
who have been diagnosed with dementia.  As with the care practitioner whose 
assignment I analysed in Chapter 2, Eva also has an excess which resists the ‘call of 
the other’.  As Lacan writes in Seminar X1, ‘when I look at an object, the object is 
always already gazing at me, and from a point at which I cannot see it’ (Lacan 1977: 
109).   This gaze – at what or whom we do not know – creates a kind of inchoate 
unease both in Robbie (the writer/director’s alter ego) and in the viewer. To address 
Eva’s gaze we have to ask what she sees; who she thinks we are.   
 
4) Eva’s ‘escape’ and Martin’s intervention
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All participants made reference to the point in the final scene where Eva struggles out 
of her wheelchair and disappears from camera shot.  All but one mention this in the 
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From Ex Memoria:  Robbie and Eva: ‘Be careful, or what will the ladies be 
thinking…….?’
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context of Eva having been left alone by the care staff, who are more intent on their 
own private lives
The staff leave Eva in order to gossip
Two staff members stand talking about their private lives
She is abandoned by the lift 
The possibility that Eva’s ‘flight’ is in part a response to her fear of the glass lift 
beside which she has been left – and which she is seen to cower away from - is less 
frequently mentioned and only two participants suggest that this may be linked with 
past experiences, or have wartime associations.
Martin’s intervention is also mentioned by all but one participant, and for many 
viewers this was highlighted as the only example of positive interaction with Eva in 
the entire film, although Martin too was subjected to some criticism.  Martin is most 
frequently mentioned here (by 11 participants) as a provider of ‘comfort’ and 
‘reassurance’.  Several viewers refer to the sexual content of Eva’s words and actions 
towards Martin at this point, and to Eva’s apparent misidentification of Martin as a 
high ranking official
Eva seems to think that the male nurse will help her with her papers for what  
is implied as sexual favours
Martin becomes uncomfortable when she begins to talk to him in a sexual way
Eva appears to flirt with the nurse obviously mistaking him for someone else
It is noticeable, however, that these accounts take a passive view of Eva’s sexuality. 
None of the participants mention that Eva moves Martin’s hands towards her breasts, 
and only one quotes her as saying, ‘You can do anything you like with me’.  Eva’s 
own demeanour at the end of the film would seem to suggest that she views Martin’s 
agreement that ‘everything is in order’ as a conquest.  The overt sexuality of her 
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approach to Martin and the suggestions of collaboration and manipulativeness which 
underpin it are, however, played down by viewers in favour of a sanitized version 
which, ironically, detracts from Eva’s individuality.  The complexities of her 
character and the possibility that she may enjoy wielding sexual power over men, 
even at the same time as she fears their power are thus occluded. 
The limitations of a formalist approach
Foregrounding theory proved to be a very useful starting point in my initial 
organisation and categorisation of the data from student assignments. The connection 
between the narrative accounts of Ex Memoria written by students and the concept of 
syuzhet, as used by Bordwell, enabled me to identify patterns of response to the film 
which may not otherwise have emerged.  As has already been suggested above, 
however, the reasons for a particular viewer’s foregrounding of an element of the film 
cannot be considered intrinsic to the film itself, as formalist and structuralist 
approaches in film theory have tended to suggest.  
As Van Peer and Hakemulder (2006) point out, the precise meaning of the term 
‘foregrounding’ often has to be deduced from the context within which it is being 
used.  Sometimes it refers to the reader or viewer’s perception, sometimes to authorial 
intention, and sometimes to an effect on the viewer or reader.  This uncertainty in 
itself points to a failure to engage with the possibility of extra-filmic connotations 
which are woven into the retroactive construction of a fabula.  For students it seems 
likely that such connotations will be influenced by, for example, other films they have 
seen, experiences of real-life care practice, and relationships within their own 
families.  Some elements may be subliminal and coloured by earlier or more deeply 
internalised discourses.  As mentioned in Chapter 4,  there are, for example, certain 
fairy tale elements in Ex Memoria which begins with a rather silly young girl having a 
nasty experience in a wood which is partly her own fault, and losing someone close to 
her as a result of her actions.  There is something almost archetypal about a storyline 
that can be summarised as ‘lipstick – gunfire – mistaken identity – escape/re-capture’. 
Since numerous interpretations of these elements can be advanced, however, it might 
be argued that they are not so much foregrounded, as ‘overdetermined’.  The manifest 
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image in a dream according to Freud (1900; trans Brill, 1913) is always 
overdetermined because it is underpinned by a multiplicity of latent meanings, rather 
than a single coherent message.
Foregrounding theory is generally uninterested in the social contexts in which films 
are produced or watched.  Formalism, in other words, ignores ‘the multiplicity of 
social forces and practices at play, at work, in the reading of any text…The best any 
purely textual analysis can do is open up problematic areas of …ideological space by 
activating the repressions, contradictions and latencies within it.’ (Lapsley and 
Westlake, 1988: 59).  Students’ narrative synopses of Ex Memoria all tell the same 
story – one which is ‘given’ – but they tell it with different emphases and varying 
degrees of richness and complexity.  Their connotative interpretations (or latent 
content) arise from their imaginative and creative engagement with the film in ways 
that read, and write, into its gaps, sometimes subverting the film’s conscious 
intentions, or uncovering unintended ambiguities.  
When I first started to engage with this data, I framed these assignments as having 
been written simply in response to Ex Memoria.  I did not initially consider what 
ought to have been obvious, that they had also been written in response to the content 
of the Social Psychology module, the Dementia Studies course as a whole, and the 
specific requirements of an assessed assignment.  Eagleton (1983) notes that 
Bakhtin’s critique of formalism rests largely on the dialogic nature of language in a 
particular context of production. In other words, we always speak or write as an act of 
communication with someone else (an implied other), and what we say or write will 
depend upon the purpose of that communication.  Students may thus use a variety of 
techniques and sources in order to second guess what an assessor may be looking for 
in their work.  Those who are juggling academic study and a demanding work role 
may be particularly tempted to mirror back, in their assignments, a position or 
perspective they believe to be held by the assessor.  Price (2003) discusses the ways in 
which post-registration nursing students on a distance learning course adopted distinct 
kinds of academic ‘voice’ in their relationships with nurse educators, and suggests 
that students’ main priority when adopting a particular voice is the management of 
anxieties related to assessment.
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Whilst the strongly, and consistently, foregrounded elements discussed in this chapter 
are likely to have had considerable impact on each student’s construction of a fabula, 
other factors are also likely to be significant here, not least the content of the Social  
Psychology module itself, and the way this may ‘cue’ participants to read the film in a 
particular way.  Already, in these brief narrative accounts of the film, it appears that 
many of the connections, interpretations and resistances which appear are the result of 
influences beyond the film itself.  In the next chapter I explore these themes in more 
detail in the context of the later sections of students’ assignments where they have 
applied the theory from the Social Psychology module to the events shown in Ex 
Memoria.  Here I argue that a symptomatic reading of these assignments reveals not 
only an absence of ‘neuropathic ideology’, as I had originally hoped, but also the 
presence of the psycho-social model itself as ideology.
130
Chapter 6)  Reading against the grain: the political unconscious of 
person-centred care
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time      (Eliot 1942: from Little Gidding) 
Introduction
In the previous chapter I explained how foregrounding techniques were used to 
analyse students’ narrative accounts of the content of Ex Memoria as an initial means 
of discovering which aspects of the film had been perceived as most striking or salient 
for them.  It seems that, as suggested in formalist film theory, the style of the film was 
influential in directing viewers towards a particular construction.  Viewers were also 
likely to emphasise elements of the film which gave rise to unease or puzzlement, due 
either to the nature of the events represented (eg a shooting) or to ambiguities in the 
storyline itself (eg a misidentification).  There is also, however, evidence to suggest 
that influences beyond the film itself have played a significant part in the construction 
of the fabula, which then becomes the raw material for analysis in the second section 
of the assignment.  Often this is noticeable as much in what is not said, in what is 
overlooked or misrepresented, as in those elements that have been given prominence. 
The longer and more analytic sections of these 12 assignments, have thus been 
approached from the perspective of what Ricoeur (1970) described as a ‘hermeneutics 
of suspicion’. I have also drawn on Jameson’s (1981) concept of the ‘political 
unconscious’ underpinning all texts.  Interpretation, for Jameson, means the discovery 
of a latent meaning behind a manifest one, in order to ‘rewrite the surface categories 
of a text in the stronger language of a more fundamental interpretative code’ (Jameson 
1981: 60). This practice of ‘reading against the grain’ requires a surface/depth model 
of interpretation which takes the text’s meaning to be that which it does not say, but 
which - through attention to its gaps, silences, disruptions, and exclusions – reveals 
what are taken to be its absent causes and determining structures.   
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In these assignments, beneath or woven in with, the manifest content related to the 
events and dialogue of the film there are latent messages which are both surplus to the 
film itself and which, I will suggest, echo the orthodoxies of Kitwood’s psycho-social 
approach. My aim here is not to direct critical attention toward the participants, their 
workplaces, or the organizations in which they are employed, but to identify aspects 
of their assignments which are symptomatic of Kitwood’s model of person-centred 
dementia care.  I suggest that they mirror back (often in a less sophisticated and 
therefore more blatant form) the ideological nature of the discourse of malignant 
social psychology.
Critical discourse analysis
In Chapter 2 I drew on an approach to critical discourse analysis which assumes that 
the surface of a text is a means of concealing the ideological interests that are served 
by its deeper concealed meaning (Fairclough 2001).  Ricoeur (1970: 33) suggests that 
the aim of this kind of reading practice is to reveal the political interests served by the 
text; ‘the purpose of interpretation is to strip off the concealment, unmasking those 
interests’. My suggestion here is that whilst Kitwood’s work may appear transparent 
in its critique of neuropathic ideology, it advances a concealed ideology of its own; a 
liberal humanist ideology which still bears traces of 19th century philanthropic 
notions of the deserving and undeserving poor, and the moral re-education of both the 
mentally ill and those who care for them.  This ideology invariably psychologises the 
source of social ills by locating them in what Smail (1993) describes as the ‘proximal’ 
domain, where they appear in the guise of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ acts carried out by 
individuals, rather than drawing attention to the role of ‘distal’ socio-economic 
powers in the genesis of personal distress.   Liberal humanism is, as Eagleton (1983: 
207) puts it, ‘a suburban moral ideology, limited in practice to largely interpersonal 
matters [and] stronger on adultery than on armaments.’
If Kitwood’s work does not entirely dismiss the significance of distal, socio-economic 
and historical forces in the experience of dementia, it directs attention away from 
them on the grounds that the best we can achieve within the proximal sphere of 
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influence, when providing care for people with dementia, is to make moment-by- 
moment individual moral decisions to act well or badly.  At the same time, the need 
for political action to redistribute wealth in order to provide properly for the care of 
older people on the basis of need, and to improve the pay and conditions of care 
workers, is endlessly deferred.  It is implicit in Kitwood’s work on organizational 
defence that to suggest such things are important is to be in a state of denial, to seek 
excuses for the shortcomings of one’s own care, to refuse to look into one’s own heart 
and mind for the source of the problem. 
In the following analysis of students’ work based on Ex Memoria I suggest that a 
number of symptomatic points emerge, and that these cannot be explained solely by 
the style or content of the film itself. First, whilst there were indications of empathic 
identification with Eva, very often this was expressed in terms of her helplessness, 
passivity and dependence.  Scenes which imply sexual interest or desire, potentially 
racist sentiments, or possible wartime collaboration on Eva’s part, for example, were 
frequently either overlooked or rendered innocuous in the accounts participants gave 
of them.   Second, other characters – the care staff, and particularly Eva’s family – 
often attracted a kind of moral opprobrium which seemed disproportionate to their 
actions.  This was particularly noticeable in the identification of types of personal 
detraction, Kitwood’s indicators of a ‘malignant social psychology’.  A number of 
viewers generalise their identification of personal detractions suggesting, for example, 
that members of the care staff ‘use infantilisation, banishment, and invalidation 
against Eva’, but without linking this to any specific incident. Finally there is a 
tendency to disregard what Eva and, to a lesser degree, the other characters in the film 
actually say.  These findings are discussed below with reference to film techniques, 
the impact of Kitwood’s psycho-social model of dementia on viewers’ responses, and 
Jacoby’s theory of social amnesia (1975; 1996).
Empathic identification with Eva:  the past in the present
A stated intention of the film is to make people think differently about dementia 
through the device of the face to face encounter with Eva.   Reviewers commented on 
the different perspective that was offered by the camera staying locked on Eva
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The camera shots indicate how a person confined to a chair for long periods  
may only see a limited range of activities at a certain height
The focus on Eva, particularly her face, was compelling, made you…think  
about the different set of realities the staff and Eva were experiencing
The film also suggests in numerous ways that Eva’s wartime experiences are 
colouring her understanding of where she is now; that she associates the care home 
with things she believed were over, and with places that she had managed to avoid in 
the past by living on her wits.  Almost all viewers make some mention of the 
traumatic nature of the events shown in the first scene and three make specific 
reference to post traumatic stress and the flashbacks which characterise it
Eva is recalling a traumatic event from her native Poland
Symptoms of post-traumatic stress such as auditory and visual experiences  
can cause flashbacks for people like Eva who have lived through war  
experiences.
A number of participants also identify specific ‘reminders’ of Eva’s wartime 
experience in the present day care home.  
She perhaps believes the place to be a concentration camp and this is why she  
tries to ‘escape’
Wartime songs and shouting may well be reminiscent of memories she has  
kept locked away
I wondered whether during the Nazi occupation of her country she had either  
used her sexuality or been sexually exploited in obtaining her freedom
The home makes her feel as she did in the war, so she tries to create change  
by drawing upon the skills she used then
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In addition, two students showed evidence of having done further research themselves 
to follow up on the historical leads
In the Nazi death camps signs of age or physical or mental illness could be a  
death sentence….Ageing and loss of status can lead clients to a sense of  
helplessness..and can reawaken emotions and fears associated with their  
captivity experience (Brainin and Treicher, 1997)
Cooke and Matarasso (2005) note the ‘lack of acknowledgement by health  
professionals of traumatic life events’.
This aspect of the film was not, however, consistently picked up on by viewers.  Two 
participants make no reference at all to historical events in their analysis of the film, 
while three more refer only briefly or vaguely to ‘experiences’ and ‘roles adopted’ 
during the war.  Although this is a small study, there are some indications – as 
discussed further below – that viewers who made little or no reference to the impact 
of historical events on Eva’s present day experience formed more negative 
impressions of Eva’s family and the care staff, than those who had linked her 
responses and reactions with reactivated long term memories.  
Personality traits attributed to the older Eva
There was a consistent tendency to attribute different personality traits to the older 
Eva from those associated with her younger self. This can be deduced from the 
descriptive language used in relation to Eva in the first scene (‘frivolous’, ‘confident’, 
‘sensual’, ‘seductive’, ‘proud’, ‘self-indulgent’) and in later scenes. This appears to 
coincide with a tendency to represent the older Eva as a hapless victim of events, 
rather than someone who survived by cunning and stealth.  
I found that particular adjectives or adjectival phrases had been used very frequently 
to describe Eva in the present day care home.  These focused on her isolation, 
abandonment, helplessness and fear, whilst paying less attention to the retained 
wiliness she displays in resisting the way she is positioned by others.  Words most 
frequently used to describe the present day Eva were ‘frightened’, ‘distressed’, 
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‘alone/lonely’, ‘worried’, ‘anxious’, ‘upset’, and ‘sad’.  In all, 39 different adjectives 
are used to describe Eva in ways that position her passively, and these almost always 
carry negative connotations (eg uncertain, desperate, vulnerable, powerless, detached, 
ashamed, rejected, withdrawn, hopeless, disliked, unloved).  Whilst Eva’s resistance – 
her struggles in the bathroom, her escape from the wheelchair - is no longer seen as 
‘challenging behaviour’ to be managed by the care staff, few participants recognise it 
as having political context, as an expression of human rights either by a resident in a 
care home, or by a refugee.   Eva is viewed predominantly as an object of pity.
Some words are used with striking frequency; the word ‘frightened’ and synonyms 
such as ‘afraid’ and ‘fearful’ occur over 40 times in this body of data.  In the 
following extract the words ‘distress’ and ‘distressed’ are used four times in eight 
lines.
They (staff) are oblivious to the distress they are causing Eva….in the corridor  
Eva immediately becomes more distressed…the carers make no attempts to listen  
to the distress in what Eva is saying… Martin acknowledges Eva’s distress. 
Sometimes this becomes repetitive and even tautologous
When Eva is left in the corridor she looks frightened and afraid…left…in the  
corridor…Eva became worried and afraid. 
By contrast only nine adjectives are used which position Eva in the present day as an 
active agent, whether with positive or negative connotations, and these are used much 
more rarely (eg suspicious, flirtatious, determined, annoyed).  On the corridor of the 
care home, for example, Eva has a brief interchange with another resident, Jenny, who 
is talking to herself in a circumlocutory fashion which can be characteristic of 
dementia.  Eva tells Jenny emphatically to, ‘Shhh…Shut up!’  Participants have 
invariably interpreted this as a fearful or anxious response on Eva’s part. Whilst it is 
quite plausible that Eva’s response is based the idea that in wartime ‘careless talk cost 
lives’, the tone of voice in which Eva says this indicates – to me at least – irritation 
and contempt, rather than fear.
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Nine out of 12 viewers have commented on the scene in which Eva alleges that ‘there 
are stealers here…the blacks, the schwartzes’, but none of the nine suggest that this 
might be a racist comment about the staff.  Two have explicitly defended Eva against 
any charge of racism, locating the meaning of her words in the past. 
This is not an obvious racial comment but one which refers to the Waffen SS  
who took her brother away
Eva accuses the care staff of stealing. Her daughter fails to see that the real  
reasons for Eva’s accusations lie in the past.
In the second of these examples it is interesting to note that the viewer has 
acknowledged Eva’s reference to the staff as ‘stealers’, whilst eliding the reference to 
‘blacks’ altogether.   
In the final version of the script, it is notable that adjectives used to describe Eva in 
stage directions are more frequently active/positive than they are passive/negative. 
They include, for example, ‘proud’, ‘animated’ ‘wily’, ‘conspiratorial’, ‘knowing’ and 
‘canny’ (See Appendix 8).  It seems, however, that for whatever reason these intended 
traits of Eva’s character have remained largely unrecognised by viewers.
Attitudes of the care staff and family
The care home shown in Ex Memoria was not intended to be one which offered a 
particularly poor standard of care.  The intention was, rather, to give an impression of 
how standard care practice looks from the perspective of someone who is on the 
receiving end of it.  The original portrayal of the family changed little during the 
script development process because the biographical and autobiographical aspects of 
the film were considered to be the director’s province. From general discussion it 
seemed that the family’s behaviour was intended to be variously humorous, ironic or 
poignant, rather than reprehensible to the extent that viewers have tended to suggest. 
On the other hand, it has to be acknowledged that there seems to be something deeply 
dysfunctional about the relationship between the family members.  Helena usually 
refers to her mother, Eva, as ‘Granny’; as though speaking ‘through’ her to Robbie 
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and Jacob.  Neither of Helena’s sons speaks to their mother at any point in the film, 
and Helena herself never speaks directly to Jacob.  It may well be that if viewers have 
picked up on these tensions, even at a subliminal level, it will have influenced their 
perceptions of Eva’s family.
Negative attributions to, and generalisations about, the fictional staff in Ex Memoria 
appear if anything to be more prevalent than in the previous assignments for this 
module based on self-selected critical incidents.  Reminiscent of the ‘atrocity stories’ 
that Dingwall (1977) suggests members of an occupational group tell in order to bind 
group identity by denigrating others, the tendency to attribute blame appears here to 
be exaggerated rather than reduced.  Reynolds (2007) quotes Hall (1997) on the 
construction of professional identities through the creation of binary oppositions in 
which the qualities associated with the ‘other’ are always devalued (for example, the 
‘incompetent other’).  It may also be that the fictional care staff are more distanced 
and therefore perceived as more thoroughly ‘other’ than participants’ own colleagues 
or co-workers.  In many cases, viewers have indicated – either implicitly or explicitly 
- that they would handle things differently from the care staff in the film. 
Examples of extracts from student assignments which I would suggest are 
unwarranted based on the actual content of Ex Memoria include the following.  
There appears to be no acknowledgement of the fact that Eva has feelings, or  
concern for the fact that they may be the ones who are causing her emotional  
upset
Throughout the whole film Eva has been made to feel undervalued, useless,  
misunderstood
Transporting persons as lumps of dead matter without communication can offer  
no orientation or validation
It is evident that carers have no respect for Eva and certainly do not see her as  
being in any way equal to them
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They had very little insight into the need for interaction with a person with  
dementia and it portrayed a care home whose staff had stigmatised the residents,  
finding their behaviour ‘awkward’ and ‘difficult’
Again, I would suggest that there is a tendency towards hyperbole and over-
generalisation in many of these statements. This is particularly evident in the 
attribution of malign agency to staff.  In these extracts members of staff in the film are 
held to be causing Eva’s distress in a way that is deemed morally reprehensible, even 
when it is simultaneously acknowledged that they are unaware they are doing so.
There are many similar attributions of blame to Eva’s family; for example
Helena answers questions about the care home on Eva’s behalf, without allowing  
her to reply  
In this scene the visitor directs his questions to Helena (‘Excuse me, is this your 
mother?...’).  Helena does initially reply on her mother’s behalf, but then makes a 
rather inept and belated attempt to include her mother (‘You’re happy here aren’t you, 
Granny’), at the same time presumably trying to preserve for her sons the illusion of a 
‘normal’ family visit to a grandparent.
 
Helena is more interested in doing tasks than in chatting to Eva
When Eva speaks of ‘the robbers, the Schwartz’s and the blacks, Helen ridicules  
her and makes no attempt to understand what the underlying meaning of her  
speech may be
Robbie and Jacob do not interact well with their grandmother and ignore what  
she is experiencing.
The younger child just stared and didn’t speak – appearing not to show any  
respect
139
It is particularly noticeable that participants indicate little sympathy towards Robbie, 
Eva’s younger grandson.  They have considered the impact of his actions on Eva, but 
express little recognition of his own anxiety, boredom, and embarrassment, or of his 
mother’s tendency to push him into an emotional breach that she seems unable to 
enter herself.  Whilst Kitwood’s person-centred approach is not overtly intended to 
exclude anyone, the emphasis it places on the individual with dementia can lead to a 
culture in which blame for his or her ill-being is merely shifted onto other individuals 
who are easy targets, and endlessly recycled within the proximal zone of the family 
home or care setting.  
Identification of personal detractions: indicators of malignant social psychology
One of the most significant findings from this body of data is the over-identification 
and exaggeration of personal detractions.  A number of personal detractions were 
added to Ex Memoria during the script development stage. Most – other than in the 
bathroom scene - were intended to be ‘mild’ in nature.  The very terms adopted by 
Kitwood to describe the different types of personal detraction tend, however, to 
demonize the person who ‘commits’ them.  Whilst the malignancy of personal 
detraction is held by Kitwood to lie in the culture of the organisation, rather than in 
individual intent, the strong language of ‘mockery’, ‘banishment’ and ‘treachery’ 
suggests that such acts are knowingly perpetrated by malevolent individuals.
My own mapping exercise, prior to introducing the film into the curriculum, identified 
the following eight personal detractions
 
Disruption – Martin interrupts Gertrude’s journey across the lounge to see Anja
Intimidation – Delores to Anja, ‘We’ll have to put you by yourself’
Objectification – Grace pushing Eva in the wheelchair without telling her where she is 
being taken
Infantilisation – Helena: ‘Not been any trouble I hope?’
Invalidation – Helena: ‘There are no stealers’
Ignoring – Eva’s ‘Who’s there?’ unanswered by Jacob, talking on his mobile phone
Outpacing – Helena - Talks too quickly for Eva to keep up at the end of the visit
Imposition – Jim and Delores override Eva’s wishes in the bathroom
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In some cases it is the sheer number of personal detractions participants have 
identified that seems excessive; as many as 14 different types have been noted by 
some participants. In other cases there is a distortion of what is actually shown in the 
film.  A number of participants have suggested for example that in the scene set in the 
lounge of the care home, Delores ‘banishes’ Anja (‘An example of banishment is  
when Anja is taken to her room’), when what the film actually shows is Anja being 
told that she will be ‘put by herself’ if she can’t be quiet.  In the reported version, 
however, this admonishment becomes an act. 
This is also a good example of the concept of personal detraction foreclosing 
interpretation. The interpretation of what happens here is that Delores is guilty of 
‘banishment’ (or as one participant put it ‘Delores demonstrated incompetent  
communication skills that were lacking in warmth and understanding’).  This does not 
take into account the possibility that Delores may be anxious because the manager is 
within earshot, and that she may be seen as incompetent if she can’t keep Anja quiet 
while a prospective client/customer is being shown round the home.  Delores is a 
Filipina member of the care staff, possibly an economic migrant, and likely to be 
employed on minimum wage, or very little above it.  Underpinning this scene are 
potential themes related to profit margins in independent sector care, and the 
exploitation of workers at the bottom of the employment hierarchy.   Sassoon (2007) 
points out that a major independent sector care provider with 10,000 beds in 170 
homes pays its staff the minimum wage to work a 48-hour week.  Between 2002 and 
2005 the company’s profits rose from £6.1 million to £43.6 million. At the time of 
writing the UK minimum hourly wage for employees over the age of 22 is £5.52). 
In other examples, cause for concern arises from the character to whom the 
depersonalising action is attributed.  Robbie, for example, is frequently charged with 
‘withholding’ during the scene where he darts out of reach when Eva asks him to kiss 
her.  Here it seems that the concept of personal detraction has been used to justify (or 
perhaps even to construct) the view that Robbie is blameworthy in this situation. As 
mentioned in chapter 5, Eva does not address Robbie either as her grandson or as her 
brother in this scene, but as an object of her sexual interest.  His actions, when viewed 
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in this light, seem entirely understandable, but any sympathy viewers might have felt 
for him tends to be overcome by the pressure to ‘spot the personal detraction’. 
A final finding related to personal detraction is that participants tend to ‘borrow’ from 
the strong language of malignant social psychology.  The reference to ‘transporting 
persons as lumps of dead matter’ in the extract from an assignment quoted above (p 
137), read oddly to me at first, until I realised that this participant was merely quoting 
from Kitwood’s own definition of the personal detraction termed ‘objectification’: 
that is ‘treating a person as if they were a lump of dead matter: to be pushed, lifted, 
filled, pumped or drained, without proper reference to the fact that they are sentient 
beings [sic]’ (Kitwood, 1997a: 47).
Whilst it is often unclear whether Kitwood holds individual members of staff or the 
organisational culture responsible for high levels of personal detraction, blame is 
attributed strongly to individuals in these viewers’ analyses. Whilst the assignment 
guidelines asked students to identify examples of both personal detraction and 
positive interaction, negative attributions dominate, and the ‘scattergun’ approach to 
identifying personal detractions adopted by a number of students suggests they may 
believe that the more they can identify the better.
Inattention to ‘voice’ 
Participants frequently criticised the fictional care staff for ignoring Eva, or not 
listening to her
Carers make no attempt to listen to the distress in what Eva is saying
At no point did they listen to what she had to say
Participants themselves, however, made noticeably little reference to Eva’s lines of 
dialogue.  Where the words Eva speaks in the film are reproduced, this is often in the 
form of reported rather than direct speech, and such direct speech as there is has rarely 
been quoted verbatim. 
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Of the 14 separate occasions in the film where Eva speaks, only five were quoted 
verbatim and accurately by any student.  Four additional lines of dialogue were 
mentioned by at least one student, but in reported speech only.  Of the remaining five 
dialogue sequences three were reported inaccurately, and two were not referred to at 
all. While eight participants made reference to the first line Eva speaks in the nursing 
home (‘I think we should go home now’) only one quoted this accurately in direct 
speech.  Although simplified forms of this line such as, ‘I want to go home’ or, ‘It’s 
time to go home now’ may, on the face of things, seem reasonable substitutes they 
overlook the important point that Eva is already, in this scene, speaking to someone 
who isn’t there.  By oversimplifying her words, viewers thus tend to misrepresent her 
from the outset.
One of Eva’s longest passages of speech in the film (beginning ‘Of course, silly…I 
remember everything’ and ending ‘…time to go home now’) was mentioned by only 
one participant using reported speech and incomplete wording.  Other participants 
occasionally made reference Eva saying again, at this point in the film, that she 
wanted to go home, but without further contextualisation in terms of Jacob’s failure to 
understand which home she is talking about.  A revealing section of dialogue related 
to Eva’s avoidance of the ghetto takes place between Eva and Martin near the end of 
the film  .
Eva:                Yes, that’s right, you’ll help me won’t you?
Martin:           That’s right
Eva:                You’ll help me with my papers – they’re at home waiting for me. 
And I’ll help you.  You can do anything you want with me.  Anything  
                       you want – right here – right now .
Martin:           I…um…everything is in order
Eva:                I……thank you.
There is undeniably some ambiguity in the scripted line relating to Eva’s papers, and 
some viewers have assumed that it is the papers, rather than Eva’s family, that are ‘at 
home waiting’ for her.  This aside, it is notable that only four students make any 
explicit reference to this interchange between Eva and Martin, and only one quotes 
the words ‘You can do anything you like with me’ verbatim. Eva’s demeanour at this 
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point in the film is that of a practiced seductress; her interchange with Martin is 
described in the script as ‘a ploy’.  It appears, however, that there is a tendency to 
censor Eva’s direct (in both senses) speech in favour of a more euphemistic version in 
which she is merely seeking comfort and reassurance from Martin  .
Lack of attention to what is said by Eva and other characters in the film led some 
participants to assume that Eva had been in the Warsaw ghetto; that she was 
transported to a concentration camp; and that she was subjected to sexual abuse or 
rape there.  By contrast, the evidence in the film suggests that Eva relied on her 
feminine wiles and non-Jewish appearance to obtain papers under a false identity 
which allowed her freedom of movement, but resulted in constant anxiety every time 
her papers needed to be checked by someone in authority.  Helena’s comment to the 
visitor, ‘Mum made it through Warsaw - managed to avoid the ghetto somehow,’ 
underpins this version of events, but this is another line that is not quoted directly by 
any of the participants.
Discussion:  conformist psychology and person-centred dementia care
It seems important to reiterate, at this point, that I do not intend my analysis to imply 
that students did not complete this assignment ‘properly’.  On the contrary, they 
almost all followed the guidelines provided closely and conscientiously.   In 
attempting to trace the source of the consistent ‘symptomatic’ tendencies discussed 
above it is possible, then, to advance a number of explanations.  The first possibility is 
that the film itself has influenced viewers’ reactions.  Much of the righteous 
indignation expressed on Eva’s behalf can, perhaps, be explained in terms of the 
film’s camerawork; the cinematic insistence on the Levinasian face-to-face encounter 
with Eva which forces attention on her in order to make someone who is usually 
socially invisible the centre of attention  (see illustration on following page).  As 
mentioned in chapter 4, this effect is further intensified by the lack of point of view 
shots.  Not only do we never see things from Eva’s perspective, nor do we see them 
from the standpoint of any of the other characters.  In the process, viewers perhaps 
become so over-sensitised to Eva’s experiences that they are less aware of the 
perspective of other characters.  
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From Ex Memoria: The Levinasian ‘face-to-face’
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As a reviewer comments
We see very little of other people…around Eva because the film makes the  
viewer concentrate solely on Eva’s face
This filmic technique may well, then, have had the effect of putting Eva and her 
experiences under something of a magnifying glass.  Whilst Ex Memoria may have 
provided a particularly fertile territory for the application of Kitwood’s concept of 
malignant social psychology, I would argue, however, that the extent to which the 
film itself can be held to account for the characteristic tendencies of the assignments 
discussed above is limited.  This is for three main reasons; first similar traits were 
already present in assignments based on self-selected incidents prior to the 
introduction of the film.  It seems possible, moreover, that these characteristics have 
merely become more visible as a result of the use of film, rather than being the result 
of the film itself.  It seems likely, for example, that instances of personal detraction 
have always been over-identified by students completing this module.  In previous 
assignments based on self-selected incidents it would, however, have been impossible 
to check whether this was the case or not.   Finally, to the extent that Ex Memoria may 
have contributed to these tendencies, this is only in its filmic reiteration of some 
aspects of the psycho-social model already present in the module content; for 
example, the dyadic relationship with Eva; the camera’s positioning of her in a 
passive role and the, perhaps inevitable in film, privileging of the visual over speech.  
The theological origins of humanistic psychology
In terms of its camerawork, at least, Ex Memoria may be considered to have features 
in common with Kitwood’s person-centred approach; specifically in its creation of a 
dyadic but unequal relationship between carer and cared-for, observer and observed.  
The ‘Levinasian’ face-to-face encounter in Ex Memoria takes the film’s message into 
the idealist domain of ethics and away from the historical and political themes related 
to the return of Eva’s troubled past. ‘Levinas’ enterprise serves to remind us with 
extraordinary insistence’ Badiou (2001: 22) says, ‘that every effort to turn ethics into 
a principle of thought and action is essentially religious…ethics is a category of pious 
discourse’ (Badiou 2001: 22).  Clearly the film is also, however, capable of a deeper 
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materialist, socio-historical reading which offers a more complex view of Eva’s 
character.  Verbal clues to her story are provided if viewers are motivated to look for 
them and consider them significant.  What seems likely is that a key obstacle in the 
path of this deeper reading has been the content of the Social Psychology module and 
its underpinning philosophy. Assessment-focused students are attempting to show that 
they can ‘do’ person-centred care, by constructing the fictional care home as a hotbed 
of ‘malignant social psychology’ and Eva as a cowed victim of its uncaring staff.
 
So, I would argue, it is not merely the film’s syuzhet and style that contribute to 
participants’ construction of a fabula but the lens of the psycho-social model through 
which the film is being viewed.  Viewers, their minds ‘filled with presuppositions’ 
(Geertz 1983: 84) about ill-being related to malignant social psychology, reach the 
expected ‘common sense’ conclusions.  Eva is thus characterised as a needy, 
blameless and homogenised ‘person with dementia’, typical of those presented in 
Kitwood’s fictionalised case examples. The relationship of the more powerful other to 
the person with dementia is taken as read: the other has the power to bestow 
personhood or withhold it.  The person with dementia brings nothing to the interaction 
and is merely ‘vulnerable to the vicissitudes of others’ (Nolan et al, 2002: 209). This 
notion of the dyadic relationship between carer and cared-for stands also as a model 
of society in which people’s ‘rights’ are given to them as an act of philanthropy on 
condition that they accept their own subjectification; that they ‘know their place’. 
History would suggest, to the contrary, that human rights are never guaranteed, but 
have always had to be prised from the hand of power.
As Baldwin et al (2007) have argued recently, close engagement with Kitwood’s 
work suggests that his model of personhood in dementia is derived ultimately from 
theological rather than psycho-social concepts. His concept of personhood as a status 
granted by one person to another within a dyadic interpersonal exchange is explicitly 
drawn from the work of the Austrian theologian and philosopher Martin Buber 
(1922).   
Both Buber and Levinas saw the essence of human existence, or ‘true meeting’, as 
something to be found in the encounter between Self and Other.  For both, moreover, 
the Other is fundamentally of value as a transcendental entity which bears the stamp 
of divine creation.  That is to say, we meet God through our relationships with others. 
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The extension of this concept into areas beyond theology is evidenced by the major 
influence Buber’s work had on the development of post-Freudian humanistic 
psychology in the US.  What may appear to be a radical argument in theology – the 
idea that all human beings are a route to an encounter with the divine – leads in 
Jacoby’s view to a psychology which is merely ‘spiritualised’; which ‘confuses 
psychic first aid with liberation’ and in which ‘the human community shrinks to the 
immediacy of the I/You encounter…abstracted from historical and social reality’ 
(1975, 1996: 146-150).  As with Kitwood’s abstract ‘person with dementia’, 
conformist psychology is also, Jacoby argues, given to making pronouncements about 
abstract ‘man’ without ever arriving at an engagement with really existing people in 
their social, cultural and historical specificity.
The post-War reconstruction of psychoanalytic theory
Central to the argument of Jacoby’s text Social Amnesia, is the historical rift in the 
psychoanalytic movement which had already begun before Freud’s death in 1939, and 
became increasingly apparent in the post-WWII period.  Members of the Frankfurt 
School, including Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer remained faithful to Freud’s 
view of psychoanalysis as a critical theory of society.  Their theoretical work in the 
post-War period was, moreover, largely concerned to prevent any repetition of the 
Holocaust. Adherents of the American post-war humanistic movement, such as Adler, 
Erikson and Rogers, by contrast, put increasing emphasis on psychoanalysis as a form 
of therapy intended to bring about adaptation of the individual ego to the prevailing 
norms of society.   In the spirit of the American dream, their focus was on progress 
toward a future society consisting of ‘normal’, healthy, well-adapted individuals.
One of the key themes of Jacoby’s work on social amnesia (1975: 1996) is society’s 
inability to learn from history.  Jacoby (1996: 3-4) refers to the societal denial, or 
wilful repression, of things that are already known – the ‘memory driven out of mind 
by the social and economic dynamic of this society…the impatience to hustle through 
the past as if it were the junkyard of wrecked ideas’.  Jacoby views social amnesia as 
a ‘general syndrome…Society [ie the industrialised countries of Western Europe and 
North America] has lost its memory... the inability or refusal to think back, takes its 
toll on the ability to think’.   Although Jacoby sees social amnesia as a general trait in 
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society, his text is largely concerned to provide what he terms ‘a critique of 
conformist psychology’: predominantly the humanistic psychology which came 
increasingly to replace psychoanalytic theory in post-WWII America.
The module The Social Psychology of Dementia Care, within which Ex Memoria was 
incorporated, explicitly locates the theoretical background of the person-centred 
approach in humanistic psychology.  One of the key terms introduced in the module is 
‘unconditional positive regard’ (Rogers 1951). Emphasis on this concept as a central 
tenet of person-centred care may have led students to feel that in order to demonstrate 
their own person-centredness they should display unconditional positive regard 
towards Eva at all times, even if this involves writing about her in a way which pays 
little attention to her actions and words as they are represented in the film.  As 
Masson (1990) points out, the requirement for unconditional positive regard is at odds 
with another claimed cornerstone of humanistic psychotherapy, congruence (or 
genuineness).
In fact the therapist is not a real person with the client, for if he were, he 
would have the same reactions he would have with people in real life which 
certainly do not include ‘unconditional acceptance’, lack of judging or real 
empathic understanding.  No real person does any of the things Rogers 
prescribes in real life (Masson, 1990: 232).
Humanistic psychology thus offers a set of moral ideals, rather than insights into the 
actions and decisions of real people in real situations.  Clinically, as Masson notes, 
humanistic psychotherapy is provided in sessions of less than an hour, perhaps once a 
week, by highly trained therapists.  Kitwood promoted this as an approach that should 
be used by hard-pressed careworkers throughout the whole of the time they are on 
duty.  If, at any point, a caregiver has ‘the same reaction s/he would have with people 
in real life’, this constitutes a personal detraction and evidence of a ‘malignant social 
psychology’ in the microcosm of the care setting.
Jacoby is protesting, in Social Amnesia, against the postructuralist notion of the end of 
the ‘grand narratives’, and particularly the demise of Marxist and Freudian thought. 
He also draws attention, however, to the revisionism that was required in order for the 
original work of Marx and Freud to be rendered obsolete.  Their ideas had first to be 
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diluted, misrepresented and vulgarised by way of ‘neo-‘ and ‘post-‘ reconstructions. 
Over time, Jacoby suggests, this enabled the original work to be forgotten in favour of 
social conformism and what he describes as the ‘monotonous rediscovery of 
commonsense’ (1975: 11). The extreme irony for Jacoby is that, in this process, 
Freud’s theory of repression was, itself, repressed. The relegation to the unconscious 
of memories which are too painful to deal with, as the result of a constant battle 
between the anarchic id and the controlling superego, was re-enacted at a societal 
level. Psychoanalytic theory was repressed in favour of humanistic ego-psychology 
and its one-dimensional view of the human psyche.
In support of his argument that the Frankfurt School represents the true line of 
descent, Jacoby quotes Freud as follows, ‘Not in any beyond, but here on earth most 
men live in a hell…My knowledge, my theories and my methods have the goal of 
making men conscious of this hell so that they can free themselves from it’ (Jacoby, 
1975: 1996: 119).  Humanistic psychology, by contrast, denied that traumatic 
experience was a cause of human suffering.  For example, Adler (1927) perhaps the 
earliest of the Freud revisionists, asserted that ‘so-called trauma’ had nothing to do 
with human success or failure.  Instead, he argued, we can choose to make out of our 
experiences, no matter how grim they may be, whatever suits our purposes. 
Although Kitwood taught a final year undergraduate option module on the history of 
psychoanalytic theory for many years and was thoroughly familiar with these debates 
he did not, at any point, apply the psychodynamic concepts of unconscious mental life 
or repressed memory to people with dementia.  In his discussion of the responses of 
care staff to people with dementia, moreover, Kitwood frequently employs the 
Adlerian concepts of ego defence and adjustment to suggest that those who care for 
people with dementia often enter into a kind of collusive avoidance because of their 
own unacknowledged fears and anxieties.
The highly defensive tactic is to turn those who have dementia into a different 
species, not persons in the full sense.  The principal problem, then, is not that 
of changing people with dementia, or of ‘managing’ their behaviour; it is that 
of moving beyond our own anxieties and defences, so that true meeting can 
occur, and life-giving relationships can grow (1997a: 14, emphasis added).
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For Jacoby, social amnesia leads inexorably to the decline of theory in favour of the 
kind of quick-fix pragmatism, concern with immediate reforms and gains, and 
‘happy-go-lucky ethos’ that are evident in this extract from Kitwood.   
In order to be accepted into the new US reformulation of psychoanalytic theory, 
European existentialism had, Jacoby says, to be 
…cleansed and sterilized of its European accents so as to be fit for human 
consumption…Whatever truth there is to the clichés that European 
existentialism was spurred by the death camps and resistance to fascism…is 
too much truth for its American representatives; they want an existentialism 
that poses no threats to their optimism and good cheer (1975: 52 emphasis 
added)
Jacoby’s use of language is interesting here, in that it draws attention to the ongoing 
stigma that attached to those who had been persecuted and labelled as degenerate or 
unclean in some way.  Frosh (2008) notes that although Freud believed the origins of 
psychoanalytic theory to lie firmly in Jewish history and culture, many of its later 
Jewish proponents, subjected to anti-Semitism or ‘culturally compromised’ in various 
ways, now attempted to assimilate not just themselves, but the theory itself.  Indeed 
some, including Adler, converted to Christianity.  The theoretical outcome, according 
to Jacoby, is a psychology which is uninterested in either its own or society’s history, 
and in which society is reduced to a series of dyadic interpersonal encounters isolated 
from any material, social or historical context.
Although the connections are very apparent, Kitwood’s work does not draw parallels 
between people with dementia and other marginalised and excluded groups. 
Whiteford (2000) for example, refers to the experiences of prisoners and refugees as 
being one of occupational deprivation and social exclusion
lack of time spent engaged in meaningful occupation in the prison setting 
appeared detrimental to health and well-being…With few occupations except 
eating to provide structure and punctuate the day, and with little variation in 
time use patterns between days of the week and months of the year, they 
reported feeling ‘adrift’ in an undifferentiated sea of time (Whiteford, 2000: 
203).
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The experience of these prisoners, as described by Whiteford, is strikingly similar to 
that of many people with dementia in formal care settings.  Whiteford also quotes 
Boua Xa Moua (1998) a Laotian refugee relocated to America
…whenever you want to go anywhere, all the time, you have to wait for 
someone, I mean if they don’t come you can’t go where you want…I would 
like to go back now.  It’s much nicer and peaceful back home.  Here 
everything feels too lonely.  Everything is too much.  I always find myself lost 
in this world. (Boua Xa Moua, 1998: 101)
These words could easily be spoken by Eva in the care home, and by many people 
with dementia who are often subjected to frequent moves – from home to hospital, 
residential to nursing care - and then have to try to start again in a world where 
everything is strange.  Whiteford recognises the importance of allowing people in 
marginalised and socially excluded groups to speak for themselves.  By contrast, 
people with dementia are often ‘spoken for’ in Kitwood’s work, through the medium 
of ‘vignettes’ (hypothetical case material) and fictionalised examples.  His main text 
Dementia Reconsidered (1997) includes two lengthy passages in which he attempts to 
describe the contrasting experiences of ‘unattended dementia’ and ‘person-centred 
care’ from the viewpoint of the person with dementia.  In unattended dementia, he 
suggests, in this brief extract
…you are left in chaos, carrying the terrible sense of a loss that can never be 
made good.  Once you were a person who counted; now you are nothing and 
good for nothing.  A sense of oppression hangs over you, intensifying at times 
into naked terror; its meaning is that you might be abandoned for ever, left to 
rot and disintegrate into unbeing.  (Kitwood, 1997a: 77)
When person-centred care is provided, Kitwood suggests, the subjective experience of 
dementia is dramatically different
…you see that kind mother-person, already there, sitting beside you.  Her hand 
is held out towards you, waiting for you to grasp it.  As you talk together the 
fear evaporates like the morning mist, and you are again in the garden, 
relaxing in the golden warmth of the sun.  You know it isn’t heaven itself, but 
sometimes it feels as if it might be halfway there (Kitwood, 1997a: 85)
In Kitwood’s view, the best-obtainable – halfway to heaven – condition for people is 
manifested through signs of well-being which include assertiveness; social sensitivity; 
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creative self-expression; helpfulness; affection; and self-respect .  Assertiveness, it 
should be noted is defined in this context as ‘being able to express wishes in an 
acceptable way’ (Kitwood, 1992).  A mainstream dictionary, by contrast, defines 
assertiveness as ‘insistence; confidence; ability to defend one’s rights and opinions, 
sometimes with unnecessary zeal’ (Concise English Dictionary, 1988: 56).
Harding and Palfrey (1997: 64) suggests that Kitwood’s signs of well-being are 
‘remarkable for their neutrality or attractiveness’.  People who exhibit such traits 
would seem indeed to have reached the ideal of humanistic psychotherapy in terms of 
their ego-adjustment. In the process however ageing and the experience of dementia 
are depoliticized.  There is a danger here of reinforcing stereotypical views of the 
‘well-adapted’, compliant older person as one who is without embodied passion, 
desire, or legitimate hostility in the face of authority.  Anger, resistance, restlessness 
and sexual disinhibition are seen by Kitwood as signs of ill-being, rather than of 
legitimate self-expression. 
Kitwood’s ‘new culture of dementia care’ may in fact have a very long history indeed. 
Foucault (1967) in his critique of the 19th century ‘liberation’ of the insane by the 
Quaker reformer Samuel Tuke, points out that as evidence of a ‘return to reason’, 
Tuke required social conformity, helpfulness, industriousness and docility on the part 
of his patients; traits which sound remarkably similar to those signs of enhanced well-
being that Kitwood took as evidence of ‘rementia’.  Tuke cited the behaviour of 
inmates at the tea-parties he held at his model asylum in York, The Retreat, as 
evidence for the effectiveness of his liberal humanist approach.  The insane were, he 
claimed, ‘returned to reason’ by means of their ‘moral re-education’ 
The evening generally passes with the greatest harmony and enjoyment.  It 
rarely happens that any unpleasant circumstance occurs; the patients control, 
to a wonderful degree, their different propensities, and the scene is at once 
curious and affectingly gratifying (Tuke 1813, quoted in Foucault 1967: 249)
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This compares interestingly with a description of ‘extreme well-being’ in dementia 
from Kitwood (1992)
There has been a session of singing, with accompaniment from the piano. 
Now the pianist is tired.  Mrs D stands up and sings an old Irish song in a 
trembling voice but almost perfectly in tune, and with great depth of feeling. 
At the end tears are running down her cheeks (Kitwood 1992: 141).
Single examples such as this one can obviously be taken out of context, but we would 
search Kitwood’s work in vain for any instance of well-being attributed to an Irish 
woman who stood up in a public gathering to berate the British monarchy, swear at 
the pianist for his conventional range of music, and demand a rousing chorus of rebel 
songs.  This, I would suggest, provides a large part of the explanation for the 
somewhat conventionalised and conformist renditions of Eva’s history and character 
in students’ assignments based on Ex Memoria.
In the next chapter, I move on from discussion of my analysis of the data from these 
assignments to a consideration of social amnesia in the broader historical context of 
the lived experience of people who are now in the highest risk age groups for 
dementia, and its social and psychological impact.  
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Chapter 7) Social amnesia, retrospective trauma and the ghettoization of 
dementia
           EVA:  Of course, silly…I remember everything…
           (from the script of Ex Memoria)
 
The impact of the traumatic event lies precisely in its belatedness, in its refusal 
to be simply located, in its insistent appearance outside the boundaries of any 
single place or time.                           
(Caruth, 1995: 9)
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in 
which we live is not the exception but the rule.  We must attain to a 
conception of history that is in keeping with this insight….The current 
amazement that the things we are experiencing are ‘still’ possible in the 
twentieth century is not philosophical.  This amazement is not the beginning 
of knowledge, unless it is the knowledge that the view of history which gives 
rise to it is untenable.
                                                             (Benjamin, 1940: 248-249)
Introduction          
At the end of the previous chapter, I outlined Jacoby’s theory of the connection 
between social amnesia and conformist psychology (Jacoby 1975: 1996). During this 
study I have come to believe that the concept of social amnesia adds an important 
dimension to dementia studies for several reasons, which I will summarise here before 
developing my argument further. First, it requires a recognition that the person-
centred approach to dementia care tends towards conformist rather than critical 
thinking.  Although Kitwood’s psychosocial model is undoubtedly a significant move 
away from the biomedical model of dementia, it cannot continue indefinitely to be 
regarded as radical or innovative. From the perspective of social amnesia, the 
‘disorder of forgetting’ is located in society, rather than the individual brain.  A 
historical dimension is added which opens up the possibility of new hermeneutic 
approaches such as the concept of retrospective trauma discussed later in this chapter. 
Jacoby also suggests that the erosion of links between past and present, the increasing 
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tendency to mistake novelty for progress, means that the lessons of the past are not 
learned; history repeats itself, albeit in changed circumstances.  
This chapter also picks up on several themes introduced at the end of chapter 4, where 
I wrote about the turning point that I reached when trying to analyse the primary data 
for this study.  In this chapter I want to pursue several of the lines of flight (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987) that opened up during the six months or so that I was struggling 
with my analysis of this data.  At the point where the initial action research project 
became insufficient to narrate the action, I turned to an approach more allied to 
grounded theory.  Glaser (1998) points out that in grounded theory everything is 
regarded as data, and literature is accessed as it becomes relevant; it is not given 
special treatment.  
As often happens when we are intensely immersed in something, I found I kept 
coming across examples, similar to Eva’s, of traumatic experience returning in the 
context of dementia.  Many were anecdotal – picked up through personal 
correspondence, at conferences and in newspaper articles.  These were ‘lucky finds’ – 
the kind of chance juxtapositions that Benjamin (1929) considered the source of 
‘profane illumination’.  By following these threads, I came across other bodies of 
literature which have informed this chapter.  These are of three main types: academic 
studies on historical trauma, largely related to Holocaust survival; practice literature 
on survivors who are now in care homes, and research studies on post traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) and dementia.  
A number of themes that had originally been marginal now became insistently 
recurring ones: the centrality of wartime experience in the lives of people who now 
have dementia; the frequency with which dementia appears to lead to a reactivation of 
repressed, traumatic memories, and the analogies between the ghettoes, the 
‘concentrationary universe’1 and the situation of people with dementia today.  
____________________________________________________________________
1 The term concentrationary universe or univers concentrationnaire is attributed to the communist member of the 
French resistance, David Rousset, who used it in his testimony of life in a concentration camp, Les jours de notre  
mort (1946).  The term refers to a world beyond the bounds of normality where concentrationees are “set apart 
from the rest of the world by an experience impossible to communicate”.
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My focus in this chapter therefore shifts from close-up to wide screen; from Eva’s 
story as a specific case, to the lived experience of those people born in the first half of 
the 20th century (and predominantly during the inter-war years) who now belong to 
the main ‘at risk’ generations for dementia.  This is a vast subject area and one that I 
can only attempt to illustrate here by means of examples.
Historical trauma
LaCapra (2001: ix) writes of trauma related to major historical events that 
this problem has become crucial in modern thought in general, and is especially 
prominent in post-World War II thought bearing on the present and the 
foreseeable future.  Trauma and its symptomatic aftermath pose particularly 
acute problems for historical representation and understanding.  
Academic studies of historical trauma in recent years have tended to centre on the 
Holocaust as their subject area, and to take a specifically Jewish perspective on its 
survival and aftermath (eg Rothberg 2000; LaCapra, 2001).  Holocaust studies is 
currently a growing area and one which has much to offer in understanding the social 
processes of remembering and forgetting, and the censoring of testimony which are 
also relevant to the study of dementia. I have thus drawn on heavily on these studies 
for theoretical insights.
At the same time, it seems important to note that such studies are, essentially, studies 
of the Shoah, rather than of the Holocaust as more broadly defined (see footnote p 7). 
Critical analysis of the Nazi campaign to exterminate European Jewry is vital for the 
understanding of everyone in the post-War world, and I would not want any part of 
the argument that follows to suggest that I think this is a subject that has been given 
too much attention.  On the contrary, I have found it striking that the concept of 
historical trauma has not been employed to anything like the same extent in relation to 
those sub-groups of concentrationees who were also labelled as ‘degenerate’: 
communists, trade unionists, gypsies, gay men and the mentally ill or handicapped. 
Moreover, the full extent of traumatic wartime experience among combatants, 
refugees, civilians and evacuees seems not to have been extensively theorised to date. 
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Beyond this again are the more private and individual experiences of domestic or 
institutional violence and abuse, which might also be considered ‘historical’ to some 
extent. Corporal punishment in schools was, for example, an everyday occurrence in 
the childhood of people who are now in their 80s and 90s.  Over the following 
decades it then came, gradually and uneasily, to be seen first as a practice whose 
educational benefits were questionable, and then as possible assault.  Corporal 
punishment in UK schools was not finally abolished until 1987, and then only after 
several rulings by the European Court of Human Rights. Society’s ambivalence about 
the discipline of children still, however, seems to prevent full recognition of the 
impact of the violent physical assaults meted out in schools for so long and with 
public approval.  
To map out the whole conceptual field of historical trauma in relation to the war 
years, it may be helpful to begin by thinking of a series of concentric circles, in which 
the Shoah lies at the centre, with the Holocaust, World War, and civilian life radiating 
outwards in successive circles.  I will thus begin by outlining some real life examples 
which parallel Eva’s story in Ex Memoria, before going on to consider the broader 
contexts of historical trauma.
Jewish experience of the Shoah and late-life dementia
The central significance of remembering in Judaic culture makes dementia a 
particularly poignant condition for observant Jews.   As Rothberg (2000: 193) points 
out, a slogan often applied to the Nazi genocide by the Jewish diaspora is ‘You must 
not forget anything’. This, together with the  broader cultural imperative to 
‘Remember everything accurately’ through holidays and festivals that are all 
connected in some way with memorialisation, perhaps gives point to Eva’s statement 
in Ex Memoria, ‘Of course, silly…I remember everything’.  There is a double irony, 
here, however, in that Eva does, in fact, remember things her family never knew, have 
forgotten, or would prefer not to know.
Cook et al (2003) note that many aspects of the environment may act as reminders of 
traumatic experiences, including television news coverage of violent events, the sound 
of other people in distress, and loud noises. ‘For women who have experienced 
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captivity or violent assault, the presence of unfamiliar men or physical contact by 
male health professionals may bring up unresolved trauma-related distress’ (Cook et 
al, 2003: 1223).  David (2003) similarly notes that aspects of dementia care provision 
may trigger memories of Holocaust experience for Jewish elders, including being 
asked to take a shower, medical procedures or dental treatment, the use of 
identification tags or badges, and harsh or unpleasant smells.  An Australian TV 
documentary (ABC TV 22.10.06) reported that 50 percent of the 35000 Holocaust 
survivors now living in Australia are believed to have dementia.  The documentary 
told the story of Tonia, a woman with dementia, who had survived a concentration 
camp and then experienced progressive moves from her own home to a hostel, to 
permanent nursing care, to a dementia unit, and finally to special care, with every 
move leading to parallel memory of wartime displacement and dispossession.  
Wong (2003) relates the case of a woman with dementia in a Canadian home for 
Jewish elders whose year-old daughter starved to death in the Kaunas ghetto, 
following the German invasion of Lithuania in 1941. She herself was assigned to a 
forced labour gang.  Apart from one brother, every member of her family died.  At the 
age of 88 she was diagnosed with dementia. ‘After all the losses she has suffered, the 
burning question for her is one of life or death. And so she asks, over and over again, 
if her brothers and sisters and cousins are alive’ Wong (2003: 3).   In this context 
repetitive questioning, can be seen to have a precise historical, as well as psychic, 
origin.  It is not merely a request for attention or reassurance, but the return of 
repressed anxieties related to wartime deaths and disappearances, as the cognitive 
control which previously held them out of conscious awareness gives way.  
This ‘unlocking’ of long-term memories in dementia can lead to painful events being 
spoken about for the first time, often in ways that are shocking to caregivers or other 
members of the family.  Seidler (2007: 149), for example, recalls that for years his 
mother had told him that her sister died from an illness. Now, diagnosed with 
dementia, she was ready to acknowledge that her sister ‘had been badly beaten up by 
Nazi guards on the street.  She was never to recover…My mother could no longer 
hold the untruths that she had constructed for herself and the family, but somehow 
had to face the pain of what had happened’.  
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Coming of age in the era of global warfare
…coal and politics, invisible decades
Of rain, domestic love and failing mills
That ended in a war and then a war…
(O’Brien 1983. The park by the railway)
The direct death toll of World War II, whilst still impossible to calculate accurately, is 
currently believed to be in the region of 72 million people worldwide.  Total 
casualties are estimated at 1,962 million. If we also factor in, as survivors of historical 
trauma, the civilian relatives of the dead and disabled, this takes us to around 10,000 
million people. The current tendency to reduce War to Holocaust and Holocaust to 
Shoah, has perhaps then, much to do with the still unacknowledged damage to the 
collective psyche of all the nations involved.   On the side of the Allied nations there 
seems still to be, in popular and cultural memory, a sense that WWII was something 
of a ‘Boy’s Own’ adventure; a victorious battle between good and evil.  We may 
know, roughly, the chronological order of events; but we don’t want to muddy the 
black and white distinction between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ sides by looking too closely 
at events that have been marginalised or conveniently forgotten.  It is rather as though 
the shadows by which we recognise the past today are the wrong shape to fit what 
actually happened.  
It was, no doubt, impossible for anyone living through events as cataclysmic as those 
of WWII to conceptualise their significance at the time.  More than 60 years later, 
however, this still seems to be a process that society as a whole has not worked 
through.  The post-Holocaust world summed up by Adorno (1973) in his phrase ‘nach 
Auschwitz’ is not the world after a particular extermination camp, but the historical 
impasse that Auschwitz symbolises for the rest of the world. The world after 
Auschwitz is one in which all theorising about what it means to be human requires a 
radical reassessment, one that that by and large has still not happened. 
 Schefer (1995:  141-2) writes of growing up in wartime France as a form of 
‘mnemonic damage’
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a primal consciousness of an era of planetary destruction which has lodged a 
soul within us like a bullet or piece of shrapnel that hit us and, by chance, 
reached a centre where it could live on after having done no more damage than 
destroy a town or kill someone other than us.
This ‘mnemonic damage’ seems among other things to have led to the societal 
repression of instances of extreme and widespread trauma during WWII which, whilst 
not falling within the definitions of either Holocaust or Shoah, involved similar 
extremities of experience.  For example, 700,000 Russian civilians survived the siege 
of Leningrad, during which 1.2 million of their compatriots died from cold, starvation 
and disease in a period of only 18 months.  If not all Holocaust survivors are Jewish, 
nor were all concentration camps presided over by Germans.  Under the Nazi-Soviet 
pact, 1.5 million non-Jewish Poles were sent to gulags (forced labour camps) in the 
Soviet Union, something that has been almost erased from history following the 
Stalinist regime’s shift to the side of the Allies in 1941.  Following the bombing of 
Pearl Harbour in 1942, more than 100,000 Japanese-Americans had their property 
seized and were interned in ten concentration camps on the US West Coast until the 
end of the war (Kashima, 1980).  This has been a matter of official silence in the 
intervening years.  Only ten years ago, Feeley pointed out that there were just two 
published texts on the subject (1998: 69).  Kashima notes that for the detainees 
themselves in later life, ‘the camp experience simply didn’t exist – but was totally 
banished as it were to the darker recesses of their consciousness’ (1980: 114).  
The ‘unspeakability’ of war-time trauma, for many, has not just been a result of the 
freezing of affect believed to accompany such experiences, and discussed further 
below, but also the societal taboo on disclosure of experiences which do not conform 
to the ‘institutional underpinnings of the social order’ and which thus ‘[feed] into 
overriding forms of collective fear and anxiety’ (Neal, 1998). The still prevailing 
myth is that WWII was a ‘clean’ war ‘where people died intact and quickly; where the 
injured overcame their disabilities; where cheerful, patriotic wives and sweethearts 
waited patiently and faithfully back home’ (Bender, 1997: 343).  One result, as 
Bender points out is that subsequent generations have absorbed the ‘highly sanitised 
and stereotyped version of the War…regularly presented in various media – novels, 
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radio, and most especially the dominant forms of film and television’ (1997: 345). 
The permitted, sanitised discourses of war have been perpetuated through filmic 
representations of various kinds: discourses of patriotic stoicism (Pathé newsreels), 
selfless heroism (The Great Escape) and, more recently, humour (Dad’s Army; ‘Allo  
‘Allo).
The reality, by comparison with this publicly sanctioned myth, is that there is no 
convenient ‘episodic’ start and end point for the wars of the 20th century, or for the 
traumatic experiences associated with them.  Bender (1997) points out that those who 
were actively involved in WWII had often been brought up by parents and 
grandparents who were still grieving for relatives lost in the First World War.  
Bender suggests that ‘the damage to the older generation caused by the First World 
War, and the limited communication during the Second, increased the psychological 
toxicity of the events being experienced’ (1997: 344).  Unlike Kitwood, who located 
‘malignant social psychology’ within the interpersonal milieu, Bender here locates 
‘psychological toxicity’ in national and social history.  
The toxicity of the first half of the 20th century is, moreover, intensified even further 
when we consider that between the two World Wars came a depression which brought 
mass unemployment, poverty and ill-health.  Board of Education studies for these 
years show that in some of the worst affected areas children were found wearing 
clothes ‘that often fail to afford adequate protection and to maintain the self respect of 
the children…the meagre income upon which the families live cannot run to the 
purchase of both food and clothing’ (Eichholz et al, 1928).  For many families, it 
could not run to either.  On Tyneside, as late as 1936, over 30% of schoolchildren 
were assessed as malnourished, a figure which rose to over 70% in some areas of the 
Welsh coalfields (British Association for Labour Legislation, 1938; Pearse et al, 
1936).  (See also Molly’s story in Chapter 8).
The social movements and displacement of populations that took place during the war 
years also had their aftermath for later generations. Some stories, such as those of the 
Kindertransport and evacuation within mainland Britain are relatively well-known; 
others have received less attention.  It is estimated, for example, that by the end of 
WWII, in spite of the extreme sanctions that were taken against collaborators, there 
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were 200,000 children in France who had German fathers (Gildea et al, 2007).  In 
June 1940, the entire child population of Guernsey aged 3 to 14 years was evacuated 
within the space of a week, due to fears of a German invasion following the surrender 
of Paris.  When these children returned home in 1945, having spent the intervening 
years in mainland children’s homes or boarding schools, many of them had difficulty 
even in recognising their own parents, let alone readjusting to family life (Smith 2005, 
unpublished PhD thesis).  These two small examples indicate the many ways in which 
the ripples from these mid-20th century events continue to spread outward into the 
future, whilst having barely ever been acknowledged at a societal level.  
Dementia, retrospective trauma and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD)
Current estimates suggest that at least two-thirds of people with dementia are over 80 
(Knapp et al 2007), and will thus have lived through the war years as children or 
young adults.  When we consider the full range of situations which meet the standard 
definition of trauma, there is an increased likelihood that any older person with 
dementia may have been exposed to one or more of them.    Hunt (1997) outlines five 
types of traumatic situation, and it has been suggested (Breslau et al, 1991; Norris, 
1992) that between 40 and 70 percent of the population have experienced at least one 
of them.
1.  Subjection to, or subjecting others to, bombing and other forms of attack or 
     torture, in war, or within repressive political regimes
2.  Acts of terrorism which aim to influence organisations or governments but 
     which are directed against individuals or groups.  These include hostage 
     taking, and the explosion of bombs.
3.  Personal attacks directed at individuals such as rape, and sexual or other 
     forms of violence, within families and on the street.
4.  ‘Man-made’ disasters [such as chemical explosions or ships sinking]
5.   Natural disasters [such as earthquakes or floods]
    (Hunt 1997: 4)
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Central to my argument in this thesis, is that there is a point at which the past and 
present day experiences of people with dementia converge; that past experience is 
activated or reactivated because the person is reminded of the past by something in 
the present day.  Miesen and Jones (1997: 152) note that in some people with 
dementia their experience of the onset of the condition
reactivates unresolved pain (stemming from past trauma), be this having 
survived the Japanese concentration camps; or having lost a future (Jewish) 
husband who was first hiding and later murdered; or having participated in the 
underground Resistance; or in hiding Jewish children during the war; or to have 
[sic] been ‘kidnapped’ as an adolescent girl to work hundreds of miles away 
from home in the war industry of the occupying army and never returning home; 
or…to have survived physical, sexual and emotional abuse within the family.
To take one example, The Guardian (9.6.07) carried a story about Wanda, a Polish 
Catholic living in Britain, who developed dementia in her 80s, and became convinced 
that the police would arrive at any time to deport her.  At the age of 16 she had joined 
the Polish Resistance after her father was killed by a sniper.  Her job then for several 
months – along with other children some of whom were as young as nine – was to 
carry messages through the sewers of Warsaw.  Nicknamed Myszka (the Mouse) 
because of her smallness, she was eventually captured and sent to a number of 
concentration camps culminating in Bergen-Belsen. 
After the liberation, Wanda lied about her age to avoid being taken to a refugee camp 
and was sent instead to a cousin in London.  Here she married, and for many years 
seemed unaffected by the events she had experienced and witnessed. With the onset 
of dementia, however, she reverted to speaking only in Polish. She often mistook her 
husband for a camp guard, and believed that hostile, staring children came into her 
room.  From the standpoint of the biomedical model of dementia, such phenomena are 
passed off merely as paranoid delusions resulting from neuropathology.  From the 
viewpoint of the psychosocial model, Wanda might be seen as someone whose 
individual hardships had depleted her ability to cope with the additional challenges of 
memory impairment.  From a socio-historical perspective - as Mackenzie (2007) has 
pointed out - Polish refugees escaped an occupying force which was blatant in its zeal 
for exterminating the entire population of Poland, only to be subjected to further 
discrimination and social exclusion on their arrival in this country.  Present day media 
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reporting on asylum seekers frequently involves calls for their deportation, and it is 
more than likely that Wanda would have heard TV news reports about deportations or 
campaigns to deport people.   It might be argued on this basis, that in perceiving 
history as having turned full circle, Wanda is less deceived than we are ourselves 
when we are persuaded to think of it in terms of unidirectional, linear progress.
Nachträglichkeit: retrospective or diachronic trauma in dementia
In response to stories like Wanda’s, it is interesting to consider the phenomenon that 
Freud described as nachträglichkeit2, a retrospective or ‘diachronic’ trauma in which 
‘events of the past repeat themselves but are simultaneously restructured from the 
perspective of the present’ (Rothberg 2000: 79).  In critiques of Freud’s work there is 
some debate between those who believe that retrospective trauma results from 
inability to understand the event at the time it first happened, and those who believe 
that it is the inability to articulate what has happened  - its ‘unspeakability’ (Thoma 
and Cheshire, 1991).  De Levita (1997: 97-98) points out that ‘diachronic trauma is 
not a new trauma, but a traumatic reaction from an earlier date which at long last finds 
words to express itself – words which can convey the impact of something not 
previously experienced in this way’.
What seems centrally important, in Freud’s conception of retrospective trauma, is that 
the initial experience need not at the time have been experienced as traumatic.  The 
‘pathology’ thus ‘cannot be defined…by the event itself – which may or may not be 
catastrophic, and may not traumatize everyone equally’ (Caruth 1995: 4).   It is, 
rather, the later recognition of the ‘real’ nature of the event, by means of some form of 
repetition, or ‘with hindsight’ revelation, that brings past and present together in a 
new form of awareness.
________________________________________________________________
2 Translated in the Standard Edition of Freud’s work as ‘deferred action’, nachtraglichkeit is another 
German term that eludes exact translation; ‘retrospective (or diachronic) trauma’ seems closer to 
Freud’s intention.  In French it is translated as après coup or ‘after shock’.
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Coleman and Mills (1997) for example, report the case of a man with dementia, now 
living in a care home, who had been held in the Japanese prisoner of war camp at 
Changi, and was haunted by memories of the cruelty of his treatment there.  ‘As he 
told his stories of the camp, he occasionally screamed orders in Japanese.  It was as if 
he relived those days, and heard once again the voices of those guards who had been 
in total control of his life. The progression of his illness appeared to have little effect 
on his memories’ (1997: 171).  
In dementia, I suggest, anything that has been experienced as traumatic in the past is 
likely to reappear in the form of retrospective trauma, and that even something non-
traumatic, in the strict sense, can still be activated as trauma by association, because 
of its repetition ‘out of time’.  Perceptions of being back in a factory, or a barracks, or 
of having no food to give one’s children, or needing to pay bills, can turn what may 
have previously appeared to be benign memories into malignant ones through a 
process of association. As discussed in chapter 3, such experiences also have much in 
common with Freud’s notion of the uncanny; that is to say that, ‘among the instances 
of frightening things there must be one class in which the frightening element can be 
shown to be something repressed which recurs.  This class of frightening things would 
then constitute the uncanny; and it must be a matter of indifference whether what is 
uncanny was itself originally frightening or whether it carried some other affect’ 
(Freud 1919 in Strachey 1953: 217).  
Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and dementia: a review of research studies
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is the clinical term used today for symptoms of 
initial psychic numbing following a traumatic experience, followed by delayed 
intrusive recollection, and/or hyper-arousal.  PTSD has only been recognised as a 
psychiatric disorder since 1980, but appears remarkably similar to the phenomenon 
Freud described as nachträglichkeit.  As Caruth (1995: 5) notes, ‘If PTSD must be 
understood as a pathological symptom, then it is not so much a symptom of the 
unconscious, as it is a symptom of history.  The traumatized, we might say, carry an 
impossible history within them, or they become themselves the symptom of a history 
that they cannot entirely possess.’
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Some form of the condition now known as PTSD has been recognised since at least 
the time of the American Civil War, when it was known as ‘soldier’s heart’ (Engel 
2004). In the intervening years similar symptoms have variously been described as 
neurasthenia (or ‘shell shock’), combat fatigue, and combat stress.  During World 
War II it was recognised that civilians, internees, and evacuees were at risk of 
developing similar symptoms in response to war-related traumatic events.  PTSD is 
now also recognised to be a frequent consequence of rape, child sexual abuse (Cooper 
and Kristiansen 2004) and incest (Somer 2000). Often, however, recognition of 
psychological trauma related to war or natural disasters has been hampered by official 
denial of conditions that may be held to entitle large numbers of people to some form 
of compensation.  A recent example is official denial of the existence of Gulf War 
Syndrome (Mather and Marsden 2004).  
Kessler (1995) reported that 38.8% of males exposed to combat stress developed 
PTSD.  Ursano and Benedeck’s (2003) report on a 40 year follow up of US 
servicemen who had been held in Pacific and Korean prisoner of war camps showed 
depressive symptoms and post-traumatic stress to be three to five times higher than in 
the general population.  Some studies suggest that symptoms of PTSD that are present 
in the immediate aftermath of trauma diminish over time.  For example, Kulka et al 
(1990) found that the prevalence of PTSD among Vietnam veterans was 30% in the 
year after the war and 15% 20 years later.  It is, however, in the nature of PTSD that 
reminders of the original trauma are likely to trigger flashbacks, and a renewal of the 
original symptoms may occur many years after the original event.
As early as the 1970s a correlation between prisoner of war experience and the 
subsequent development of cognitive deficits was noted.  This was attributed at the 
time to the physiological after effects of extreme weight loss (Thygesen et al 1970). 
Sutker et al (1990) found similar effects among prisoners of war from WWII and the 
Korean conflict.  A number of more recent research studies suggest that the onset of 
dementia may unleash dormant PTSD (eg Mittal et al 2001; Van Achterberg et al 
2001; Cook et al 2003).  Studies have focused on Jewish Holocaust survivors (eg 
Grossman et al 2004; Yehuda et al 2004) and US and British veterans, particularly 
those who were prisoners of war (eg Johnston 2000; Orengo et al 2001). 
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In one of the earliest studies making a specific connection between PTSD and 
dementia, Johnston (2000) describes the cases of three World War II veterans who 
developed combat-related PTSD for the first time shortly after being diagnosed with 
dementia. Johnston comments that their ability to ‘function well’ in the immediate 
aftermath of war was probably due to the cognitive effort required to keep intrusive 
images under control.  When their cognition began to deteriorate, Johnston suggests, 
these defences were lost and the images broke through.  They began to have combat-
related nightmares and to be hyper-reactive and anxious in any situation that involved 
war-associated stimuli. Other symptoms involved violent outbursts, tearfulness and a 
preoccupation with wartime experience that had not previously manifested itself.  
Grossman et al (2004: 1) similarly report on two Holocaust survivors who appeared to 
‘have adapted well, post-trauma’, but developed severe symptoms of PTSD following 
the onset of late life neurological illness.  Yehuda et al (2004) found that Holocaust 
survivors diagnosed with PTSD showed marked deteriorations in memory with age. 
Verma et al (2001) report that former prisoners of war who had dementia and PTSD 
scored higher on assessment scales for ‘paranoia’ and lower on ‘verbal agitation’ than 
matched samples without combat-related trauma. It is always difficult to know 
whether findings such as these are artefacts of the rating scales used; however, one 
way of interpreting these findings is that the former PoWs showed more behavioural 
signs of fear and avoidance, whilst continuing to talk less about their anxieties.  
In a significant paper, Cooper and Kristiansen (2004) suggest that symptoms of PTSD 
may often be overlooked in people with dementia, or, indeed, misdiagnosed as 
dementia.  Their study involved 265 clinicians, half of whom were psychologists and 
half psychiatrists, responding to a paper-based case study. The findings indicated that 
in cases where the diagnostic criteria were ambiguous, clinicians were consistently 
more likely to diagnose dementia than PTSD.  In conclusion, Cooper and Kristiansen 
(2004: 5) note that ‘clinicians need to recognize that aging may be a risk factor for 
onset of PTSD…stressful experiences that are often part of aging (eg loss of social 
supports, institutionalization) can result in a recapitulation of previous trauma and 
potentially lead to delayed onset PTSD or exacerbation of current PTSD symptoms’.
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The ghettoisation of dementia: turning the screw of history
I have argued in this chapter that all people who now have late-onset dementia lived 
through a period of history that much of society is now only able to admit into 
conscious awareness in a sanitised and mythologised form.  I have also suggested that 
the concept of history as linear progress away from that period is a myth.  Benjamin 
suggests that in order to see history stripped of the ideological myth of progress, we 
need to wake from a collective dream; from our usual somnolent acceptance of 
surface appearances (Cohen 1993: 5).  Benjamin uses the concept of the 
‘constellation’ to describe the bringing together in writing, of a montage of elements, 
so that the apparent continuum of history is disrupted.  ‘It isn’t that the past casts its 
light on what is present, or that what is present casts its light on what is past; rather…
the Then and the Now come together into a constellation like a flash of lightning’ 
(cited in Cohen, 1993: 10).  For Benjamin a constellation undermines the ideology of 
progress, an ideology that in his own time failed to foresee or prevent the growth of 
Nazism3.  My strong claim in this last part of the chapter is that there are many 
analogies between the anti-Semitism of the mid-20th century and society’s uneasy 
relationship with people who have dementia today; that dementia is being ghettoised. 
The montage of elements making up this constellation is discussed below.
Discrimination is almost invariably accompanied and fuelled by demographic panic, 
based on the idea that an undeserving or unproductive group of people are consuming 
more than their fair share of national resources.  On a surface reading, policy 
documents on dementia invariably stress the need for research into prevention or cure, 
and the improvement of care services.  Read against the grain, however, they often 
reveal an overriding concern with what has been heralded for many years now as the 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
3Walter Benjamin (1892 – 1940) - German-Jewish critical theorist who went into exile in 1933 
following Hitler’s rise to power.  He later attempted to escape to the USA via neutral Spain, but after 
being detained at the Spanish border was believed to have taken his own life rather than be deported 
back to Germany. In 2003, newspaper reports suggested that Benjamin had been murdered by Stalinist 
agents determined to prevent his critique of orthodox Marxism being published (Zizek, 2006). 
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‘rising tide of dementia’ and its material implications for the mid-21st century 
economy.  
The metaphor of the ‘rising tide’, as applied to dementia, can be traced to the title of 
an article on the demographics of dementia by Ineichen (1987) published in the 
British Journal of Psychiatry (Measuring the rising tide.  How many dementia cases  
will there be by 2001?).  This title is almost certainly, however, a conscious or 
unconscious reference to the ‘scientific racist’ text, The rising tide of color against  
white world supremacy (Lothrop Stoddard, 1920).  The metaphor of a tidal wave that 
will engulf society due to the over-representation of a particular group has no doubt 
passed into common parlance in such a way that it need not be used with any overtly 
discriminatory intention and I am not suggesting that Ineichen did so.  The point 
remains, however, that the image of a society ‘swamped’ and overrun by non-
productive older people who are about to bankrupt it has echoes of racist and fascist 
propaganda.
The recent Dementia UK report commissioned by the Alzheimer’s Society (Knapp et 
al 2007) carries on its front cover the following words, prominently displayed
by 2025 one million people in the UK will have dementia
dementia costs the UK over £17 billion per year 
This major report runs to 189 pages, but the two facts selected for emphasis are the 
number of people affected (too many) and the cost of their care (too much); there 
seems to me to be a strongly implied ‘already’ lurking beneath that second line.  The 
blue front cover of the report bears an image that resembles surging waves, or perhaps 
steeply ascending lines on a graph (see illustration on the following page).  Knapp et 
al (2007) estimate that around 700,000 people in the UK currently have dementia, but 
go on to suggest that prevalence may be up to three times higher than this figure, due 
to underreporting.  Projections suggest that, due to the ageing of the population, 
prevalence could reach 1.7 million by 2050. 
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‘The rising tide of dementia’:  Dementia UK report (2007)
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As with all disease categorisation, however, it is who we decide should be inside the 
parameters that determines the size of the category.  Projected prevalence rates for 
dementia in the mid-21st century may thus owe more to rhetoric than to established 
fact.  The most widely used diagnostic screening test for dementia the Mini-Mental 
State Examination (Folstein et al, 1975) has been found to have an 86% false-positive 
rate in people over 75 (White et al 2002) and earlier diagnosis is leading to 
increasingly blurred boundaries between mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and 
dementia.
Extending the disease category: stigma by association
In Chapter 1, I discussed the extension of the original disease category ‘Alzheimer’s 
disease/pre-senile dementia’ to incorporate increasing numbers of people with late-
onset dementia.  The Alzheimer’s movement increasingly pursues its quest for 
research funding by extending this category to take in all cases of apparent memory 
impairment, however mild. Although mild cognitive impairment (MCI) is currently 
estimated to progress to ‘full blown’ dementia in only one in three cases (Fleischer et 
al, 2007) US studies are beginning to appear which conflate MCI and Alzheimer’s 
disease.  In their otherwise valuable study of social disenfranchisement in people over 
65, Beard and Fox (2008), for example, muddy the water considerably by treating 
people diagnosed with MCI and those with ‘early-stage dementia’ as a single 
population with ‘Alzheimer’s disease’.  Beard and Fox go on to note, without 
conscious irony, that among the research participants they chose to amalgamate 
diagnostically in this way, ‘the lack of consensus on what comprises normal age-
related memory loss was a major obstacle in the incorporation of the disease identity’ 
(2008: 1512 emphasis added).  
The demand for earlier and earlier diagnosis of ‘Alzheimer’s’ thus appears, in many 
cases, to be leading to a tentative and provisional diagnosis - as ‘MCI’ - of what may 
well be part of the continuum of normal age-related memory impairment experienced 
to some extent by all older people.   In the process, however, a climate of fear is 
created in which the most transient example of ‘memory lag’ provokes fears of 
terminal decline. Fear of not being able to remember may, indeed, become a self-
172
fulfilling prophecy, since anxiety has been reported as one of the most significant 
factors in predicting whether those diagnosed with MCI ultimately go on to develop 
dementia (Palmer et al, 2007).  In an article on stigma and Alzheimer’s disease, 
Scholl and Sabat (2008) report on a number of studies which suggest that people who 
have low confidence and self-esteem are likely to perform poorly on tests of recall, 
and also on tests used to screen for cognitive impairment such as the Mini-mental 
State Examination (Folstein et al 1975).  
Agamben (1999) notes that in Nazi Germany, Aryans were first distinguished from 
non-Aryans, non-Aryans transformed into Jews, Jews into deportees, and deportees 
into prisoners.  Only when no further degradation was possible and a condition of 
‘bare life’ had been arrived at did this process of categorisation end.  Similarly, it 
might now be argued that pseudoscientific means have been used to construct a 
category of ‘others’ in which the cognitively intact are first distinguished from the 
mildly cognitively impaired; the mildly cognitively impaired transformed into those 
who have dementia; those who have dementia transformed into those with 
‘Alzheimer’s’, those with Alzheimer’s into the terminally ill, and the terminally ill 
into the ‘already dead’.  At the end of both processes, what is left is the Muselmann, 
the ‘living dead’.  Muselmann, a term used in the death camps to refer to those who, 
having lost the will to live, were considered no longer human but merely as animated 
skeletons, has much in common with the imagery used in relation to people with 
dementia today (‘the death that leaves the body behind’).  
The endless extension of this category of the ‘living dead’ can be illustrated by the 
case of the author Terry Pratchett, aged 59, who was recently widely reported in the 
media to have been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease.  Pratchett has, in fact, been 
diagnosed with posterior cortical atrophy, a primarily visual disturbance that causes 
problems with reading and depth perception.  Whilst posterior cortical atrophy can, 
over time, lead to some symptoms that are clinically similar to those of dementia (eg 
misrecognition of faces), it would not even be accurate to say that Pratchett has been 
diagnosed with dementia, let alone that he ‘has’ Alzheimer’s disease.  This did not, 
however, prevent The Times (17.3.08) using his story to head up an article on the 
campaign for increased research funding for Alzheimer’s disease, with the title ‘A 
Living Death’. 
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In recent years vast sums of biomedical research funding have been dedicated to the 
pursuit of genes for Alzheimer’s disease. These research projects are justified to the 
lay population by suggestions that once such genes are identified they can then be 
eliminated.  Here there is a direct line of descent between the pre-WWII German and 
post-war eugenics and genomics projects.  Hitler was fascinated by theories of 
eugenics, developed from Enlightenment philosophies of progress, which appeared to 
offer the promise of human perfectibility.  Franz Kallman, who argued in pre-War 
Germany for the sterilization of the relatives of people diagnosed with schizophrenia, 
continued to advocate this programme with enthusiasm following his arrival in the 
USA in 1936 as a refugee from Nazism. In 1938 he wrote that schizophrenics were 
a source of maladjusted crooks, asocial eccentrics and the lowest type of 
criminal offenders.  Even the faithful believer in …liberty would be much 
happier without these…I am reluctant to admit the necessity of different eugenic 
programmes for democratic and fascistic communities…but there are neither 
biological nor sociological differences between a democratic and a totalitarian 
schizophrenic.                                                    (quoted in Rose et al 1984: 208)  
Kallman went on to become president of the American Society for Human Genetics, 
and US sterilisation programmes for the mentally ill and ‘morally depraved’ 
continued in some US states until the 1970s.  
My argument here might well be contested on the basis that, although some of the 
outcomes appear similar, there is really no comparison between the ideological 
genocide carried out in the mid-20th century and the current treatment of older people 
diagnosed with dementia.  There is, of course, no intentional programme to eliminate 
people with dementia.  There is, however, within the medical-industrial complex the 
same driving force towards the scientific perfectibility of human beings; the same 
motifs of hygiene, efficiency and progress persist.  In pursuit of this perfection, older 
people with erratic memories are, for example, subjected to experimental drug trials 
that have no benefit for themselves, in service of the greater good: the ‘eradication of 
Alzheimer’s’.
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The concentrationary universe
The quality of life enjoyed by people diagnosed with late-onset dementia varies 
considerably, but it is characterised in general by high levels of segregation and social 
invisibility.  There is considerable debate about whether people with dementia should 
be cared for in their own homes or in formal care environments; residential and 
nursing homes.  Within formal care services there is further debate about whether 
people with dementia should be in mixed care settings (with older people without 
dementia) or in specialist units, and in specialist units there is debate about whether 
people with early onset dementia (under 65) should live in the same units as those 
with late-onset dementia.  Typically, a person with dementia once admitted to formal 
care, will be moved several times, and (as in Tonia’s case earlier in this Chapter) 
these moves will often be to successively more controlling or medicalized 
environments.
MacDonald and Cooper (2007) report that currently around 50 per cent of all people 
with dementia are in care homes and that present provision will need to double over 
the next 30 years in order even to maintain the status quo.  The authors suggest that 
we are on the cusp of a national crisis of care provision.  Ballard et al (2008) report 
that, within care homes, people with dementia are often inappropriately sedated so 
that they can be dealt with by untrained staff.  Neuroleptic drugs, initially developed 
to treat psychoses in younger adults, are prescribed to 45% of older people in care 
homes and were found by Ballard et al (2008) to lead to significant deterioration in 
verbal fluency and cognition.  People prescribed such drugs were twice as likely to 
die during the course of this five-year study as those who were not.  
Rothberg (2000) suggests that it is the very interpenetration of the everyday and the 
extreme that defines the concentrationary universe. What Rothberg means by this is 
that although a concentration camp may, in one sense, be thought of as a parallel 
universe in which the unthinkable happens, it is also run along lines that we already 
recognise from everyday life, and is thus part of a continuum with the everyday. 
Arguably, even the atrocities of the Holocaust would not have been possible had we 
not already had prisons, asylums, workhouses and factories.  Similarly, everyday 
aspects of a care home can be recognised as part of a continuum with traumatic past 
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events.  Primo Levi commented that ‘the Lagers [a general term for camps of various 
kinds - labour, concentration, extermination] constituted an extensive and complex 
system which profoundly compenetrated the daily life of the country’ (Levi, 1989: 15 
cited in Rothberg).  In a similar way, the various kinds of care setting where older 
people live out their final years are present in every community, although the worlds 
within them are generally kept out of mind, and out of public view, enabling the 
population as a whole to carry on as though nothing is happening.  Within care homes 
it is not unusual for people to be deprived of personal possessions and dignity.  One 
student reviewer who felt that Ex Memoria painted too positive a picture of life in a 
care home had this to say about his own workplace, ‘You do not often see jewellery 
worn, other than rings.  Glasses and dentures are often missing; usually slippers not 
shoes are worn’.
Passive euthanasia - the hastening of death by sedation, withdrawal of food and 
hydration - is already common in dementia.  Opinion is divided as to whether 
euthanasia – either active or passive - is to be avoided in any circumstances in 
dementia (eg van Delden, 2004), or whether this is a humane and painless way of 
allowing those with no remaining quality of life to die (eg Terman, 2007). As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, there are currently hundreds of thousands of Internet pages 
related to euthanasia and dementia.  Whilst many of these provide balanced and 
reasonable arguments about the relative benefits and disadvantages of advance 
directives, and ‘do not resuscitate’ orders, others take a more robust approach to the 
withdrawal of food and hydration from people with severe dementia who are 
considered to be unable to state their own wishes.  Here too there are frequent 
references to the economic burden of care and the projected increase in numbers of 
people with dementia.
Adorno (1970) in a radio broadcast entitled Education after Auschwitz, suggested that 
we need to build awareness of the links between civilization and barbarism for the 
very reason that ‘the fundamental structure of society and its members, which brought 
it [Auschwitz] on, are today the same’ (cited in Rothberg 2000: 49).  Adorno insists 
that Auschwitz was not a single aberration that can be dismissed in the post-War 
world as something never to be repeated; rather it was a logical conclusion of the 
Enlightenment notion of human perfectibility and progress through science.  He saw 
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an urgent need to educate the post-War generations to anticipate and prevent the 
continuation of these myths (Adorno 1977) which are so evident today in society’s 
response to the cognitive changes of ageing.
        
As Funkenstein (1993: 29) says of the need to bear witness to the atrocities of the 
Holocaust, ‘We can be deprived of our identity against our will.  It is our duty to 
understand…how it can happen and to rescue as many life stories – identities or, if 
you wish, narratives – as we can out of the ashes’.  This will be the subject of my final 
chapter.
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Chapter 8)  Art, history, narrative: dementia studies and social justice
                                          
When I grow sick or mad
Mock me not nor chain me
When I reach for the wind
Cast me not down
Though my face is a burned book
And a wasted town.                   (from War Poet.  Keyes 
1942)
The orientation on the past tends towards an orientation on the future. 
The recherche du temps perdu becomes the vehicle of future liberation 
                                                                                   (Marcuse 1955: 
34)
Introduction
This thesis falls, conceptually if not entirely structurally, into two halves.  In the first, 
the original ‘compliant’ action research study, I considered the potential for art, 
particularly the visual medium of film, to challenge and humanise the predominantly 
biomedical construction of dementia which still predominates today: Kitwood’s 
‘standard paradigm’.  In the second, increasingly rhizomatic and ‘subversive’, thesis 
the interface between art and history came to be an increasingly important theme, and 
I developed a second line of argument about the need for a socio-historical 
perspective to challenge some of the more conformist tendencies of Kitwood’s 
alternative psychosocial model.  
As I have acknowledged earlier, Kitwood’s multifactorial model of dementia (1993; 
1997a) was a necessary move away from ‘neuropathic ideology’, recognising as it 
does that dementia is the result of an interplay between many factors. My argument in 
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this thesis is that that some of these factors have received much less consideration 
than others, and that as a result the debate, such as it is, has remained largely one 
between medical science and psychology.  Key among the still largely unexplored 
avenues is the period of history during which those who now have dementia grew up. 
A socio-historical perspective on dementia has the potential to open up a more 
interdisciplinary approach because it brings into the arena many other fields of social 
inquiry including the arts, humanities, social sciences and critical theory.  In addition 
to the possibility of historically-related trauma which has been my main subject here, 
a fully developed historicist take on dementia would also require, for example, a more 
fully developed exploration of the effects of standards of living and social welfare in 
the early 20th century on the subsequent health of different populations. It might also 
involve further critical analysis of changing social constructions of dementia during 
the lifetimes of those now diagnosed with the condition, since this will inevitably 
influence their own construction of what it is they are experiencing.
I have suggested here that once an older person’s short term memory starts to fail, and 
the ability to censor long-term memory is simultaneously weakened, dormant post-
traumatic stress may often be unleashed.  This is not, I would reiterate, a causal 
argument which attempts to explain why people develop dementia.  My suggestion is 
that the nature of dementia makes the repression of traumatic memories increasingly 
difficult and a ‘return of the repressed’ more likely. Thus many of what are 
considered within the biomedical standard paradigm to be ‘behavioural problems’ of 
dementia, stemming from pathological changes in brain tissue, may better be 
understood as symptoms of post traumatic stress.  I have further suggested that such 
stress is frequently triggered or exacerbated by the associations that a person with 
cognitive impairments makes between institutional care and traumatic or unpleasant 
experiences earlier in life.  Post-traumatic stress disorder seems to correspond closely 
with Freud’s concept of retrospective (or diachronic) trauma, although this has not 
been widely recognised in the field of psychiatry (Mather and Marsden 2004). 
The possibility of post-traumatic stress seems worth considering in all cases where the 
words or actions of people with dementia cause concern to caregivers, or are difficult 
to interpret.  The tendency, however, even in more enlightened care environments at 
present is to adopt, in keeping with Kitwood’s pycho-social model, a proximal and 
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synchronic approach to understanding the causes of ill-being in people with dementia. 
This tendency towards the dyadic and interpersonal is further exacerbated by the 
social amnesia which has obliterated or conventionalised collective memory of past 
events and social conditions, which often become increasingly salient for people with 
short term memory difficulties.
In Western societies where people are now living longer than ever before, the results 
of advanced brain ageing should perhaps be viewed as inevitable, and part of a 
continuum with ‘normal ageing’, rather than as a disease.  This is certainly an 
argument that Whitehouse (2007) puts forward in favour of abandoning the search for 
a ‘cure’ for old age.  Like any other human organ or organ system, however, some 
people’s brains and nervous systems will age less well than others and the reasons for 
this cannot, to my mind, reasonably be divorced from standards of social welfare 
during their lifetime.  Whilst it seems likely that dementia is a final common end-
point for many underlying causes, the widespread malnutrition of the ‘hungry thirties’ 
will, for example, have had major implications for the subsequent general health of 
those affected.   Associations between height, childhood nutrition and later 
development of dementia have recently been reported by Schnaider Beeri et al (2005) 
and Huang et al (2008). Dementia studies now needs a more robust engagement with 
questions of social justice that have been sidelined by the discourses of person-centred 
care and the new culture.
This study has moved a long way, along rhizomatic trajectories, from its starting 
point.  In this final chapter I do not want simply to ‘conclude’; to close down what has 
been opened up in the process.  Instead I wish to discuss what I think it is possible to 
do with these findings in the context of practitioner education, but also what it is not 
possible to do given the current professional and policy agendas impacting upon 
dementia care education.  As Brown and Jones (2001: 184) put it, ‘Here there is no 
sense of an endpoint having been reached.  More new opportunities are opened up for 
inspecting how the present and future might be understood in relation to alternative 
constructions of the past’.   The constructions of the past I wish to consider here are 
predominantly those of people with dementia themselves.
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The art/history/narrative nexus and dementia care education
As suggested at the end of Chapter 7, the recovery of narratives of historical trauma is 
perhaps the only way we now have left of countering social amnesia related to the 
‘war years’.  Treating the narrative biographies of people with dementia as historical 
testimony is also an important aspect of any project to develop a model of dementia 
that is based on a concept of human rights, rather than philanthropically-met needs.  
There has been a long history of silencing people with dementia on the basis that they 
are ‘unreliable narrators’ or ‘confabulators’.  From the perspective of psychoanalytic 
or deconstructive literary criticism, however, such objections can have little currency 
today when it is recognised that all our narratives are ‘multiple, multivoiced, 
discontinuous and fragmented’ (Sermijn et al 2008: 636).  The voices of people with 
dementia can thus no longer be discounted on these grounds.  
Beneath these surface arguments for excluding the voices of people with dementia, I 
suggest, lies a different unconscious fear.  People with dementia lose the ability to 
censor their own traumatic memories, and thus to conform to the ‘stiff upper lip’ 
stoicism that has characterised survivorhood in the post-War period, and has made the 
appearance of an ‘efficiently functioning’ society possible.  People with dementia thus 
become the voices of an unwritten history; they can only be listened to, or at any rate 
believed, if we are prepared to face the ‘unspeakable’ that is society’s unconscious. 
On the ‘reverse side of what is written’ as official history, as Marcherey (1978: 94) 
says, lies the collective, societal repression that is ‘history itself’.  
All of this implies that, at least in principle, a more interdisciplinary approach to 
teaching dementia studies is required, one that draws not only on the arts, but also on 
sources that have the potential to counter social amnesia through a more unflinching 
engagement with 20th century history, particularly in its less palatable aspects.  As I 
will go on to discuss in the later sections of this chapter, there are significant obstacles 
to such an approach being implemented in the foreseeable future.  I will nevertheless 
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start by outlining some educational strategies and approaches that are being, or might 
be, adopted.
Fictions, histories, and life history work 
Practitioners can, first of all, be encouraged in a variety of ways to develop their 
awareness of people diagnosed with dementia as historical beings, in the context of 
the interface between personal history and historical events.  Following its pilot use as 
part of this study, for example, Ex Memoria is now delivered regularly as part of a 
different core Level 2 module in the Dementia Studies programme.  The assignment 
associated with it has, however, been framed more specifically in the context of life 
history work with people who have dementia. In previous life history assignments it 
has been relatively rare, in my experience, for students to make reference to war-time, 
or other traumatic events in their clients’ past.  Having watched Ex Memoria, 11 of 
the most recent group of 19 students, subsequently made reference to war-related or 
other historical trauma, when they wrote up the life history of a person with dementia 
in their own workplace. To give just a few examples: one student wrote about a man 
whose mother and brother were taken to Treblinka and never returned; another about 
Mrs R who had an embarkation leave wedding, and whose husband then died of 
malaria in Africa when she was pregnant with their second child, and a third about Mr 
A who had to move house several times as a result of the wartime bombing of Bristol 
and was later sent to Korea on National Service. 
It would thus appear that the film has sensitised students to the historical events 
people with dementia may have lived through or taken part in.  As a result their 
accounts map more closely onto the actual history of the 20th century than does 
Kitwood’s ahistorical developmental model. It is still often the case, however, that 
when students come to write a real life history, they pay relatively little attention to 
the words of the person diagnosed with dementia, and they often rely uncritically on 
information that is already on record, or that can be garnered from other members of 
the family.  In one account, for example, it is implied that the coincidence of having 
been born and married in the same years as the Queen of England has been the 
defining experience of a woman’s life. This owes little to her own narrative, but 
seems to conform to the kind of retrospective conventionalisation that often shapes 
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family history.  On those occasions when it is clear that a student has drawn directly 
on the narrative of the person whose life history they are writing, this often puts a 
different slant on the events recorded.  One man talks, for example, of how, ‘the war 
smashed everything’ for him; another supplements the bald facts of his wartime 
service in Germany and Poland (already in his records) by describing how the bridges 
he was involved in building were often destroyed as soon as they were completed.
In the context of the arts and health agenda, it thus seems important to move beyond 
using sources that are simply related to the condition with which student-practitioners 
are concerned – in this case, novels and films involving characters with dementia. 
Accurate fictionalised or testimonial accounts of historical events also have 
considerable potential for supplementing students’ understanding and building 
awareness of the interplay between personal biography and public history. Such 
sources often give a different perspective on events that have been mythologised or 
sanitised in popular sources and official literature.   They can, as Bickford (2008: 138) 
suggests, resist the homogenization of history in favour of ‘a call to solidarity that is 
not reliant on bonding through shared experience, but instead is based in shared 
resistance and shared commitment to social justice’.  For example, the sense of anger 
and dislocation experienced by many returning British servicemen after WWII has 
been novelised effectively by Melvyn Bragg in The Soldier’s Return (1999), and by 
Martyn Waites, in The White Room (2005).
Part of Ian McEwan’s novel Atonement (2001), itself based on a contemporary 
memoir, describes the retreat of the British Expeditionary Force from Northern France 
in 1940.  The Dunkirk evacuation is largely remembered today for the ‘miracle of the 
little boats’; the fleet of non-military vessels that arrived to ferry British servicemen 
back across the channel.  What we are shown in the novel, by contrast, is the military 
debacle that even Churchill, at the time, acknowledged Dunkirk to be.  The following 
extract is also a good example of the interpenetration of the extreme and the everyday, 
the banal and the terrible, which Rothberg (2000) identifies as definitive of historical 
trauma 
They passed men who could barely walk for their blisters.  Some were barefoot. 
A soldier with a bloody chest wound reclined in an ancient pram pushed by his 
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mates.  A sergeant was leading a carthorse over the back of which was draped 
an officer, unconscious or dead, his feet and wrists secured by ropes.  Some 
troops were on bicycles, most walked in twos and threes.  A dispatch rider from 
the Northern Light Infantry came by on a Norton.  His bloodied legs dangled 
uselessly, and his pillion passenger, who had heavily bandaged arms, was 
working the foot pedals…[Turner saw]…a long black barge slipping under the 
bridge in the direction of Furnes in Belgium.  The boatman sat at his tiller 
smoking a pipe, looking stolidly ahead.  Behind him, ten miles away, Dunkirk 
burned. Ahead, in the prow, two boys were bending over an upturned bike, 
mending a puncture perhaps.  (McEwan 2001: 240-44) 
Late life trauma and memory disturbance related to wartime experience are the 
themes of a number of recent novels including Those Who Save Us (Blum 2004), A 
Short History of Tractors in Ukrainian (Lewycka 2005) and The Madonnas of  
Leningrad (Dean 2006). Interestingly, as with the memoir on which Ex Memoria is 
based, all three are written by women, from the perspective of a daughter whose 
parent now appears to be experiencing some form of retrospective trauma.  Whatever 
their literary merits, this again raises the questions of whose perspective we are being 
given, whose voice we are hearing, and why.  For the purposes of art or entertainment, 
it may matter relatively little if the words of a character with dementia fail entirely to 
convince (as in Ex Memoria), or if he or she is given inner monologues which seem to 
belong more properly to the author (as in The Madonnas of Leningrad).  In 
educational contexts I would argue, however, there needs to be significant 
justification for using such material in preference to the words of people with 
dementia themselves.  Whilst literary fiction, film, poetry and drama all have a 
significant role to play, and certainly a much greater one than has traditionally been 
the case in health and social care education, there cannot ultimately be any substitute 
for first person narrative.
Recovering censored testimonies
Recent years have seen the beginnings of a ‘narrative turn’ in dementia studies, but as 
Cayton (2004) and Williams and Keady (2006) have pointed out the polyvocality of 
people diagnosed with dementia can easily be overlooked in favour of a reductive 
project to ‘hear the voice of people with dementia’.  As demonstrated by the material 
from Brown and Clegg (eds 2007) discussed below, the voices of people with 
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dementia are neither singular nor unanimous.  Indeed, Bakhtin’s concept of 
heteroglossia, seems to be a particularly apt one in this context, given its connotations 
of ‘speaking in (many) tongues’ (Bakhtin 1981).  In addition, I would argue, there is a 
need to move away from the current narrow focus on narrative disclosure as either a 
form of therapy for the person diagnosed with dementia, or a service-driven 
requirement for ‘user involvement’.  What is also needed is a wider recognition of 
such narrative both as art and as socio-historical testimony.
Fine and Weis (1998: 27) write of the need to theorise and contextualise differently 
‘voices that have been historically smothered’ and to ‘relentlessly create textual room 
for counter-hegemonic narratives’.  Many people who now have a diagnosis of 
dementia will have experienced this smothering of their voices twice; once in the 
context of historical trauma, and again in the context of their current diagnosis. 
Like others of their generation, their experiences of historical trauma have been 
repressed, or suppressed, by society.  It has frequently been noted that those who 
survived concentration camps or captivity as prisoners of war, were unable or 
reluctant to talk about their experiences.  Strous et al (2005: 2288) note, for example 
that
many Holocaust survivors do not voluntarily disclose their experiences.  In 
addition, some commentators have suggested that the Holocaust, taught as 
history, has been ignored by many persons in the mental health community…
personal histories often omit features of traumatic experiences
Seidler (2007: 143) notes, similarly, that the Holocaust was ‘an event that could not 
easily be spoken about…even though it was experienced through a sense of 
overwhelming loss.’  Not only did speaking about traumatic memories mean that the 
speaker him- or herself was forced to remember them, often it appeared that no kind 
of catharsis or support was available, because other people simply did not believe: 
‘You are met with the incredulity of listeners.  The incommensurability of wartime 
atrocities, spoken of in the safety of an ordinary front room can seem like delirium or 
exaggeration’ (Appignanesi L, 2000: 129).  Not only were such disclosures 
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unwelcome, this would suggest, they were greeted from the outset as ‘false memories’ 
self-aggrandisement, or some form of neurotic over-reaction.  
Heller (cited in Sutton 1997: 155) noted the same tendency in his study of the 
experiences of ageing veterans 
When they try and speak of it the memories overwhelm them and they fall 
silent.  The British servicemen who saw Auschwitz from the inside, as prisoners 
of war, can never forget its horror.  Nor is it possible for them to understand 
why, when they came home as young soldiers almost fifty years ago, no-one 
wanted to hear the story of what they had witnessed.  Even today survivors share 
the feeling that still no-one is listening.
Ironically, the internalised shame and fear of not being believed, or of once again 
being identified as defective or weak, has contributed to an extreme fear of dementia 
among some communities.  Mackenzie (2006: 235) points out that ‘variations in the 
ways stigma is operationalised in different cultures are rooted in particular historical 
events, spiritual beliefs and traditions that have influenced the process of conformity 
in each culture’.  In older Polish people, for example, Mackenzie suggests, there has 
been a tendency to try to keep dementia within the family in order to avoid the 
renewed stigma of a condition that would have made the person a target for 
extermination under the Nazi occupation. Teaching resources thus need to reflect, 
from a historical perspective, the ethnic and cultural diversity of populations of older 
people, and the different ways in which dementia is constructed among varying 
communities. 
From confabulation to fabulation 
The second form of historical smothering of the voices of people with dementia 
results from the widespread perception that, as a result of their current diagnosis, their 
words and actions now have little importance or meaning.  It has frequently been 
assumed that due to their cognitive impairments and associated fragmentation of 
speech or unorthodox modes of expression it is not possible to ascertain the views of 
people with dementia.  This is, however, a convenient assumption; one that has often 
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been used to exclude people with dementia from decision-making or self advocacy. 
Downs (1997; 2000) for example points out that, where such assumptions are present, 
attempts to elicit the views of people with dementia are rarely made, and any 
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‘Disappearance of former serviceman with dementia’: cover of a medical textbook.
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questions that are asked may be inappropriate.   Baldwin (2006) describes this, 
tellingly, as the ‘narrative dispossession’ of people with dementia.
‘Confabulation’ in dementia has been divided into two types: momentary/provoked 
and fantastic/spontaneous (Orulv and Hyden 2006).  The first refers to a tendency to 
‘invent’ answers to routine questions that the person with dementia cannot answer due 
to gaps in short term memory.  The second is the apparent ‘invention’ of life history 
events (particularly ‘grandiose’ ones) that did not actually happen.  In neither case is 
confabulation considered to be deliberate lying.  It is, however, often described as 
‘false memory’, a problematic construct in the context of dementia for a number of 
reasons.  The first is that the ‘grandiose claim’ may actually be true, but merely seem 
implausible to listeners.  As Clegg (Brown and Clegg eds 2007: 9) notes in relation to 
his own biographical work with people with dementia, ‘If someone says they dodged 
crocodiles while they swam in the Tigris, or that they dated the Acid Bath Murderer 
you would have thought most people would find some way of digging deeper, but 
they don’t’.  In many cases, this resistance to ‘digging deeper’ is because the person is 
simply not believed.  The two people who had recounted these memories to Clegg 
both, however, go on to give accounts of the experience that seem too detailed and 
precisely contextualised simply to have been fantasised. 
In other cases, the story may be an invention, but still be a symbolic representation of 
something that has ‘truth value’ even though made up of elements that are ‘storied’ to 
a greater or lesser degree.   Often it seems to be the case that what are classed as ‘false 
memories’ are not in fact false at all, but merely stem from the belief that something 
that actually happened in the past is still happening, or is about to happen again.  As 
discussed in chapter 7 this phenomenon is perhaps often better to be understood as a 
return of the repressed, than as a ‘false memory’.  Finally, it must be said, people with 
dementia should also be recognised as capable of telling deliberate lies.  To suggest 
otherwise is to deprive them of a form of agency that has served other groups of 
marginalised and oppressed people as one of their few resources.  Benjamin suggests 
that among the greatest weapons the oppressed have at their disposal are not only 
courage and fortitude, but also humour and cunning (1999: 246).
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People with dementia may then be regarded, artistically, as fabulators, rather than 
pathologically as confabulators.  In literary criticism the term ‘fabulation’ was used 
initially by Scholes (1979) to describe a genre of fiction which, in common with 
postmodernist texts, tends to decentre the notion of genre itself.  Fabulation involves 
disruptions of temporal order and the compenetration of the everyday and the bizarre, 
the tragic and the comedic, the terrifying and the mundane.  It may be argued, then, 
that the fabulations of people with dementia, whose narratives are often fragmentary 
allusive and characterised by neologisms, can best be explored by working along what 
Parker (2005) has described as ‘the line of the Symbolic’; by being open to their 
potential to disrupt and disorganize conventional ways of seeing.  This is how I have 
approached the narrative biographies of people with dementia contained in Clegg and 
Brown’s (2007) anthology Ancient Mysteries discussed in the following section.  
This existing body of biographical material has considerable potential for being used 
educationally, particularly in situations where practitioner-students lack the 
confidence, skill or time to obtain first-person life history narrative from people with 
dementia, or indeed to believe that it is possible to do so.  It also offers a wealth of 
examples of the courage, fortitude, humour and cunning of people diagnosed with 
dementia. 
Ancient Mysteries:  In their own words….
            How slowly they return
   Like princes into the halls they once owned (Douglas, 1943)
Ancient Mysteries consists of 28 stories told by people with dementia to David Clegg 
(Brown and Clegg eds 2007).  These testimonies have been allowed to stand alone as 
personal and social history narrated by people who now happen to have dementia. 
Here there are no claims to the ‘bestowing of personhood’, but through a painstaking 
process of listening to what is already there Clegg has pieced together stories that 
would otherwise never have been heard.  Not only were a number of contributors 
believed to be more or less mute before the project began, some of the stories include 
the last words they ever spoke.  
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These stories range in length from 27 pages to two lines. Among them are a diverse 
array of characters, including the ‘Belle of Bangalore’, Lulu’s dressmaker, Sybil 
Thorndike’s maid, acquaintances of Doris Day and Amy Johnson, a Bletchley Park 
code-breaker, and a 102-year old cowboy.  There are also people whose lives have 
been blighted by war and poverty, by the early death of parents, and by sadistic 
teachers.  The broad sweep of 20th century social history unfolds alongside the quirky 
and mundane.  Ellen ends her story with the recollection that she’ll have to go now 
because she’s left a pan on the stove.  Elizabeth refers to her diagnosis as ‘Outsider’s 
disease’, and Sheila recalls the disappointment of a reunion with her newly-wed 
soldier husband due to the bromide the army had put in his tea. 
The lines from Douglas (1943) quoted at the beginning of this section seem 
particularly relevant in the context of narrative dispossession.  Douglas, a poet of the 
Second World War, is speaking of the difficulty the dispossessed have in reclaiming 
what should be theirs. For many of the contributors to Ancient Mysteries, the 
preservation of historical memories and their re-emergence in the process of telling is 
a strong theme.  ‘Such a long time ago it seems; like I’d forgotten it for centuries’ 
(Sid); ‘these things keep coming back at midnight – nothing in the day’ (Jean); ‘I 
wonder why it is I can remember these things?  I’m wondering now if I’m the only 
person who remembers….’ (Catherine). 
The stories in Ancient Mysteries contain many examples of both extreme and 
everyday historical trauma, illustrated here by extracts from the stories of Molly, 
Maria, Sid, Daisy and Catherine.
Molly’s story: everyday trauma
Molly tells what appears at first to be the story of a conventional happy childhood in 
the 1930s until we realise that, within her family, TB, diabetes, epilepsy and rickets 
carried off one member after another.  In Fig 3, I have summarised some of the main 
events of Molly’s childhood, as narrated to Clegg.  This gives added point to the 
section of chapter 7 where I discussed the impact of the depression on children 
growing up in the 1920s and 30s.  It is evident from Molly’s story that in spite of all 
her losses and deprivations she considers herself to have had a happy childhood. At 
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the same time it does not seem an exaggeration to consider many of her childhood 
experiences as examples of ‘everyday’ trauma.
Fig 3 Molly’s story: a working class childhood in the 1930s
Molly and her twin brother Jack were the youngest in a family of six remaining 
children.  Three others had died before Molly was born.  At the age of three (her 
earliest memory) she was taken to hospital with scarlet fever.  Her father used to beat 
her with a belt across her back, but she ‘wouldn’t cry for him’.  In 1931/2 her father 
was put on the dole and was never able to get a proper job after that. The family was 
means tested. All the children were ill ‘because they never got the right vitamins and 
minerals’.  Molly says she spent most of her childhood in hospital and convalescent 
homes.  One sister was epileptic, and a brother had rickets.  Another brother died aged 
11, of diabetes and malnutrition, a few weeks before WWII broke out.  The oldest 
child, Owen, had TB and was sent to Ireland to live with an aunt. Molly’s mother also 
had TB and was in a sanatorium for about eighteen months.  She died at home at 
Christmas, having ‘lost her life’s blood’, when Molly was still less than eight years 
old. ‘I remember her in the house…her body in the coffin’. Molly adds that she 
believes that her father always blamed her for her mother’s death. 
                                                                (from Brown and Clegg eds 2007: 23-28)
Molly then goes on to talk of events that would meet the criteria for extreme trauma, 
or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  She tells how, during the war, her best 
friend was killed, probably by a bomb (Molly describes it as a ‘land mine’), moments 
after they had parted outside a cinema, ‘…it dropped close by and blew her head off 
her shoulders…blew it clean off’ (Brown and Clegg eds 2007: 30).  
Narratives of extremity: Maria, Daisy, Sid and Catherine 
Although many of the stories in Ancient Mysteries are dominated by memories of war 
it is noticeable that the strands related to historical events, and those of the everyday 
are closely interwoven.  Maria, for example, talks of the little piece of family land in 
Italy with chickens and rabbits, and ‘some fresh eggs for myself…’ before revealing 
that her accordion-playing uncle was hanged there by fascists (Brown and Clegg eds 
2007: 63).  Sheila confesses that during the incendiary bombing of London she 
remembers ‘crouching in the corridor praying that if only the bombs would stop I 
would never do anything dishonest or bad again’ (Brown and Clegg eds: 83).  Sid 
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notes his own luck in getting through the war ‘without a scratch’ and being back in 
time for the street parties, but then notes ‘they were all right until you started to look 
round…then you found the realisation of it…people you’d known for years…all 
dead…all dead…I lost all my school friends.’ (Brown and Clegg eds 2007: 103)
Daisy’s account of the London Blitz is clearly one of extreme trauma
Once the siren went you were on edge all night…the worst night everyone 
cried…the top of the road was bombed…a big bombing session…you can’t 
describe the noise…I used to put pillows over my ears but you could still hear 
it…the sound of people screaming and crying…people running up the road…
little children all covered with blood…babies burnt black…you can’t describe 
it…the smell…terrible (Brown and Clegg eds 2007: 125).
Catherine’s story is, however, a particularly significant one for my purposes here, 
since it appears to demonstrate not merely the return of memories of extreme 
historical trauma, but also an allusive mode of expression that is filled with ‘dream-
like’, or surrealist, imagery
…it worked out that eventually I was going to be murdered…by this new 
umbrella or something it was…I was drowning three times an hour back then
…looking back it was the most important thing I ever did…I can’t forget it…
that the wind and rain always settled on me…but when it comes to agony the 
Germans thought they had something special…why they did it nobody ever 
knows until this day (Brown and Clegg eds 2007: 145).
Catherine’s narrative, five pages in total, suggests that she is a Russian Jew whose 
family suffered at the hands of both fascist and Stalinist regimes, before coming to 
London as refugees, where they were again subjected to anti-Semitism.  Her reference 
here to ‘drowning three times an hour’ and, elsewhere in her story, to a bath of cold 
water ‘where they put me to rest for no reason at all…until I die’, sound eerily 
reminiscent of experiments on hypothermia carried out on concentration camp 
prisoners, which involved plunging them repeatedly into freezing water (David 2003). 
‘The Germans told everybody that this is the last measure’, Catherine says, ‘they put 
me in a…what do you call it?  It looked like a bath…that was the whole point…’ 
(Brown and Clegg eds 2007: 143).  
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Once the association has been made, it seems increasingly likely that Catherine is 
referring here to the ‘final solution’, and to Nazi experimentation.  The fragmented 
nature of her speech makes it comparatively unlikely, however, that her words would 
be interpreted in this way by care practitioners.  There is, for example, the substitution 
of ‘last measure’ for ‘final solution’.  Catherine also continues from the last quote 
given above to say that the ‘bath’ was ‘a pram…they put me in a pram…a new pram 
with a wonderful big canopy’ and that the pram then ‘caught fire…while I was in it’. 
So here we have an apparent chain of associations, where attention often has to be 
paid to connections and repetitions, rather than literal meanings.
Clegg reports that Catherine laughed frequently as she told her story, and she also 
appears to identify at points with the aggressors; as in her comment above about ‘the 
most important thing I ever did’.  In another part of her story she remarks that the 
Germans ‘said I was taking their bread…They gave me a silver umbrella…I don’t 
know why I was given it…somebody must have liked me…but who liked Jews?’ This 
is followed a little later by, ‘they still tried to murder me…the Hitler people…with a 
huge umbrella…it was their new invention…and it was only me that it came for’. 
This feeling of having been singled out for some special fate is reported to be 
common among concentration camp inmates who were chosen to take part in 
experiments because they were stronger or healthier than their peers (Bettelheim 
1960).  It is, however, unclear what Catherine is referring to when she talks of a 
‘(huge) silver umbrella’.  A characteristic ‘standard paradigm’ response is to pass this 
off as dysphasia (word finding problems) particularly, perhaps, since Catherine isn’t 
speaking in her first language.  This ‘umbrella’ seems, however, to have the quality of 
a dream image whose latent meaning is perhaps different from its manifest content; a 
symbol that stands in metaphorical relationship to the repressed material that is 
striving to return (Freud 1900).
Like those of many people with dementia, Catherine’s narrative is characterised 
throughout by strikingly creative images, apparent non sequiturs, and circumlocution. 
In this it also has much in common with the work of modernist and surrealist writers. 
Indeed, Brown (2007: 9) in his introduction to Ancient Mysteries notes that, ‘Some 
[stories] are complete and can stand alongside any memoirs written in a more 
conventional manner, while others are breathtaking contortions of language 
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approaching the verbal inventiveness of Surrealist sound poetry, or the other-
worldliness of sound collage, or the cut-up experiments of William Burroughs and 
others’.  There is thus a great deal of interest to be found in narratives such as 
Catherine’s, both as history and as art, but they inevitably resist any form of 
determinate interpretation or closure.  We may never know the ‘facts’ of Catherine’s 
lived experience, but her story nevertheless has huge potential for opening up issues 
related to historical trauma, the nature of interpretation, and social justice.
The work I have undertaken during this study has already informed my own 
professional practice in many ways and will continue to do so for as long as I remain 
employed in this field.  Given the historicist slant of my thesis, however, it seems 
misguided to introduce a note of false optimism at this late stage by implying that I 
think my argument or its implications for educational practice will be taken up with 
enthusiasm elsewhere or, still less, that it will influence policy or practice.  As Brown 
and Jones (2001) write, an inevitable failure of research which is intended to be ‘in 
the interests’ of any particular group of people, is that an approach which may be held 
to work in a particular local context does not thereby come to inform national policy. 
Many of the current trends in the field of dementia care, and in Higher Education, 
work against anything I have suggested here being adopted on a broader scale, and 
perhaps even within my own immediate work area.  In the next section I will link 
these professional and policy constraints back once more to the concept of social 
amnesia.
The ‘monotonous rediscovery of common sense’
Dementia care in general is still dominated by a ‘training culture’ and, as Downie and 
McNaughton (2000) among others have pointed out, training is a technical-rational 
approach to preparing practitioners; one that involves a focussing in and narrowing 
down on particular tasks.  Education, on the other hand, involves both a broadening 
out, and a recognition that there are many different ways of approaching the same 
situation or phenomenon.  Policy sources repeatedly refer to the need for increased 
‘training’ for care staff.  The National Services Framework for Older People (DoH 
2001) identified workforce development as a priority area seven years ago.  The 
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recent dementia UK report (Knapp et al 2007: 82) recommends again that ‘Dementia 
care training should be made a core and substantial part of the training curriculum for 
nurses and social care staff.  National Minimum Standards must be developed to 
include dementia specific requirements on dementia care training’.  The soon to be 
published results of the consultation on the first National Dementia Strategy are 
certain to reiterate this message.  
There is, however, little if any evidence ‘on the ground’ of serious commitment, or 
funding to make even basic programmes of training a possibility for all direct 
careworkers; indeed many of their supervisors and line managers will not have had 
specialised preparation for this area of work.  On the BSc course at Bradford in recent 
years we have had numerous instances of students having to leave without completing 
their course because of the withdrawal of employer funding, or their inability to self-
fund due to low rates of pay.  The current reality, in spite of the repeated calls at 
policy level for ‘more training’, is that the vast majority of direct dementia care 
continues to be provided by people who have received no specific training or 
education in this field.  Mozley et al (2004) for example, found in a care home study 
that only 8 percent of direct care staff had received any in-service training on the 
psychological needs of residents with dementia.
This repeated cycle of demographic panics, followed by expensive consultation 
processes and remarkably similar policy statements which are then not acted upon, 
seems to be precisely what Jacoby was referring to when he wrote about the 
‘monotonous rediscovery of common sense’ (Jacoby 1975; 1996).  Indeed the 
concept of ‘training’ itself can be considered a ‘common sense’ one derived, as it is, 
from what Freire (1972) described as the ‘banking model’ of education; the idea that 
if some information is put into people they will perform more effectively in the 
service of their superiors.  Within this common sense approach, for example, nurses, 
who have been required since the early 1990s to have a Higher Education 
qualification in order to practice, are still to be ‘trained’ rather than educated when it 
comes to dementia care (Knapp et al 2007: 82).  These aspirations, even were they to 
be met, are low level ones, and reflect the prevailing view of dementia care as an area 
of work requiring little skill, creativity or initiative.
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The financial crisis in the NHS has led to major cuts in commissioning by strategic 
Health Alliances (SHAs) of places on nursing and other health care courses, leading 
to ‘knock on effect’ job losses in HE health studies departments.  These are not all 
new developments, of course, but part of the political and economic background 
against which the Dementia Studies programme was first developed.  Kitwood 
himself seems to have half-anticipated that this might happen.  In commenting on the 
prospects of the development of his new culture of dementia care, he wrote
There are many obstacles in the way, and the forces of reaction are strong.  It is 
conceivable that most of the advances that have been made in recent years might 
be obliterated, and that the state of affairs in 2010 might be as bad as it was in 
1970, except that it would be varnished by eloquent mission statements, and 
masked by fine buildings and glossy brochures.    (Kitwood 1997a: 133)
Although Kitwood suggests that professional hierarchies of power and commercial 
interests are among the ‘forces of reaction’ he refers to here, ultimately he comes back 
to the concluding point, something of a mantra in his writing, that the dismantling of 
individual psychological ego defences is the route to making the new culture of care a 
reality.  One of my unhappy conclusions at the end of this study is that Kitwood’s 
psychosocial model of dementia has itself been a barrier to the development of new 
perspectives.  Whilst he makes reference in passing to the impossibility of long term 
culture change within a capitalist economy, he does not at any point suggest that what 
is needed is a political campaign to agitate for the human rights of people with 
dementia.
Conclusion: ‘everything that concerns people…’
Who are the keepers of collective memories?  In the final analysis, we all are. 
The intersection of personal biography with historical events is crucial to the 
many aspects of knowing who we are and what we are to become. 
(Neal, 1998: 213)
If I have achieved nothing else in this thesis, I hope to have shown that dementia, as 
Gramsci (1971) famously said of history itself, is about ‘everything that concerns 
people’; that it is an interdisciplinary field rather than one to be pushed to the 
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academic margins, the equivalent of the locked ‘back-wards’ and out of sight care 
homes where people with dementia have so often been confined.  The social 
ghettoisation of dementia discussed in Chapter 7 appears still, however, to be 
accompanied by a degree of academic disdain.  Despite its evident potential for study 
from the perspectives of currently ‘hot topics’ such as trauma, history, memory, and 
narrative, dementia has, until recently, been subjected to relatively little serious 
critical theorising.  Whilst there are some welcome signs that this is beginning to 
change, as Johnson (2007: 96) suggests, cultural studies is also affected by social 
amnesia; ‘Cultural studies and that style of sociology often called ‘social theory’ have 
shared a fascination with the new and also, all too often, a rather short historical 
memory.  We all want to say something new about something new’.
In its humanistic faith in the potential for transformation through interpersonal 
relationships and its optimism about progress towards the ‘new culture’, Kitwood’s 
model of dementia did not locate dementia in the context of 20th century history and 
its associated denials and impasses.  Instead he presented a model of dementia care 
based on individual morality, which as Eagleton suggests can never, of itself, lead to 
political change
What it means to be a better person…must be concrete and practical – that is 
to say, concerned with people’s political situations as a whole – rather than 
narrowly abstract, concerned only with the immediate personal relationships 
which can be abstracted from this concrete whole.  It must be a question of 
political and not only ‘moral’ argument…Political argument is not an 
alternative to moral preoccupations: it is those preoccupations taken seriously 
in their full implications (Eagleton 1983: 208).
The problem today lies less in Kitwood’s original formulation of his psychosocial 
model (perhaps a necessary transitional stage between biomedical and socio-historical 
perspectives) than in its continued dominance.  One of the dangers of the conformist, 
psycho-social approach is its implied message that the accumulation of small acts of 
kindness will one day change the world; that social justice can somehow be achieved 
without social or political change, without awakening from the ‘dream history’ of the 
20th century.  Benjamin’s concept of profane illumination was precisely aimed at 
such awakening; his ultimate concern as Lukacher (1986: 277) says, is with ‘the 
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ability of language to uncover fundamental historical concealments…to give voice to 
the dead and the oppressed, whose experience has always been elided from traditional 
historical understanding’.   This also needs to become an aim of dementia studies. 
      ‘So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.’    
                                                                        
                                                                  (Scott Fitzgerald 1925/1993: 115)
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About the film, Ex Memoria
Ex Memoria is a short fiction film (approximately 12 minutes long) which attempts to 
capture some of the experiences of a woman with dementia who is living in a care 
home. The film was made with funding from Wellcome Trust’s SCIART funding 
stream and is the product of a collaboration between writer/director Josh 
Appignanesi, producer Mia Bays, and Errollyn Bruce and Andrea Capstick of 
Bradford Dementia Group.  SCIART projects are intended to use arts media to 
increase popular understanding of medical/scientific issues.
 The film focuses on the central character – Eva – a woman in her late 70s, who is 
was born in Poland, and her interactions with staff, other residents and visitors.  Ex 
Memoria is filmed in a way that attempts to highlight Eva’s view of events.  It 
challenges us to think about what she is experiencing, and invites us to consider 
what it is like to be an older person with dementia trying to make sense of past and 
present.  
All the speaking roles in the film are played by actors.  The film is divided into a 
number of scenes, as follows.  In order to help with your viewing of the film the 
characters in each scene have been identified below in the order in which they 
speak.
Scene 1:  A wood:  Poland 1940
Young Eva
Scene 2:  The lounge of a care home: the present day
Mrs Eva Lypsyc
Grace – first member of staff
Gertrude – resident with Zimmer frame
Martin – second member of staff
Anja – resident in armchair
Delores – third member of staff
The home manager
Man visiting
Scene 3:  The corridor
Eva
Jenny – resident in side room
Hanna – resident on corridor
Helena – Eva’s daughter
Grace – member of staff
Jacob – Eva’s older grandson
Robbie – her younger grandson
Boris – resident at piano
Home manager
Man visiting
221
Scene 4:  Eva’s room
Eva
Helena – Eva’s daughter
Jacob – older grandson
Robbie – younger grandson
Becky – young care assistant
Scene 5:  The bathroom
Eva 
Jim – member of staff
Delores – member of staff
Scene 6:  The corridor/lift
Eva
Grace – first member of staff
Trinh – second member of staff
Martin – third member of staff
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Dear
Study title:  Using film in dementia care education
As you know, your final report assignment for the module The Social 
Psychology of Dementia Care, which you are currently undertaking as part of 
the Dementia Studies programme, is based on your viewing of a short film – 
Ex Memoria.  I am currently undertaking research on the use of film in 
dementia care education and would like to ask for your assistance with this 
project.  I hope to find out how different audiences respond to and interpret Ex 
Memoria, and whether the introduction into course curricula of this and similar 
films is likely to be helpful in improving awareness and understanding of 
dementia.  To help with this, I would like to carry out an analysis of your 
assignment after you have submitted it.
Your participation is entirely voluntary.  If you agree to take part your 
assignment will be marked and returned to you in the normal way before I 
carry out my analysis.  This will have no effects whatsoever on the mark you 
receive for the assignment, nor will you be identified when the study is written 
up or in any subsequent publications.  Individual quotes from your assignment 
may be used, but they will not be attributed to an individual. All requirements 
of the Data Protection Act will be met when storing data related to the study.
If you do not wish to participate in the study, your assignment for the module 
will still be based on the film, but I will not retain a copy of your report for 
analysis.  If you agree to take part, and then change your mind you can 
withdraw at any time without having to give a reason.  Please complete the 
attached consent form and return this to me using the reply paid label 
enclosed.  Your early response would be very much appreciated.
If you have any questions please feel free to contact me.
Andrea Capstick,
Lecturer in Dementia Studies
Tel. 01274-235192 (UB ext 5192)
Email a.j.capstick@bradford.ac.uk
Fax 01274-236395
224
Contact person: Andrea Capstick, Lecturer in Dementia Studies
a.j.capstick@bradford.ac.uk
Tel 01274-235192
Fax 01274-236395
Short title of project: Using film in dementia care education
Please delete as necessary:
Have you read the information sheet provided? Yes/No
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the 
study with Andrea Capstick? Yes/No
Have you received satisfactory answers to any questions? Yes/No
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study
at any time and without having to give a reason Yes/No
Do you understand that you will not be identified by name in any
documents or articles based on this study Yes/No
Do you agree to take part in this study Yes/No
Signature of participant………………………………………………
Date…………………………………………………………………….
I confirm that the purpose and nature of the study and the risks involved have 
been fully explained.
Signature of investigator………………………………………………
Date……………………………………………………………………..
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Appendix 3:  Certificate of research participation
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    Bradford Dementia Group
Division of Dementia Studies
School of Health Studies
www.brad.ac.uk/acad/health/dementia
Certificate of Research 
Participation
This is to certify that during the academic year 2005/06
X X
contributed as a research participant to the following project
Ex Memoria:  an exploratory case study of 
the use of fiction film in dementia care 
education
Awarded with thanks
Andrea Capstick
Principal Investigator, Lecturer in Dementia Studies
                                       Bradford Dementia Group
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Ex Memoria:  Guidelines on completing your review (artistic technique 
and imagery).
In order to complete this review you will need to:
1)  Read through the information sheet  ‘About the film, Ex Memoria’ and the 
handout ‘How film can help us notice more’.
2)  Watch the dvd of Ex Memoria.  I’d like you to watch it at least twice, and  you 
may want to watch it several times.  If you want to watch the film with others and 
discuss it with them before writing your review, that’s fine.
NB.  Sound is important in this film.  Experiment with the volume before you 
start, set it rather higher than usual, and make sure that you and anyone else 
watching can hear clearly.
3) Write your review which can be as long or as short as you wish, commenting in 
particular on anything you think works well or badly in the film in terms of the artistic 
techniques and imagery used (eg lighting, sound, camerawork, symbolic images etc). 
How you write the review is entirely up to you but you may, for example, want to 
comment on
• points already mentioned in the handout ‘How film can help us notice more’
• other similar features of the film that you have noticed yourself
• how you think the artistic techniques used in the film relate to what you can 
work out about Eva’s life history
• how the film compares with any other representations of people with dementia 
you have seen in fiction film
It’s important for my research that you give unbiased responses, so please feel free to 
say so if there are things in the film that you think don’t work, that you found difficult 
to understand, or that could have been done better.  Remember that this isn’t a 
coursework assignment and you are not being assessed on what you write!
4)  Fill in the cover sheet with your details so that we can send you your certificate of 
research participation, and return it along with your review in the reply paid envelope 
provided, if possible by 15 September 2006. If you say that you wish to remain 
anonymous on the cover sheet, identifying details will be removed from your review 
by administrative staff before it is passed to me.
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Appendix 5:  Collective syuzhet of Ex Memoria
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Scene 1:  A wood:  Poland, 1940
We first see Eva as a young and attractive woman in wartime Poland.  She looks 
smart and proud of her appearance. She is strolling through a wood, not far from 
home, having just left her brother Adex (sic).  She calls out to him in Polish, looks to 
see if he can see her and – reassured that he can’t – experiments with a cigarette.  She 
reaches for her handbag, opens her compact and looks in the mirror.  She checks her 
make-up, puts on lipstick, and blows herself a kiss. She walks sexually and 
seductively. It appears that she is waiting to meet someone.
It is very quiet. Suddenly birds fly past.  Within a few seconds the peace is disturbed 
by the shouting of German soldiers and the sound of gunshots, followed by a struggle. 
It appears that Eva’s brother has been captured, and she hears him call out her name. 
She replies in a terrified voice and covers her mouth.  We hear a vehicle driving away, 
then once again it turns to eerie silence.
Scene 2:  The lounge of a care home: the present day
We see an older woman in the foreground staring ahead.  She says, ‘I think we should 
go home now’.  No-one responds and she looks sad and worried.  The nursing home 
looks comfortable, but the lounge is a thoroughfare – a public arena where visitors are 
shown round and residents are ignored.  The residents are of different nationalities.
Staff enter the lounge.  Gertrude is obviously feeling anxious and, when asked by 
Grace, does not know where she is going.  Gertrude asks for a cup of tea and Martin 
tells her to go and sit down, repeating information about what time tea is served.  This 
seems to displease her and she moves away muttering in German.
Another resident Anja is evidently distressed and whimpering.  Delores responds in a 
negative way by explaining she will take Anja out of the lounge for disturbing the 
others.  Eva looks distressed by Anja’s treatment.
The manager enters the room showing a male visitor around.  She explains that 
residents are ‘free to do as they please’; however, she appears nervous, especially 
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about Anja, whom she ignores.  Eva hears the manager’s voice and appears to be 
trying to make sense of what is said.  No one responds to Eva or notices her non-
verbal communication.  At the end of the scene, Grace approaches Eva from behind 
and she is wheeled out of the room, but not informed of the reason, or where she is 
going.  Eva looks worried and frightened.
Scene 3:  The corridor
Eva is wheeled down a long, dark corridor.  The environment is very institutional. 
Noises echoing around the corridor appear to cause Eva uncertainty – a man can be 
heard shouting in the background.  The doors are open; residents have neither privacy 
nor interaction.  Eva has to sit in the corridor waiting when Grace leaves her without 
explanation to deal with something else.  During this time another resident, Jenny, 
begins to talk very loudly.  This appears to annoy Eva who whispers to her to ‘Shut 
up!’  Eva and Grace continue their journey through the corridor in silence.  When they 
pass Hanna, Hanna tells Eva that she loves her.
Eva looks worried.  She is seen applying lipstick as she goes along.  She is delivered 
to a room where her daughter, Helena, and two grandsons, Robbie and Jacob, are 
waiting with flowers to greet her.  Helena initially ignores Eva, asking Grace if her 
mother has been any trouble.  Eva smiles at the boys and the flowers.  She is pleased 
to see Robbie and calls him Adeck (sic).  Helena corrects Eva, who says that Robbie 
reminds her of her brother.  Helena agrees about the family resemblance.
Boris’s piano playing disrupted by Jacob who ‘bangs on the keys’.  Helena is asked 
by the male visitor what she thinks of the home and speaks for Eva by saying ‘You’re 
happy here aren’t you?’’  Helena also mentions Eva’s escape from Poland during the 
war.  Robbie jerks Eva violently backwards and forwards in her chair, frightening her.
Scene 4:  Eva’s room
Helena looks disgusted at something she picks off Eva’s clothing.  Eva appears 
suspicious of the care staff and she confides in Helena that ‘There are stealers here’. 
When Helena asks who, Eva replies, ’the blacks, schwartzes’. Helena dismisses Eva’s 
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fears as nonsense; she sighs and walks away.  The family seem to bustle around but 
do not spend much time communicating with Eva.
Robert, Eva’s youngest grandson is encouraged to tell Eva about his holidays, while 
Helena goes to enquire about her mother’s knees.  Robbie declines, ignoring his 
mother’s request and pretending to be a robot.  Eva drops off to sleep.  When she 
wakes, she begins to flirt with Robbie, saying, ‘Such as handsome young man – give 
me a big kiss’. Robbie is embarrassed and darts away from Eva, who laughs politely.
Jacob is talking on his mobile phone with his ear plugs in.  Eva becomes disturbed by 
the sexual nature of his conversation.  She looks worried and afraid.  She can’t see 
who is there or who Jacob is talking to.  Jacob appears unaware of her distress.  Eva is 
faced away and pushed further into the room while he finishes his conversation. 
Jacob bends down to Eva; she mistakes him for her brother.  Jacob corrects her.  Eva 
tells Jacob, ‘When they come to get us….time to go home’.  She then starts talking in 
Polish.  Jacob shows kindness but says he doesn’t understand. He is interrupted by the 
return of his mother, preparing to leave.
Helena informs her mother that she has spoken to Matron and the doctor will visit her 
during the week.  The family say their goodbyes which seem rushed and without 
meaning.  Eva is left alone and deep in thought.  Becky the young care assistant 
comes in and starts to arrange the flowers.  She seems wary of Eva, and does not 
speak to her.
Scene 5:  The bathroom
Two staff members, Jim and Delores, wearing gloves and aprons, are trying to sit Eva 
on the toilet and she appears to be very upset.  Eva is physically attempting to hold 
her skirt down and Jim and Delores are tugging at her clothes, ordering her to go to 
the toilet.  Initially Eva is giggling, but she begins to protest saying, ’Not here, not 
here’.  The staff persist, ‘You know you’ve done this before’.  Eva continues to 
protest by saying ‘No’.
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Scene 6:  The corridor/lift
Eva is now being taken by Grace through another unfriendly corridor.  She is 
hyperventilating, her posture is hunched, and she appears to be rocking in the 
wheelchair.  She pulls her clothing tight around her neck and upper body.  She seems 
worried by the noisy electric lift and other equipment.
Eva is left to sit by the lift while Grace and Trinh gossip about problems in their 
private lives within her earshot.  She sees an empty hoist being wheeled out of the lift. 
After Eva has seen the lift going up she looks round at the staff, waits until the staff 
are not looking, and seizes the opportunity to escape.  The staff do not see Eva move 
from the wheelchair.  Moments later Grace shouts when she realises Eva has gone. 
Whilst they are looking for her a small bird flies in and sits on Eva’s wheelchair. 
From the shouting and sounds of a struggle it is evident that the staff have found Eva 
and she is prevented from leaving.  
Martin takes Eva’s empty wheelchair.  We then see Eva being dumped back in the 
chair.  She appears anxious, telling staff ‘You’ve got the wrong one, the wrong one, it 
isn’t me!’  Martin helps to get Eva back into her chair, and tells Grace and Trinh that 
he will deal with this.  Martin kneels down, and places his hands on Eva’s.  He 
maintains eye contact; his approach is calm and sensitive.   He tries to comfort and 
reassure Eva by telling her ‘Everything is going to be fine’.  Eva misinterprets this, 
and appears to flirt with Martin, obviously mistaking him for someone else.  Eva 
seems to think that he will help her with her papers. In a desperate attempt to escape 
confinement she offers sexual favours in exchange for her freedom, saying ‘You can 
do anything you want with me…right now’.
Martin makes no attempt to challenge Eva’s confused speech.  He is uncomfortable 
and embarrassed, but tells her that ‘Everything is in order’.  This appears to comfort 
her and she thanks him.  Martin then says that he will make a ‘nice cup of tea’ and 
leaves Eva once more alone on the corridor.  Eva looks as though a weight has been 
lifted from her shoulders.  We see the same wood as at the beginning.
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      Appendix 6:  Individual elements of syuzhet identified by participants
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Scene 1, A wood - Poland 1940 No of participants who mention
It is wartime 5
Eva is attractive/smart 4
Eva calls out to her brother/Adek 4
Eva smokes a cigarette 6
Opens handbag/compact/mirror 3
Eva puts on lipstick          10*
Eva’s walk 4
Eva waiting to meet someone 4
Silence/quiet/peace 3
Birds fly past 2
Voices/shouting 9
Gunshots           11*
German soldiers 5
Capture of Adek 6
Eva’s reaction to Adek’s capture 8
Vehicle driving away 5
Scene 2 – lounge of a care home, present day
Eva wants to go home 8
Gertrude prevented from walking 8
Martin promises tea later 9
Gertrude speaks in German 3
Anja’s distress 6
Threats to remove Anja 6
Eva’s response to Anja’s treatment 2
Manager showing male visitor round 7
Eva trying to understand what manager is saying 1
Eva wheeled out of lounge 9
Eva not informed of purpose/destination 7
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Scene 3 – The corridor
Grace leaves Eva without explanation 2
Eva’s response to Jenny’s talking 8
Hanna says ‘I love you’ 2
Eva’s second use of lipstick                    12*
Eva’s family waiting             6
Flowers for Eva 3
Helena’s query to Grace 6
Eva mistakes Robbie for Adek1                10*
Helena corrects Eva            4
Helena agrees with Eva about family resemblance       2
Boris’s piano playing disrupted by Jacob                       5
Helena responds to male visitor on Eva’s behalf           7
Helena claims that Eva is happy in the home                4
Helena refers to Eva’s escape from Poland                   2
Robbie pushes Eva in wheelchair                                  6
Scene 3 – Eva’s bedroom
Helena picks something off Eva’s clothing 4
Eva – the stealers/blacks/schwartzes 9
Helena’s dismissal of Eva’s fears 6
Robbie told to talk to Eva about holidays 1
Robbie pretending to be a robot 2
Helena goes to enquire about Eva’s knees 1
Eva falls asleep/wakes up 3
Eva flirts with Robbie/asks him to give her a kiss 4
Robbie is embarrassed and runs away 6
Jacob on mobile phone 8
Sexual nature of telephone conversation 2
Eva moved in wheelchair by Jacob 1
Eva doesn’t know who Jacob is talking to 2
Jacob mistaken for Adek 4
Jacob corrects Eva 2
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Eva explains the need to go home to Jacob 3
Jacob doesn’t understand 3
Helena informs Eva about doctor’s planned visit 3
Family kiss Eva goodbye 4
Eva left alone 3
Becky comes in/arranges flowers 3
Becky does not speak to Eva 4
Scene 4 – The bathroom
Jim and Delores wearing gloves and aprons 1
Trying to put Eva on the toilet 6
Jim and Delores tugging at Eva’s clothes 7
Eva attempting to hold her skirt down 3
Eva’s protests ‘not here, not here’; ‘No…..’ 7
Jim and Delores persist 7
Scene 5 – The corridor/lift
Eva’s signs of distress 8
Eva’s reaction to the lift 6
Eva left alone while staff gossip          11*
Eva gets out of her wheelchair          12*
Staff don’t notice that Eva has gone            2
Grace notices and shouts 4
Bird on wheelchair 3
Martin brings the empty wheelchair 1
Staff get Eva back into the wheelchair 9
Martin says he will deal with this 3
‘You have the wrong one; it isn’t me’ 6
Martin attempts to comfort Eva            11*
Eva appears to flirt with Martin  1
Eva’s misidentification of Martin             2
Eva’s concern to get her papers dealt with 4
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Eva offers herself in exchange for freedom/papers 7
Martin is uncomfortable/embarrassed 5
Martin offers reassurance          11*
Eva thanks him   2
Martin goes to make a cup of tea 5
Martin leaves Eva alone in the corridor 5
Eva smiles/looks happy/relieved 3
Wood/s 2
NB 1) *  = Most strongly foregrounded elements
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        Appendix 7:  Participant foregrounding of characters in Ex Memoria
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Foregrounding of characters in Ex Memoria
Number of participants who mentioned each character by name/title
Eva           12*
Adek   5
Grace   5
Martin   9*
Gertrude                                          7
Anja   7
Delores   5
Manager   6
Man visiting   5
Jenny   3
Hanna   1
Helena                                             7
Robbie                                                           11*
Jacob              8*
Boris                                                4
Jim                                                          6
Trinh                                                 3
Becky                                                2
NB 1)  * = most strongly foregrounded characters
       2) The manager and man visiting are not given names in the film, but appear on 
            the cast list with these titles
       3) One participant confuses Grace with Dolores; one confuses Hanna with Jenny; 
           one participant names Trinh as ‘Trish’.
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                                    Appendix 8:  Adjectives used to describe Eva 
                                    in the script of Ex Memoria
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Adjectives used to describe Eva in the script of Ex Memoria
In order of occurrence
Passive/negative
Expressionless
‘Buttoned-up’ (unclear)
Worried x 3
Suspicious x 2
Confused x 2
Fed up
Anxious
Disengaged
Scared
Alarmed x 2
Terrified x 2
Active/positive
Proud
Aware
Expectant
Animated
Wily
Conspiratorial
Wry
Knowing
Pert x 2
Wary
Determined
Quick
Wide-eyed
Canny*
Lascivious
Calm
Rapturous
Joyful
NB * Eva’s interchange with Martin is described as ‘a ploy’ on her part.
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